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The Four Books of Sentences

THE FIRST BOOK OF THE SENTENCES

ON THE UNITY AND TRINITY OF GOD

DISTINCTION 8

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Pars I.

Cap. I.

De veritate ac proprietate divinae essentiae.

Nunc de veritate sive proprietate, et incommutabilitate atque simplicitate divinae naturae vel[1] substantiae sive essentiae agendum est. « Est itaque Deus, ut ait Augustinus in quinto libro de Trinitate,[2] sine dubitatione substantia vel, si melius hoc appellatur, essentia, quam Graeci usiam vocant. Sicut enim ab eo quod est sapere dicta est sapientia, et ab eo quod est scire dicta est scientia; ita ab eo quod est esse dicta est essentia. Et quis magis *est* quam ille, qui in Exodi tertio[3] dixit famulo suo Moysi: *Ego sum qui sum. Et dices filiis Israel: Qui est misit me ad vos* ». Ipse vere ac proprie dicitur essentia, cuius essentia non novit praeteritum vel futurum. Unde Hieronymus ad Marcellam[4] scribens ait: « Deus solus, qui exordium non habet, verae essentiae nomen tenuit, quia in eius comparatione, qui vere est, quia incommutabilis est, quasi non sunt quae mutabilia sunt. De quo enim dicitur *fuit*, non *est*; et de quo dicitur *erit*, nondum *est*. Deus autem tantum est, qui non novit *fuisse* vel *futurum esse*. Solus ergo Deus vere est, cuius essentiae comparatum nostrum esse non est ».

Part I

Chapter I

On the truth and property of the Divine Essence.

Now one must deal with the truth or property, and the incommutability and simplicity of the Divine Nature and/or[1] Substance or Essence. « And thus God is », as (St.) Augustine says in (his) fifth book <u>On the Trinity</u>,[2] « without doubt a substance and/or, if this be better named, an essence, which the Greeks call an *ousios*. For just as from that which is "to be wise" [sapere], wisdom [sapientia] has been said, and from that which is "to know" [scire], knowledge [scientia] has been said; so from that which is "to be" [esse], essence [essentia] has been said. And who *is* more than that One, who in the third (book) of Exodus[3] said to his household-servant Moses: *I am who am. And you shall say to the sons of Israel: He who is has sent me to you* ». He Himself is truly and properly said (to be) the Essence, whose Essence knows [novit] not past and/or future. Whence (St.) Jerome writing to Marcella[4] says: « God alone, who has not a starting-forth [exordium], held the name of a true essence, because in comparison to Him, who truly is, because He is incommutable, (it is) as if there are not those which are mutable. For of which there is said *it was*, not *it is*; and of which there is

said *it shall be*, while *it is* not. But God is the only one, who knows not *to have been* and/or a *going to be*. Therefore God alone truly is, to whose Essence our "to be" is not compared ».

Hic diligenter advertendum est, quomodo intelligi debeant illa verba Hieronymi, scilicet: « Deus tantum est et non novit fuisse vel futurum esse »,[5] tanquam non possit dici de Deo *fuit*, vel *erit*, sed tantum *est*, cum de eo scriptum frequenter reperiamus: fuit ab aeterno, fuit semper, et erit in saecula, et huiusmodi; unde videtur, quia non est tantum dicendum de Deo *fuit*, vel *est*, vel *erit*. Si enim diceretur tantum *fuit*, putaretur, quod desierit esse; si diceretur tantum *est*, putaretur, quod non semper fuerit, sed esse coeperit; si tantum diceretur *erit*, putaretur non esse modo. Dicatur ergo, quia semper fuit, est et erit, ut intelligatur, quia nec coepit nec desiit nec desinit[6] nec desinet esse. De hoc Augustinus super Ioannem[7] ita ait: « Cum de sempiterna re proprie dicatur *est*, secundum nos bene dicitur *fuit* et *erit* et *est*: *fuit*, quia nunquam desiit; *erit*, quia nunquam deerit; *est*, quia semper est: non praeteriit, quasi quod non maneat; non orietur,[8] quasi quod non erat. cum ergo nostra locutio per tempora vairetur, de eo vere dicuntur verba cuiuslibet temporis, qui nullo tempore defuit vel deest vel deerit; et ideo non est mirum, si de Spiritu veritatis Veritas loquens dicit per futurum: *Quaecumque audiet loquetur*;[9] *audiet*, scilicet ab eo a quo procedit. Audire illius est scire, idem etiam[10] esse. A quo ergo est illi essentia, ab illo audientia, id est scientia, quae non est aliud quam essentia. *Audiet* ergo dixit de eo quod audivit et audit, it est, quod semper scivit, sict et sciet ». Ecce hic dicit Augustinus, verba cuiuslibet temportis dicit de Deo, sed tamen[11] proprie *est*. Illud ergo quod Hieronymus dicit, ita intelligendum est: non novit *fuisse* vel *futurum esse*, sed tantum *esse*, id est, cum dicitur de Deo, quod fuit vel erit, non est intelligendum, quod praeterierit vel futurus sit,[12] sed quod existat simpliciter sine aliquo temporali motu. Licet enim verba substantiva diversorum temporum de Deo dicantur, ut fuit, erit, est, erat, non tamen

Here one must diligently advert, in what manner those words of (St.) Jerome ought to be understood, namely: « God is the only one and He does not know a "to have been" and/or a "going to be" »,[5] as if there could not be said of God *He was*, and/or *He shall be*, but only *He is*, though we frequently discover written concerning Him: "He was from eternity, He always was, and He will be unto the ages," and (words) of this kind; whence, it seems, that there must not only be said of God *He was*, (but) also *He is*, and/or *He shall be*. For if there would be said only *He was*, it would be thought, that He has ceased to be; if there would be said only *He is*, it would be thought, that He was not always, but He undertook to be [esse coeperit]; if there would be said only *He shall be*, it would be thought that He is not now. Therefore let it be said, that He always was, is and shall be, so that there is understood, that He neither undertook nor ceased nor ceases[6] nor will cease to be. Concerning this (St.) Augustine On John[7] speaks thus: « Since of the sempiternal Thing there is properly said *It is*, according to us there is well said *It was* and *It shall be* and *It is*: *It was*, because It never ceased; *It shall be*, because It shall never be remiss [deerit]; *It is*, because It always is: It has not passed by, as if (It were) what does not remain; It shall not rise,[8] as if (It were) what was not. Therefore since our speech is varied throughout times, of Him there are truly said words of every time, who at no time was remiss and/or is remiss and/or shall be remiss; and for that reason it is not a wonder, if the Truth speaking of the Spirit of truth has said by means of the future tense [per futurum]: *Whatever He will hear, He shall speak*;[9] *He will hear*, that is from Him from whom He proceeds. To hear of Him is to know [scire], the same also[10] (is) to be. From whom, therefore, is His Essence, from Him the hearing [audientia], that is the knowledge [scientia], which is not other than the Essence. Therefore He

temporales motus tunc[13] distinguunt, scilicet praeteritum vel futurum vel praeteritum imperfectum vel praeteritum perfectum vel prateritum plus quam perfectum, sed essentiam sive existentiam divinitatis simpliciter insinuant. Deus ergo solus proprie dicitur essentia vel esse; unde Hilarius in septimo libro de Trinitate[14] ait: « Esse non est accidens Deo, sed subsistens veritas et manens causa et naturalis generis proprietas ».

said *He will hear* of Him who has heard, does hear, that is, who always knew, knows and will know ». Behold (St.) Augustine says here, that words of every time are said of God, but nevertheless [tamen][11] properly (speaking) *He is*. Therefore that which (St.) Jerome says, must be understood thus: He knows not a *to have been* and/or a *going to be*, but only a *being* [esse], that is, when there is said of God, that He was and/or shall be, it must not be understood, that He has passed by and/or that He is going to be,[12] but that He exists simply without any temporal movement. For though substantive verbs of diverse tenses are said of God, as "was", "shall be", "is", "used to be", nevertheless [tamen] they do not then[13] distinguish temporal movements, namely the past [praeteritum] and/or future and/or past imperfect and/or past perfect and/or past pluperfect, but rather they simply hint at the Essence or the existence of the Divinity. Therefore God alone properly is said (to be) an essence and/or to be; whence (St.) Hilary (of Poitiers) in (his) seventh book On the Trinity[14] says: « "To be" is not an accident for God, but a subsistent truth and a remaining cause and the property of (His) natural genus ».

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[1] Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 3, 8 *sive*.
[2] Cap. 2. n. 3. Cfr. etiam XII. de Civ. Dei, c. 2.
[3] Vers. 14, ubi Vulgata: Ego sum qui sum. Ait: Sic dices etc. — Immediate ante Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 5, 6, 8 omittit *Moysi*.
[4] Edd. 6, 7, 8 *ad Damasum*, attament neutro in loco haec sententia ad verbum invenitur, sed apud Isidorum, VII. Etymolog. c. 1. n. 10-13, ubi in ed. Migne (Patr. lat. tom. 82) recte observatur, locum istum potius conflatum esse ex Augustini et Gregorii variis locis, et primam partem, scil. usque ad *non sint*, sumtam esse ex August., VIII. de Civ. Dei, c. 11. — Vide etiam Rabanum, Comment. in Exod. libr. I. c. 6. — In ipso textu Vat. cum cod. A et edd. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, *tenet* loco *tenuit*, et mox cum edd. 1, 4, 7, *quasi non sint* pro *quasi non sunt*.
[5] Codd. et ed. 1 omittunt *vel futurum esse*, et paulo infra cod. D cum edd, 1, 8 ponunt *de Deo* pro *de eo*.
[6] In Vat. et cod. D nec non in edd. 4, 5, 6, 7 desiderantur verba *nec desinit*.
[7] Tract. 99. n. 45; est tamen aliqua differentia verborum in principio.
[8] Fide codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 10 necnon originali consentiente substituimus *orietur* pro *erit*. Paulo supra codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10 omittunt contra contextum *et est*.
[9] Ioan. 16, 13.

[1] The Vatican text, contrary to the codices and editions 1, 3, and 8, has *or* [sive].
[2] Chapter 2, n. 3. Cf. also The City of God, Bk. XII, ch. 2.
[3] Verse 14, where the Vulgate reads: "I am who am. He said: Thus you shall say" etc.. — Immediately before this the Vatican text, contrary to the codices and editions 1, 5, 6, and 8, omits *Moses* [Moysi].
[4] Editions 6, 7, and 8, read *To Damasus*, but, nevertheless, in neither place is this sentence literally found, but rather among (St.) Isidore, Etymologies, Bk. VII, ch. 1, n. 10-13, where in the edition of Migne (Patrologia Latina, tome 82) it is rightly observed, that that passage has rather been conflated from various passages of (Sts.) Augustine and Gregory, and the first part, that is up to *are not* [trans. note: Here the Quaracchi edition reads *non sint*, which is discordant with the text above, which has *non sunt*; but which seems to refer to the alternate reading, about to be cited at the end of this footnote], has been taken from (St.) Augustine, City of God, Bk. VIII, ch. 11. — See also Rabanus, Commentary on Exodus, Bk. I, ch. 6. — In the quote itself the Vatican text together with codex A and editions 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, reads *holds* [tenet] in place of *held* [tenuit], and then together with editions 1, 4 and 7, it has *(it is) as if there were not* [quasi non

[10] Codd. B C D E *est* loco *etiam*; cod. A *etiam est*.
[11] Codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt *tamen*.
[12] Vat. contra codd. B C D E et fere omnes edd. *praeteriit vel futurum sit*.
[13] Vat. cum edd., excepta ed. 1, *esse* pro *tunc*. Paulo infra Vat. cum edd., excepta ed. 1, verbo *divinitatis* praefigit *suae*.
[14] Num. 11. — Paulo ante Vat. et alie edd., dempta 1, addunt *suae* post *existentiam*.

sint] in place of *(it is) as if there are not* [quasi non sunt].
[5] The codices and edition 1 omit *and/or "a going to be"* [vel futurum esse], and a little below this codex D together with editions 1 and 8, puts *concerning God* [de Deo] in place of *concerning Him* [de eo].
[6] In the Vatican text and codex D, and also in editions 4, 5, 6, and 7, the words *nor ceases* [nec desinit] are wanting.
[7] Tract 99, n. 45; there is, however, some difference in wording at the beginning.
[8] Trusting in the codices and editions 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, and 10, and with the original consenting, we have substituted *It shall . . . rise* [orietur] in place of *It shall . . . be* [erit]. A little above this the codices together with editions 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, and 10, omit, contrary to the context, *and It is* [et est].
[9] Jn. 16:13.
[10] Codices B C D and E have *is* [est] in place of *also* [etiam]; codex A reads *also is* [etiam est:]. [Trans. note: here the sense is: *to hear of Him is to know of Him and to know of Him is to be from Him*.]
[11] The codices together with edition 1 omit *nevertheless* [tamen].
[12] The Vatican text, contrary to codices B C D and E and nearly all the editions, reads *He has passed by and/or that He is going to* [praeteriit vel futurum sit].
[13] The Vatican text together with the editions, excepting edition 1, reads *distinguish that there are temporal movements* [temporales motus esse distinguunt] in place of *then distinguish temporal movements* [temporales motus tunc distinguunt]. A little below this the Vatican text together with the editions, excepting edition 1, has *of His own Divinity* [suae divinitatis].
[14] Number 11. — A little before this the Vatican text and the other editions, excepting the first, add *His* [sua] after *the existence of* [existentiam].

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Cap. II.

De incommutabilitate eiusdem.

Dei etiam solius essentia proprie incommutabilis dicitur, quia nec mutatur nec mutari potest. Unde Augustinus in quinto libro de Trinitate:[1] « Aliae, inquit, essentiae vel substantiae paiunt accidentia, quibus in eis fiat vel magna vel quantacumque mutatio; Deo autem aliquid huiusmodi accidere non potest; et ideo sola substantia vel essentia, quae est Deus, incommutabilis est, cui profecto maxime ac verissime competit *esse*. Quod enim mutatur non servat ipsum *esse*; et quod mutari potest, etiam si non mutetur, potest

Chapter II

On the incommutability of the same.

The Essence of God alone is also properly said (to be) incommutable, because neither is it changed nor can it be changed. Whence (St.) Augustine in the fifth book On the Trinity[1] says: « Other essences and/or substances take accidents, by which there comes to be in them a great and/or howsoever great mutation; but to God something of this kind cannot happen [accidere]; and for that reason the Substance alone and/or Essence, which is God, is incommutable, for which indeed [profecto] it is most greatly and most truly

quod fuerat non esse; ideoque illud solum, quod non tantum non mutatur, verum etiam mutari omnino non potest, verissime dicitur esse », id est substantia Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti. Ideoque Apostolus loquens de Deo ait:[2] *Qui solus habet immortalitatem*. Ut enim ait Augustinus in libro primo de Trinitate:[3] « Cum anima quodam modo immortalis esse dicatur et sit, non diceret Apostolus: *solus Deus habet immortalitatem*, nisi quia vera immmortalitas incommutabilititas est, quam nulla potest habere creatura, quoniam solius Creatoris est ». Unde Iacobus ait:[4] *Apud quem non est transmutatio nec vicissitudinis obumbratio*. Et David: *Mutabis ea, et mutabuntur; tu autem idem ipse es*. Ideo Augustinus super Genesim[5] dicit, quod Deus nec per loca nec per tempora movetur, creatura vero per tempora et loca. Et *per temora moveri* est per affectiones commutari; Deus autem nec loco nec affectione mutari potest, qui per Prophetam ait:[6] *Ego Deus, et non mutor*, qui est immutabilis solus. Unde recte *solus* dicitur *habere immortalitatem*. « In omni enim mutabili natura, ut ait Augustinus contra Maximinum,[7] nonnulla mors est ipsa mutatio, quia facit aliquid in ea non esse, quod erat. Unde et ipsa anima humana, quae ideo dicitur immortalis, quia secundum modum suum nunquam desinit vivere, habe tamen quandam mortem suam; quia si iuste vivebat et peccat, moritur iustitia; si peccatrix erat et iustificatur, moritur peccato, ut alias eius mutationes taceam, de quibus modo longum est disputare. Et creaturarum natura caelestium mori potuit, quia peccare potuit. Nam et Angeli peccaverunt et daemones facti sunt, quorum est diabolus princeps; et qui non peccaverunt, peccare potuerunt; et cuicumque creaturae rationali praestatur, ut peccare non possit, non est hoc naturae propriae, sed Dei gratiae. Et ideo *solus Deus*, ut ait Apostolus, *habet immortalitatem*, qui non cuiusquam gratia, sed natura sua nec potuit nec potest aliqua conversione mutari, nec potuit nec poterit aliqua mutatione peccare ». « Proinde, ut ait Augustinus in primo libro de Trinitate,[8] substantiam Dei sine ulla sui commutatione mutabilia facientem et sine ullo suo

suitable [competit] *to be*. For what is changed does not keep the same *to be* [non servat ipsum esse]; and what can be changed, even if it is not changed, can (become) what is was not (able) to be; and for that reason that alone, which not only is not changed, but also cannot be entirely changed, is most truly said to be », that is the Substance of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. And for that reason the Apostle (Paul) speaking of God says:[2] *Who alone has immortality*. For as (St.) Augustine says in the first book On the Trinity:[3] « Since the soul in a certain manner is said to be immortal and it is, the Apostle would not say: *God alone has immortality*, unless (is was) because true immortality is the incommutability, which no creature can have, since it belongs to God alone ». Whence (St.) James says:[4] *Among Whom there is not transmutation nor the overshadowing of vicissitude*. And (King) David (says): *Thou will change them, and they shall be changed; but Thou art the very Same*. For that reason (St.) Augustine On Genesis[5] says, that God is neither moved through places nor through times, but a creature (is), through times and places. And *to be moved through times* is to be commutable [commutari] through affections; but God cannot be changed, neither in place nor in affection, Who through the Prophet says:[6] *I (am) God, and I am not changed*, who alone is incommutable. Whence rightly is *He alone* said *to have immortality*. « For in every mutable nature », as (St.) Augustine says Against Maximinus,[7] « not even death is itself a mutation, because it makes something in it not to be, which used to be. Whence even the human soul, which for that reason is said (to be) immortal, because according to its own manner it never ceases to live, nevertheless [tamen] has its own certain (kind of) death; because if it used to live justly and sins, it dies for justice; if it used to be a sinner and is justified, it dies for sin, to pass over in silence [ut taceam] its other mutations, of which the disputation [disputare] is long in measure. And the nature of celestial creatures could die, because it could sin. For even the Angels sinned and were made

temporali motu temporalia creantem intueri et nosse, licet sit difficile, oportet ». Vere ergo ac proprie incommutabilis est sola Divinitatis essentia, quae sine sui mutatione cunctas condidit naturas.

demons, whose prince is the devil; and those who did not sin, could have sinned; and to whatever rational creature it is assured [praestatur], that it it cannot sin, this does not belong to its own nature [naturae propriae], but to the grace of God. And for that reason *God alone*, as the Apostle says, *has immortality*, Who not by the grace of anyone, but by His own Nature neither could nor can be changed by any conversion, nor could nor will be able to sin by any mutation ». « Hence », as (St.) Augustine says in the first book On the Trinity,[8] « it is proper, though it be difficult, to intuit and know [nosse] that Substance of God, making mutables without any commutation of Itself and creating temporals without any of Its own temporal movement ». Therefore truly and properly incommutable is the Essence of God alone, which without Its own mutation has founded all other natures.

Pars ii.

Cap. III.

De simplicitate eiusdem

Eademque sola proprie ac vere simplex est, ubi nec partium nec accidentium seu[9] quarumlibet formarum ulla est diversitas sive variatio vel multitudo. Ut autem scias, quomodo simplex sit illa substantia, ut te docet Augustinus in sexto libro de Trinitate,[10] « animadverte primo, quare omnis creatura sit multiplex et nullo modo vere simplex, et primo de corporali, postea de spirituali creatura. Corporalis utique creatura partibus constat, ita ut sit ibi alia pars minor, alia maior, et maius sit totum quam pars quaelibet; et in unoquoque corpore aliud est magnitudo, aliud color, aliud figura. Potest enim, et minuta magnitudine, manere idem color et eadem figura; et colore mutato, manere eadem figura et eadem magnitudo. Ac per hoc multiplex esse convincitur natura corporis simplex autem nullo modo ».

Part ii

Chapter III

On the simplicity of the same.

And the Same alone is properly and truly simple, where there is neither of parts nor of accidents or[9] of whatever forms any diversity or variation and/or multitude. But so that you may know [scias], in what manner that Substance be simple, as (St.) Augustine teaches in the sixth book On the Trinity,[10] « turn your mind first to (this), why every creature is multiple and in no manner is truly simple, and first concerning the corporal creature, afterwards concerning the spiritual. Certainly [utique] the corporal creature is established by parts, such that there one part is lesser, another greater, and the whole is greater than any part; and in any one body the magnitude is one (thing), the color an other, the shape [figura] an other. For it can, even with a lessened [minuta] magnitude, remain the same color and the same shape; and with the color changed, remain the same shape

and the same magnitude. And through this the nature of a body is conclusively proven [convincitur] to be multiple, (and to be) moreover in no manner simple ».

Cap. IV.

De corporali et spirituali creatura, quomodo sit multiplex et non simplex.

Creatura quoque spiritualis, ut est anima, in comparatione quidem corporis est simplex, sine comparatione vero corporis multiplex est, et non simplex. Quae ideo simplex dicitur respectu corporis, quia mole non diffunditur per spatium loci, sed in unoquoque corpore et in toto tota est et in qualibet eius parte tota est. Et ideo, cum fit[11] aliquid in quavis exigua particula corporis, quod sentiat anima, quamvis non fiat in toto corpore, illa tamen tota sentit, quia totam non latet. Sed tamen nec in ipsa anima vera simplicitas / est.

Chapter IV

On the corporal and spiritual creature, in what manner it be multiple, and not simple.

A spiritual creature too, as is the soul, in comparison to a body is indeed simple, but apart from [sine] a comparison to a body it is multiple, and not simple. Which (creature) is for that reason is said (to be) simple in respect of a body, because (its) mass [mole] is not diffused through the space of a place, but in any one body both the whole (of it) is in the whole (body) and the whole (of it) is in any part of it. And for that reason, when something is done[11] in however so tiny [exigua] a particle of a body, which the soul senses, although it is not done in the whole body, nevertheless [tamen] that whole senses, because it does not lay hidden from the whole. But, nevertheless [tamen], neither in the soul itself is there true simplicity.

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[1] Cap. 2. n. 3. — In quo textu post *non servat ipsum* contra originale, codd. et ed. 1 Vat. cum aliis edd. addit *verum*.
[2] I. Timoth. 6, 16; idem textus infra bis occurit.
[3] Cap. 1. n. 2.
[4] Cap. 1, 17. Sola Vat. *Apud Deum*. — Sequens textus est Psalm. 101, 28.
[5] Super Genes. ad litteram VIII. c. 20. n. 39. secundum sensum; cfr. etiam c. 21. 22. 23. 26.
[6] Malach. 3, 6. Vulgata: *Ego Dominus* etc.
[7] Libr. II. c. 12. n. 1.
[8] Cap. 1. n. 3.
[9] Edd., exceptis 1, 8, *nec*.
[10] Cap. 6. n. 8. — Paulo restituimus ex codd. et edd. 1, 6, 8, *ut* ante *docet Augustinus*. In ipso textu ante *de corporali* Vat. cum aliss edd., exceptis 1, 4, *primum* pro *primo*. Deinde ante *partibus* Vat. cum plurimis edd. et cod. B addit *ex*. Mox post *ibi* Vat. ponit *aliqua* pro *alia*. Paulo infra ante *figura. Potest* Vat. cum plurimis edd. adiicit *est*, et immediate post omissa paritucla *et* ponit *imminuta* pro *minuta* contra codd. B C D et fere omnes edd.; Augustinus *diminuta*.
[11] Codd. A B D E et edd. 3, 5, 7, 8, 9 male *sit*. — Infra Vat. cum paucis edd. non bene addiicit *tota* legendo *in ipsa tota anima vera*; et immediate post edd. 2, 3,

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[1] Chapter 2, n. 3. — In which text after *does not keep the same* [non servat ipsum] contrary to the original, to the codices and to edition 1, the Vatican text together with the other editions adds *true* [verum].
[2] 1 Tim. 6:16; the same text occurs twice below.
[3] Chapter 1, n. 2.
[4] Chapter 1:17. Only the Vatican text has *Among God* [Apud Deum]. — The following text is Psalm 101:28.
[5] On a Litteral Exposition of Genesis, Bk. VIII, ch. 20, n. 39, according to the sense; cf. also chs. 21, 22, 23, and 26.
[6] Malachi 3:6. The Vulgate reads: *I (am) the Lord* etc..
[7] Book II, ch. 12, n. 1.
[8] Chapter 1, n. 3.
[9] The editions, excepting 1 and 8, have *nor* [nec].
[10] Chapter 6, n. 8. — A little before this we have restores from the codices and editions 1, 6 and 8 *as* [ut] before *(St.) Augustine teaches*. In which text before *concerning the corporal* the Vatican text together with the other editions, excepting 1 and 4, has *at first* [primum] in place of *first* [primo]. Then before *parts* [partibus] the Vatican text together with very many editions and codex B adds *out of*. Then after *there* [ibi] the Vatican text puts *some (part)* [aliqua] in place of *one* [alia]. A little below this before *shape* [figura] the Vatican text together with

7 *vere* pro *vera simplicitas* [trans. -- haec verba corrigata sunt de *multiplicem vera*, quae in nota editio critica habet, sed quae textus Lombardi non].

very many editions inserts *is* [est], and immediately after the omitted particle *even* [et] it puts *unlessened* [imminuta] in place of *lessened* [minuta] contrary to codices B C and D and nearly all the editions; (St.) Augustine has *diminished* [diminuta]. [11] Codices A B D E and editions 3, 5, 7, 8, 9 have badly *is* [sit] in place of *is done* [fit]. — Below the Vatican text together with a few editions inserts not so well *whole* [tota] by reading *in the whole soul itself (is there) true*; and immediately after this editions 2, 3, and 7, read *truly* [vere] in place of *true simplicity* [vera simplicitas].

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est. Cum enim aliud sit artificiosum esse, aliud inertem, aliud acutum, aliud memorem, aliud cupiditas, aliud timor, aliud laetitia, aliud tristitia, possintque haec et alia huiusmodo innumerabilia in animae natura inveniri, et alia sine aliis et alia magis,[1] alia minus, manifestum est, non simplicem, sed multiplicem esse naturam. Nihil enim simplex mutabile est; omnis autem creatura mutabilis est »[2] : nulla ergo creatura vere simplex est. « Deus vero, etsi multiplex dicatur, vere tamen et summe simplex est. Dicitur enim magnus, bonus, sapiens, beatus, verus et quidquid aliud non indigne dici videtur, sed eadem magnitudo eius est, quae sapientia. Non enim mole magnus est, sed virtute, et eadem bonitas, quae sapientia et magnitudo et veritas; et non est ibi aliud ipsum beatum esse, et aliud magnum aut sapientem aut verum aut bonum esse aut omnino esse ».

For since it is one (thing) to be artificial, another inert, another sharp, another mindful [memorem], another cupidity, another fear, another gladness, another sadness, and (since) these and others of this kind can be found (to be) innumerable in the nature of the soul, both some without others and others more,[1] others less, it is manifest, that (its) nature is not simple, but multiple. For nothing simple is mutable; moreover every creature is mutable »[2] : therefore no creature is truly simple. « However God, even if he be called multiple, is nevertheless [tamen] truly and most highly simple. For He is called great, good, wise, blessed, true and whatever other (name) seems to be said in a not unworthy manner, but to Him belongs the same greatness, which (is) wisdom. For not in mass is He great, but in virtue, and (He is) the same goodness, which (is) wisdom and greatness and truth; and There there is not One that is Itself blessed, and Another that is great or wise or true or is good or entirely (any of these). »

Cap. V.

Quod Deus, cum sit simplex, tamen multipliciter dicitur.

Chapter V

That God, though He be simple, is nevertheless spoken of in a multiple manner.

Hic diligenter notandum est, cum dicat Augustinus, solum Deum vere simplicem esse, cur dicat, eundem multipliciter dicit. Sed hoc non propter diversitatem accidentium vel partium dicit, sed propter

Here it must be diligently noted, since (St.) Augustine says, that God alone is truly simple, why he says, that the Same is said in a multiple manner. But this he does not say on account of a diversity of accidents

diversitatem ac multitudinem nominum, quae de Deo dicuntur; quae licet multiplicia sint, unum tamen significant, scilicet divinam naturam. Haec enim non ita accipiuntur, cum de illa incommutabili aeternaque substantia incomparabiliter simpliciore, quam est humanus animus, dicuntur, quemadmodum cum de creaturis dicuntur. Unde Augustinus in sexto libro de Trinitate:[3] « Deo est hoc *esse*, quod est *fortem esse* vel *sapientem esse* vel *iustum esse*, et si quid de illa simplici multiplicitate vel multiplici simplicitate dixeris, quo substantia eius significetur. Humano autem animo non est hoc *esse*, quod est *fortem esse* aut *prudentem* aut *iustum*; potest enim esse animus et nullam istarum habere virtutum ».

and/or of parts, but on account of a diversity and multitude of names, which are said of God; which though they are multiple, nevertheless [tamen] signify the One, that is the Divine Nature. For these are not accepted thus, when they are said of that incommutable and eternal Substance incomparably more simple than the human spirit, to the extent that they are said of creatures. Whence (St.) Augustine in the sixth book On the Trinity:[3] « For God *to be* is that, which is *to be strong* and/or *to be wise* and/or *to be just*, and if you have said anything concerning that simple multiplicity and/or multiple simplicity, by this His substance is signified. Moreover for the human spirit *to be* is not that, which is *to be strong* or *prudent* or *just*; for the (human) spirit can be and have none of those virtues ».

Cap. VI.

Quod Dei simplicitas nulli praedicamentorum subiicitur.

Quod autem in natura divina nulla sit accidentium diversitas nullaque paenitus mutabilitas, sed perfecta simplicitas, ostendi Augustinus in quinto libro de Trinitate[4] dicens: « Intelligamus Deum, quantum possumus, sine qualitate bonum, sine quantitate magnum, sine indigentia creatorem, sine situ praesidentum, sine habitu omnia continentem, sine loco ubique totum, sine tempore sempiternum, sine ulla sui mutatione mutabilia facientem nihilque patientem. Quisquis Deum ita cogitat, etsi non dum potest omnino invenire quid sit, pie tamen caveat, quantum potest, aliquid de illo sentire, quod non sit ». Ecce, si subtiliter intendas, ex his atque praedictis aperitur, illa praedicamenta artis dialecticae Dei naturae minime convenire, quae nullis subiecta est accidentibus.

Chapter VI

That the simplicity of God is subject to none of the predicaments.

Moreover that in the Divine Nature there is no diversity of accidents and no mutability throughout [paenitus], but (rather) a perfect simplicity, (St.) Augustine shows in the fifth book On the Trinity[4] saying: « We understand that God, as much as we can, is the Good without quality, the Great without quantity, the Creator without indigence, the One Presiding without site [situ], the One containing all without having [habitu], the One whole everywhere without place [loco], the One Sempiternal without time, the One making mutables without any mutation of His own and the One suffering nothing. Whoever thus considers [cogitat] God, even if he cannot yet find entirely what He is, nevertheless [tamen] piously let him beware, as much as he can, of thinking [sentire] anything of Him, which He is not ». Behold, if you subtlety understand [intendas], from this and the aforesaid it appears, that those predicaments of the dialectic art convene least (of all) with the Divine Nature, which is subject to none of the accidents.

Cap. VII.

Quod Deus abusive dicitur substantia.

Unde nec proprie dicitur substantia, ut Augustinus ostendit in libro septimo de Trinitate:[5] « Sicut ab eo quod est *esse* appellatur essentia, ita ab eo quod est *subsistere* substantiam dicimus, si tamen dignum est, ut Deus dicatur subsistere. Hoc enim de his rebus recte intelligitur, in quibus subiectis sunt ea quae in aliquo subiecto esse dicuntur, sicut in corpore color aut forma. Corpus enim subsistit, et ideo substantia est. Res ergo mutabiles neque simplices proprie dicuntur substantiae. Deus autem, si subsistit, ut substantia proprie dici possit, inest in eo aliquid tanquam in subiecto, et non est simplex. Nefas est autem dicere, ut subsistat Deus et subsit bonitati suae, atque illa bonitas non substantia sit vel potius essentia, neque ipse Deus sit bonitas sua, sed in illo sit tanquam subiecto. Unde manifestum est, Deum abusive substantiam vocari, ut nomine usitatiori intelligatur essentia, quod vere ac proprie dicitur, ita ut fortasse solum Deum dici oporteat essentiam. Est enim vere solus, quia incommuntabilis est ».

Chapter VII

That God is abusively said to be a substance.

Whence neither is He properly said (to be) a substance, as (St.) Augustine shows in the seventh book On the Trinity:[5] « In the same manner as from that which is *to be* "essence" is named, so from that which is *to subsist* we say "substance", if, however [tamen], it is worthy, that God be said to subsist. For this concerning these things rightly is understood, in which subjects there are those (things) which are said to be in another subject, just as color or form (is) in a body. For a body subsists, and for that reason it is a substance. Therefore mutable things and not simple ones are properly said to be substances. Moreover God, if He subsists, so that he can properly be said to be a substance, is in that something as in a subject, and is not simple. Moreover it is wicked [nefas est] to say, that God subsists and is beneath [subsit] His own Goodness, and also that that Goodness is not a substance and/or rather an essence, and that God Himself is not His own Goodness, but is in it as in a subject. Whence it is manifest, that God is abusively called a substance, as He is by more usual noun understood (to be) an essence, which truly and properly He is said (to be), to such an extent that perhaps it is proper [oporteat] that God alone be said to be an essence. For He is truly Sole [solus], because He is incommutable ».

Cap. VIII.

Quod non est in Deo aliquid, quod non sit Deus.

Huius autem essentiae simplicitas ac sinceritas tanta est, quod non est in ea aliquid, quod non sit ipsa; sed idem est habens et quod habetur. Unde Hilarius in septimo libro de Trinitate[6] ait: « Non ex compositis Deus, qui vita est, subsistit, neque qui virtus est, ex infirmis continetur, neque qui lux est, ex obscuris coaptatur,

Chapter VIII

That there is not in God anything, which is not God.

Moreover of this Essence there is so great a simplicity and sincerity, that there is not in It anything, which is not Itself; but the Same is the One having and What is had. Whence (St.) Hilary in the seventh book On the Trinity[6] says: « Not out of composites does God, who is Life, subsist, nor is He who is Virtue, contained out of infirm (things), nor

neque qui spiritus est, ex disparibus formalis est: totum quod in eo est, unum est ». Idem in octavo libro de Trinitate:[7] « Non humano modo ex compositis Deus est ut in eo aliud sit / quod ab eo habetur, . . . »

is He who is Light, fitted together from obscure (things), nor is He who is Spirit, formal from disparate (things): the whole which is in Him, is one ». (He says) the same in the eighth book On the Trinity:[7] « Not in a human manner is God from composites so that in Him there is one (thing) / which is had from Him, . . . »

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[1] Vat. sola repetit hic *et* nec non *minus* post *manifestum est*; eadem cum edd. 2, 6, 8 addit *animae*; cod. D vero post *multiplicem* ponit *eius*.
[2] Libr. VI. de Trin. c. 6. n. 8. Quae sequuntur sumta sunt ex c. 6 et 7. Circa finem huius textus post *eadem bonitas* Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 7 adiicit *eius est*. Denique nonnullae edd. *aliud sapientem aliud* pro *aut sapientem aut*.
[3] Cap. 4. n. 6. — Vat. et ceterae edd. in principio post *Deo* addunt *inquit*.
[4] Cap. 1. n. 2. — In principio huius cap. pro *divina* codd. B C D *deitatis*, A E *divinitatis*. In ipso textu post *situ* edd. 4, 8 *praesentem* loco *praesidentem*; circa finem eiusdem Vat. et edd. 4, 5, 8, 9 post *quid sit* addunt *ipse*.
[5] Cap. 4. in fine et c. 5. in principio. — In textu ante *subiectis* Vat. et edd. 4, 9 addunt *ut*; edd. 1, 6, 8 hic et paulo infra ante *subiecto* addiciunt *ut in* contra originale, codd. et ceteras edd. Deinde edd. praeter fidem codd. et originalis post *Res* ponunt *vero* pro *ergo*.
[6] Num. 27. Non *enim* ex compositis *atque inanimis* Deus . . . ex *infirmibus* continetur . . . ex disparibus *formabilis* est, ubi cod. A *disparibus formatur*. Pro *formalis* in textu Magistri legendum videtur *formabilis*. Hunc textum explicat S. Bonaventura, hic p. II. dub. 6.
[7] Num. 43. — In hoc textu Vat. et edd. 4, 8, 9 et cod. B corrupte pro *vita est natura* legunt *una est natura*, ubi Hilarius clarius: *sed totum, quod est, vita est*.

[1] Here the Vatican text alone repeats *and* [et] and *less* [minus] after *it is manifest* [manifestum est]; the same text together with editions 2, 6 and 8, adds *of the soul* at the end; codex D, however, adds *its* [eius].
[2] On the Trinity, Book VI, ch. 6, n. 8. Those things which follow have been taken from ch. 6 and ch. 7. Near the end of this text after *the same goodness* [eadem bonitas] the Vatican text, contrary to the codices and editions 1, 2, 3, and 7, adds *is His* [eius est]. Then not a few editions read *Another wise, another* [aliud sapientem aliud] in place of *or wise or* [aut sapientem aut].
[3] Chapter 4, n. 6. — The Vatican text and the rest of the editions at the beginning after *To God* [Deo] add *, he says,* [inquit].
[4] Chapter 1, n. 2. — At the beginning of this chapter in place of *divine* [divina] codices B C and D read *of the Deity* [deitatis], A and E read *of the Divinity* [divinitatis]. In the same text at *site* [situ] editions 1 and 8 read *the One Presend* [praesentem] in place of *the One Presiding* [praesidentem]; near the end of the same the Vatican text and editions 4, 5, 8, and 9, at *what He is* [quid sit] add *Himself* [ipse].
[5] Chapter 4. at the end and ch. 5 at the beginning. — In the text before *subjects* [subiectis] the Vatican text and editions 4 and 9 add *as* [ut]; editions 4, 6, and 8 here and a little below before *subject* [subiecto] insert *as in* [ut in] contrary to the original, to the codices and to the rest of the editions. Then the editions, not trusting the codices and the original text, at *mutable things* [Res . . . mutabiles] put *However* [vero] in place of *Therefore* [ergo].
[6] Num. 27. (The Text of St. Augustine reads): *For* not from composites and inanimates is God . . . is He contained from *infirm things* [infirmibus] . . . is He *formable* [formabilis] from disparate things; where codex A reads *is He formed by disparate things*. In place of *formal* [formalis] in the text of Master (Peter) *formable* [formabilis] seems to need to be read. St. Bonaventure explains this text, here in p. II. dubium 6.
[7] Num. 43. — In this text the Vatican text and editions 4, 8 and 8, and codex B, in place of *is life, . . . nature* [vita est natura] read corruptly *is one nature* [una est natura], where (St.) Hilary more clearly says: *but the whole, which He is, is Life*.

quod ab eo havetur, et aliud sit ipse qui habeant, sed totum vita est, natura scilicet perfecta et infinita et non ex diparibus constituta, sed vivens ipsa per totum ». De hoc eodem Boethius in primo libro de Trinitate[1] ait: « Quocirca hoc vere unum est, in quo nullus numerus, nullum in eo aliud praeter id quod est; neque enim subiectum fieri potest ». Augustinus quique in libro de Fide et Sumbolo[2] dicit: « In Dei substantia non est aliquid, quod non sit substantia, quasi aliud sit ibi substantia, aliud quod accidat substantiae. Sed quidquid ibi intelligi potest, substantia est. Verum haec dici possunt facile et credi, videri atuem nisi puro corde omnino non possunt ». Item Augustinus in decimo quinto libro de Trinitate:[3] « Sic habetur in natura uiuscuiusque trium, ut qui habet hoc sit, quod habet, sicut immutabilis simplexque substantia ». Unde Isidorus[4] ait: « Deus simplex dicitur, sive non amittendo quod habet, seu quod aliud non est ipse, at aliud quod in ipso est ». Et cum tantae simplicitatis atque sinceritatis sit natura divina, est tamen in ea personarum Trinitas. Unde Augustinus in libro undecimo de Civitate Dei[5] ait: « Non propter hoc naturam summi boni simplicem dicimus, quia est Pater in ea solus, aut Filius in ea solus, aut Spiritus sanctus in ea solus, aut quia sola est ista nominum trinitas sine subsistentia personarum, sicut Sabelliani putaverunt: sed ideo simplex dicitur, quia est hoc quod habet, except quod relative quaeque persona ad alteram dicitur, nec est ipsa. Nam utique persona ad alteram dicitur, nec est ipsa. Nam utique Pater habet Filium, ad quem relative dicitur, nec tamen ipse est Filius; et Filius habet Patrem, nec tamen epse est Pater. In quod vero ad semetipsum dicitur, non ad alterum, hoc est quod habet, sicut ad semetipsum dicitur virvus, habendo vitam, et eadem vita ipse est. Propter hoc itaque[6] natura haec dicitur simplex, quod non sit aliud habens, et aliud id quod habet, sicut in ceteris rebus est. Non enim habens liquorem liquor est, nec corpus color, nex anima est sapientia ». Ecce, quanta est identitas, quanta est unitas, immutabilitas, simplicitas, puritas divinae substantiae, iuxta infirmitatis nostrae valitudinem assignavimus.

which is had from Him, and another is He Himself who has, but the whole is Life, a Nature namely perfect and infinite and not constituted out of disparates, but living Itself throughout the whole ». Of this Same, Boethius in the first book *On the Trinity*[1] says: « About which It is truly the One, in which (there is) no number, no other in Him besides that which He is; for neither can He be become a subject ». (St.) Augustine also says in (his) book *On the Faith and the Creed*:[2] « In the Substance of God there is not anything, which is not the Substance, as if There one thing is the substance, another (is that) which accedes to the substance. But whatever can be understood (to be) There, is the Substance. Truly these (things) can be easily said and believed, on the other hand [autem] they cannot be seen except by an entirely pure heart ». Likewise (St.) Augustine in the fifteenth book *On the Trinity*[3] (says of the Divine Nature): « It is so had in the Nature of each of the Three, that He who has This is, what He has, just as an immutable and simple substance (does) ». Whence (St.) Isidore[4] says: « God is said (to be) simple, either by not admitting that He has, or that there is one thing that is Himself, and another that is in Himself ». And though the Divine Nature is of so great a simplicity and sincerity, It is, nevertheless [tamen] in that Trinity of the Persons. Whence (St.) Augustine in the eleventh book *On the City of God*[5] says: « We do not say that the nature of the Most High Good (is) simple on account of this, that the Father alone is in It, or the Son alone (is) in It, or the Holy Spirit alone (is) in It, or that Trinity of Names alone is without a subsistence of persons, just as the Sabellians thought: but He is said (to be) simple for this reason, that He is this which He has, except that whatever Person is said relatively in regard to an Other, nor is it the very (Other). For certainly [utique] the Father has a Son, in regard to whom He is relatively said (to be a Father), nor however [tamen] is He Himself the Son; and the Son has a Father, nor however is He Himself the Father. In which (sense) there is said in regard to His very self, not in regard to an Other, This is what He has, just as in regard to His very self He is said (to be) living, by

having life, and the same Life is Himself. And so on account of this Nature is said (to be) simple, because there is not one having, and another that which It has, just as it is among all other things. For liquid [liquor] is not one having liquid, nor color a body, nor is the soul wisdom ». Behold, how great is the identity, how great is the unity, the immutability, the simplicity, the purity of the Divine Substance, (which) we according to the strength [valitudinem] of our infirmity have expressed with signs [assignavimus].

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[1] Cap. 2. — In quo textu Vat. post *praeter id quod* addit *in eo*, contradicentibus omnibus codd., edd. 1, 6 et originali.
[2] Cap. 9. n. 20. — Mss. et edd. 2, 3, 5, 7 citant falso *de Fide ad Petrum*. — In quo textu codd. B C cum omnibus aliis edd. non bene ponunt *accidit* pro *accidat*.
[3] Cap. 17. n. 28. — In quo textu contra originale, codd. et edd. 1, 6, 8 Vat. ponit *quod* pro *ut*. Mox post *sicut* cod. A addit *est* et deinde ponit *natura* loco *substantia*.
[4] Libr. VII. Etymolog. c. 1; idem occurit libr. I. Sent. c. 1. — Ipse Isidorus loc. cit. legit: *seu quia non aliud est*; edd. vero 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 *seu non aliud habet quod non est*, et ed. 2 insuper addit *quia* post *seu*.
[5] Cap. 10. n. 1. et 2. — Vat. et edd. 4, 5 omittunt *ait* post *Civitate Dei*. In hoc textu omnes codd. et ed. 1 post *Spiritus sanctus* omittunt *in ea*; et immediate post codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3, 7, 8 pro *aut* ponunt *id est*, contradicente originali. Insuper edd. 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 *substantia* pro *subsistentia*, et loco *sine* edd. omnes cum codd. C E exhibent *sive*, sed falso et contra originale et codd. A B D. [Trans. nota: in textu criticalis originalis super perperam *substantia* pro *subsistentia.*]
[6] Vat. *utique* contra omnes codd. et edd. 2, 6.

[1] Chapter 2. — In which text the Vatican text after *besides that which* adds *in Him*, contradicting all the codices, editions 1 and 6, and the original.
[2] Chapter 9, n. 20. — The manuscripts and editions 2, 3, 5 and 7, cite falsely the On Faith to Peter. — In which text codices B and C together with all the other editions put not so well the indicative for *accedes* [accidit].
[3] Chapter 17, n. 28. — In which text, contrary to the original, to the codices and to editions 1, 6 and 8, the Vatican text puts *that* [quod] in place of *that* [ut]. Then after *just as* [sicut] codex A adds *He is* [est] and then puts *nature* in place of *substance*.
[4] Etymologies, Bk. VII, ch. 1; the same occurs in Sent., Bk. I, ch. 1. — (St.) Isidore himself, loc. cit., writes: *or because there is no other*; however editions 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9, read *or (that) no other has what He is not*, and edition 2 moreover adds *that* [quia] after *or* [seu].
[5] Chapter 10, n. 1 and 2. — The Vatican text and editions 4 and 5, omit *says* [ait] after *City of God*. In this text all the codices and edition 1 after *Holy Spirit* omit *in It* [in ea]; and immediately after this the codices and editions 1, 2, 3, 7, and 8 put *that is* [id est] in place of *or* [aut], contradicting the original. Moreover editions 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 have *substance* [substantia] in place of *subsistence* [subsistentia], and in place of *without* [sine] all the editions together with codices C and E exhibit *or* [sive], but falsely and contrary to the original and codices A B and D. [trans. note: Here, contrary to custom, the note takes a contrary approach to the textual variant of *substance/subsistence* in regard to the text of Master Peter: *sine substantia personarum* as quoted above; if the Latin text of the Quaracchi edition is followed, there results a seeming non sequitur, for there would be a trinity of names without a underlying substance, which is not what the Sabellians held. The English translation assumes the note is correct and the text in the body erroneous, viz. that the latter should read *subsistentia*.]
[6] The Vatican text has *certainly* [utique] contrary to all the codices and editions 2 and 6.

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translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation that that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
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Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VIII.

De proprietatibus et conditionibus essentialibus Trinitatis et Unitatis.

PARS I.

De veritate et immutabilitate Dei.

ARTICULUS I.

Quaestio I.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 149-153.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VIII

On the essential properties and conditions of the Trinity and Unity.

PART I

On the truth and immutability of God.

ARTICLE I

Question 1

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 149-153.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

DIVISIO TEXTUS.

Terminatis superius duabus partibus istius partis principalis, quae est de Trinitate secundum quod *intelligitur*, in quibus ad probandum Trinitem Magister adduxit rationes et removit dubitationes; in hac *tertia* parte determinat Magister ipsius[1] Trinitatis et Unitatis proprietates et conditiones. Et quoniam quaedam sunt proprietates respicientes *essentiam*, ut veritas, quaedam *personas*, ut generatio,

DIVISION OF THE TEXT

Having terminated the above two parts of that principle part (of his book), which concerns the Trinity according to what *it is understood* (to be), in which to prove the Trinity Master (Peter) brought forward reasons and removed doubts; in this *third* part Master (Peter) determines the properties and conditions of the Trinity and Unity Itself.[1] And since there are certain properties respecting the *Essence*, as truth,

quaedam *utrasque*, ut aequalitas: ideo haec pars tres habet partes. In *prima* parte agit Magister de proprietatibus essentialibus; in *secunda*, de proprietatibus personalibus, infra distinctione nona: *Nunc ad distinctionem personarum* etc.; in *tertia*, de proprietatibus et conditiontibus quodam modo essentialibus et quodam modo personalibus, sicut est aequalitas personarum in aeternitate, magnitudine et virtute,[2] infra distinctione decima nona: *Nunc postquam coeaeternitatem trium personarum* etc..

certain ones the *Persons*, as generation, certain ones *both*, as equality: for that reason this part has three parts. In the *first* part Master (Peter) deals with the essential properties; in the *second*, with the personal properties, below in the ninth distinction: *Now let us approach the distinction of persons.*; in the *third*, with the properties and conditions (which are) in a certain manner essential and in a certain manner personal, as is the equality of the Persons in eternity, magnitude and virtue,[2] below in the nineteenth distinction: *Now after we have hinted at the coeternity of the Three Persons* etc..

Prima pars, quae continet praesentem distinctionem, tres habet partes secundum tres proprietates, quas assignat; et *prima* est de *veritate*; *secunda* de *immutabilitate*, et haec ponitur tertio capitulo:[3] *Dei etiam solius essentia proprie incommutabilis dicitur*; *tertia* de *simplicitate*, quae ponitur quarto capitulo:[4] *Eademque sola proprie, ac vere simplex est* etc..

The *first* part, which contains the present distinction, has three parts according to the three properties, which he assigns: and the *first* concerns *truth*; the *second* concerns *immutability*, and this is put in the third chapter:[3] *Also of God alone is the Essence properly said (to be) incommutable*; the *third* concerns *simplicity*, which is put in the forth chapter:[4] *And the Same alone is properly, and truly simple* etc..

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[1] Praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 omisso *Magister*, substituit Vat. *istius* loco *ipsius* et paulo infra *utraque* pro *utrasque*.
[2] Vat. *unitate* pro *virtute*, sed contra textum Magistri et codd.
[3] Ita codd. cum ed. 1 ad normam alterius divisionis capitulorum; in nostra vide c. 2. — Vat. hic et in seqq. *ibi*.
[4] In nostra ed. c. 3. — Vat. *et haec* loco *quae*, sed contra mss.

[1] Not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, the Vatican text, having omitted *Master (Peter)* substitutes *of It* [istius] in place of *Itself* [ipsius] and a little below this *both* [utraque] in place of *each* [utrasque].
[2] The Vatican text has *unity* [unitate] in place of *virtue* [virtute], but contrary to the text of Master (Peter) and the codices.
[3] Thus the codices together with edition 1, according to the norm of the other division of the chapters; in ours see ch. 2. — The Vatican text here and in the following (quote) *there (where he says)* [ibi].
[4] In our edition ch. 3. — The Vatican text reads *and this* [et haec] in place of *which* [quae], but contrary to the manuscripts.

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Item *prima* pars habet duas partes, quia *primo* attribuit Deo proprietatem veritatis; *secundo* removet dubitationem habentem ortum ex praedictis, secundo capitulo:[1] *Hic diligenter advertendum est*. Similiter *secunda* pars habet duas: in prima assignat Deo[2] proprietatem incommutabilitatis et

Likewise the *first* part has two parts, because he *first* attributes to God the property of the truth; *second* he removes the doubt having risen out of the aforesaid, in the second chapter:[1] *Here it must diligently be adverted*. Similarly the *second* part has two (parts): in the first he assigns

probat auctoritate Augustini; in secunda confirmat per Apostolum, ibi: *Ideoque Apostolus loquens* etc. *Tertia*, de simplicitate infra subdividetur.

to God[2] the property of incommutability and proves (it) by the authority of (St.) Augustine; in the second he confirms (it) through the Apostle, there (where he says): *And for that reason the Apostle (Paul) speaking* etc.. The *third* (part), concerning simplicity, is subdivided below.

TRACTATIO QUAESTIONUM.

TREATMENT OF THE QUESTIONS

In parte ista[3] ad evidentiam duarum primarum proprietatum, quas Magister primo assignat, scilicet *vertatis* et *incommutabilitatis*, duo principaliter quaeruntur:

Primo quaeritur[4] de ipsa veritate.
Secundo de immutabilite.

In that part (of his text),[3] to evidence the two first properties, which Master (Peter) assigns first, that is, (the property) *of the truth* and *of incommutability*, two (questions) are principally asked:

First there is asked (the question) concerning the truth itself.
Second concerning immutability.

De veritate iterum quaeruntur duo:

Primo, utrum veritas sit proprietas divini esse.
Secundo, utrum sit eius proprietas in summo, id est, adeo quod non possit cogitari non esse.

Concerning the truth there is again asked two (questions):

First, whether the truth be a property of the Divine *to be*.
Secondly, whether the property belongs to Him in a most high manner, that is, to such an extent that it cannot be thought not to be.

ARTICULUS I.

De veritate Dei.

Questio I.

Utrum veritas sit proprietas divini esse.

ARTICLE I

On the truth of God.

Question 1

Whether truth is a property of the Divine "to be".

QUOD **VERITAS** sit proprietas divini esse, ostenditur *auctoritatibus* et *rationibus*.

THAT **TRUTH** is a property of the Divine "to be", is shown by *authorities* and by *reasons*.

1. Primo modo sic: Hieronymus ad Marcellam, et habet in littera:[5] « Solus Deus vere est, cuius essentiae comparatum nostrum esse non est »; sed quod alicui soli convenit, est proprium illi: ergo veritas est proprium divini esse.

1. In the first manner thus: (St.) Jerome to Marcella, and he has it in the text:[5] « God alone truly is, to whose Essence our "to be" is not compared »; but what is fitting to someone alone, is proper to him: therefore truth is proper to the Divine "to be".

2. Item, Augustinus de Vera Religione:[6] « Falsitas est ex istis rebus, quae imitantur illud unum, quo est unum quidquid est, inquantum illud implere non possunt ». Si ergo nulla creatura potest illud summum

2. Likewise, (St.) Augustine On the True Religion:[6] « Falsity is from those things, which imitate that One, by whom anything is one, inasmuch as they cannot fulfill that ». Therefore if no creature can fulfill that

unum implere, veritas non est in aliqua creatura, sed in omnibus falsitas.

most high One, there is not truth in any creature, but (rather) falsity in all (things).

3. Item, Augustinus in Soliloquiis et de Vera Religione[7] dicit, quod lux increata est ratio cognoscendi se et omnia cognoscibilia: ergo si veritas est ratio cognoscendi, et sola lux increata est veritas: ergo veritas est proprietas Dei solius.

3. Likewise, (St.) Augustine in (his) Soliloquies and On the True Religion[7] says, that the uncreated Light is the reason for cognizing Itself and all cognoscibles: therefore if truth is the reason for cognizing, and the uncreated Light alone is the truth: therefore truth is the property of God alone.

4. Item, Anselmus in libro de Veritate[8] dicit, quod omnia sunt vera prima veritate: aut ergo intelligit *effective*, aut *formaliter*; non effective, quia similiter omnia possent dici vera[9] prima bonitate: ergo intelligitur formaliter: ergo non est alia veritas quam veritas increata: ergo si illa est in Deo et Deus, veritas est solius Dei proprietas.

4. Likewise, (St.) Anselm in (his) book On the Truth[8] says, that all (things) are true by the prime truth: therefore either he understands (this) *effectively*, or *formally*; not effectively, because all (things) can similarly be said (to be) true[9] by the first goodness: therefore it is understood formally: therefore there is not a truth other than the uncreated Truth: therefore if that is in God and (is) God, the truth is a property of God alone.

5. Item, *rationibus* probatur sic: veritas et vanitas opponuntur; sed omnis creatura habet vanitatem[10] et permixtionem cum non esse, cum sit ex nihilo, et solus Deus hac caret omnino: ergo in solo Deo est veritas.

5. Likewise, by *reasons* it is proven thus: truth and vanity are opposed; but every creature has vanity[10] and a confusion with non-being [permixtionem cum non esse], since it is out of nothing, and God alone entirely lacks this (mixture): therefore in God alone is truth.

6. Item, veritas opponitur umbrae. Quod enim est umbra rei, non habet veritatem;[11] sed creaturae sunt ubrae illius summi esse: ergo non habent veritatem in esse.

6. Likewise, truth is opposed to shadows. For that which is a shadow of a thing, does not have truth;[11] but creatures are the shadows of that most high "to be": therefore they do not have truth in (their) "to be".

7. Item, veritas est, qua aliquid est verum; sed veritas est vera, cum sit cognoscibilis; sed constat quod non alio quam se, quia alias[12] esset abire in infinitum; sed quod est verum se ipso, est verum per essentiam: ergo omnis veritas est vera per essentiam; sed sola veritas increata est vera per essentiam: ergo veritas est proprietas Dei solius.

7. Likewise, the truth is, that by which something is true; but the truth is true, since it is cognoscible; but it is established that (it is such) not by another than itself, because otherwise[12] it would go off into infinity; but what is true by its very self, is true through (its) essence: therefore every truth is true through (its) essence; but only the uncreated Truth is true through (Its) Essence: therefore truth is a property of God alone.

Contra: 1. Si veritas est Dei proprietas, aut ergo veritas *complexa*, aut *incomplexa*. Non *complexa*; quia talis est cum compositione,

On the contrary: 1. If truth is a property of God, therefore either (this property) is a *complex* truth, or a *not complex*

in Deo autem non est compositio aliqua. Non *incomplexa*; quia haec convertitur cum ente:[13] ergo cum entitas non sit Dei proprietas, pari ratione nec veritas erit.

[incomplexa]. Not *complex*; because such is with composition, but in God there is not any composition. Not *not complex*; because this is convertible with a being [ente]:[13] therefore since entity is not a property of God, for an equal reason neither is truth.

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[1] In nostra ed. c. 1 circa medium.
[2] Codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt *Deo* et *incommutabilitatis*.
[3] Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *hac* pro *ista*; mox dicitur *primarum*, quia ut *tertia* proprietas a Magistro enumeratur *simplicitas*; omittitur tamen *primarum* a paucis codd. et ed. 1.
[4] Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 adiecimus *quaeritur*.
[5] Cap. 1. cira initium. — Vat. prater fidem mss. et ed. 1 *auctoritate Hieronymi* pro *Hieronymus*.
[6] Cap. 36. n. 66: Si enim falsitas ex iis est, quae imitantur unum, no in quantum id imitantur, sed in quantum implere non possunt. — Et ibid. paulo ante ait: At si corpora in tanum fallunt, in quantum non implent illud unum quod convincuntur imitatri, a quo principio unum est, quidquid est. — Vat. contra plurimos codd. *summe* loco *summum*.
[7] Libr. I. Soliloq. c. 8. n. 15. — De Vera Religione c. 34. n. 64. et c. 36. n. 66. — Vat. absque ulla auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 omittit verba *se et omnia* usque *cognoscendi*.
[8] Cap. 13, ubi probat omnium rerum unam solum esse rectitudinem, ex qua concludit: una igitur in omnibus ilils est veritas.
[9] Ita cum ed. 1 antiquiores codd., quorum quidem aliqui *possunt* legunt pro *possent*; Vat. autem cum cod. cc *possunt dici bona*, quoa posito argumentum destruitur; recte siquidem omnia effective dicuntur et sunt *bona* bonitate prima. Circa finem argumenti Vat. cum cod. cc post *si illa est* repetit verbum *est*, et immediate post Vat. sola pro *et Desu* ponit *etc. ergo*; sed obstat auctoritas mss. et ed. 1.
[10] Rom. 8, 20: Vanitati enim creatura subiecta est. Cfr. etiam Ecclesiastes 3, 19.
[11] Vide Aristot., V. Metaph. text. 34. (IV. c. 29.). — Mox post *summi* supplevimus ex mss. et ed. 1 male omissum *esse*.
[12] Codd. cum ed. 1 *tunc* pro *alias*, sed non ita bene.
[13] Aristot., II. Metaph. text. 4. (I. brevior. c. 1.): Unumquodque sicut se habet ut sit, ita et ad veritatem.

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[1] In our edition ch. 1, near the middle.
[2] The codices together with edition 1 omit *to God* [Deo] and *of incommutability* [incommutabilitatis].
[3] The Vatican text contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 has *this* [hac] for *that . . . (of his text)* [ista]; then it reads *of the first (parts)* [primarum], because *simplicity* is enumerated by Master (Peter) as the *third* (part); however *of the first (parts)* is omitted by a few codices and edition 1.
[4] From the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we inserted *there is asked (the question)* [quaeritur].
[5] Chapter 1 near the beginning. — The Vatican text not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 reads *by the authority of (St.) Jerome* [auctoritate Hieronomi] in place of *(St.) Jerome* [Hieronomus].
[6] Chapter 36, n. 66: For if falsity is from those (things), which imitate the One, not inasmuch as they imitate It, but inasmuch as they cannot fulfill (It). — And ibid. a little before this he says: But if bodies fail to this extent [in tantum], inasmuch as they do not fulfill that One which they are proven guilty (in) imitating, from which Principle, whatever is, is one. — The Vatican text contrary to very many codices has *most highly* [summe] in place of *most high* [summum].
[7] Soliloquies, Bk. I, ch. 8, n. 15. — On the True Religion, ch. 34, n. 64 and ch. 36, n. 66. — The Vatican text, without any authority from the manuscripts and edition 1, omits the words *Itself and all* up to *for cognizing* [se et omnia . . . cognoscendi].
[8] Chapter 13, where he proves that there is only one rectitude of all things, from which he concludes: therefore there is one truth in all those (things).
[9] Thus together with edition 1 the more ancient codices, of which indeed some read the indicative for *can*; but the Vatican text together with codex cc has *can be said (to be) good* [possunt dici bona], which posited destroys the argument; if indeed rightly all are said effectively and are *good* by the first goodness. Near the end of the argument the Vatican text together with codex cc, after *if that is* repeats the word *is* [est], and immediately after this the Vatican text alone puts *etc., therefore* in place of *and (is) God*.
[10] Rm 8:20: For to vanity has the creature been subjected. Cf. also Ecclesiastes 3:19.
[11] See Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. V, text 34. (Bk. IV, ch. 29). — Then after *most high* [summi] we have supplied from the manuscripts and edition 1 the badly omitted *"to be"*.
[12] The codices together with edition 1 have *then* [tunc] in place of *otherwise* [alias], but not so well.
[13] Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. II, text 4 (in the shorter version, Bk. I, ch. 1): Any one (thing) just as it holds itself so that it is, thus also regarding the truth.

2. Item, verum aeque commune est ut bonum, et quodam modo magis;[1] sed bonitas non est Dei proprietas: ergo pari ratione nec veritas.

2. Likewise, the true is as equally common as the good, and in a certain sense moreso;[1] but goodness is not a property of God: therefore for an equal reason neither the truth.

3. Item, veritas est ratio discernendi Creatorem a creatura et creaturam a creatura;[2] sed quod est ratio discernendi et distinguendi est diversum in diversis: ergo alia veritas est in Deo quam in creatura, et in una creatura quam in alia: ergo non est proprium solius Dei.

3. Likewise, the truth is the reason for discerning the Creator from the creature and a creature from a creature;[2] but that which is the reason for discerning and distinguishing is diverse in diverse (things): therefore the truth in God is other than (it is) in a creature, and in one creature than in another: therefore it is not proper to God alone.

4. Item, Augustinus in Soliloquiis:[3] « Verum est id quid est », ergo veritas est ipsa entitas: ergo non est proprium essentiae, quia si sic, qua ratione dicitur: Veritas est[4] proprietas essentiae, posset dici e converso, cum omnino idem sint.

4. Likewise, (St.) Augustine in (his) Soliloquies:[3] « The true is that which is », therefore the truth is entity itself: therefore it is not proper to essence, because if so, by the reason by which there is said: The truth is[4] the property of essence, it could be said conversely, since they are entirely the same.

CONCLUSIO.

Vertias, quatenus opponitur falsitati, invenitur etiam in creaturis secundum triplicem suam comparationem ad subiectum quod informat, ad principium quod repraesentat, ad intellectum quem excitat; quatenus vero opponitur permixtioni, est proprietas solius Dei.

CONCLUSION

Truth, to the extent that it is opposed to falsity, is even found in creatures according to its threefold comparison to the subject which it informs, to the principle which it represents, to the intellect which it excites; however to the extent that it is opposed to confusion [permixtioni], it is a property of God alone.

R**ESPONDEO**: Dicendum, quod veritas habet triplicem comparationem. Habet enim comparari ad *subiectum* quod informat, ad *principium* quod repraesentat, et ad *intellectum* quem excitat. In comparatione ad *subiectum* veritatis dicitur veritas actus et potentiae indivisio. In comparatione ad *principium* dicitur veritas summae unitatis[5] et primae repraesentatio sive imitatio. In comparatione ad *intellectum* dicitur veritas ratio discernendi.

I **RESPOND**: It must be said, that truth has a threefold comparison. For it has to be compared to the *subject* which it informs, to the *principle* which it represents, and to the *intellect* which it excites. In being compared [comparatione] to a *subject* of the truth, truth is meant as the act and the indivision of the power. In being compared to a *principle*, truth is meant as the representation or imitation of the most high and first Unity.[5] In being compared to an

intellect truth is meant as the reason for discerning.

Et in omnibus istis comparationibus dupliciter potest accipi veritas: *uno modo*, prout distinguitur contra *falsitatem*; *alio modo*, prout distinguitur contra *permixtionem*, secundum quod verum dicitur purum et impermixtum.

And in all those comparisons truth can be accepted in a twofold manner: in *one manner*, insofar as it is distinguished against *falsity*; in *another manner*, insofar as it is distinguished against *confusion* [permixtionem], according to which the true is said to be pure and thoroughly unmixed [impermixtum].

Prout veritas dividitur contra falsitatem, quae est privatio indivisionis et imitationis et[6] expressionis, sic cum in creatura sit aliquo modo invenire et indivisionem et imitationem et expressionem, sic est veritas non tantum in Creatore, sed etiam in creatura; et sic non assignatur Dei proprietas.

Insofar as the truth is divided against falsity, which is a privation of indivision and imitation and[6] expression, thus since in a creature there is in some manner to be found both indivision and imitation and expression, so truth is not only in the Creator, but also in the creature; and in this manner a property of God is not assigned.

Alio modo, prout veritas dividitur contra permixtionem sive impuritatem, sic est in solo Deo. Nam in solo Deo est *indivisio* pura, non permixta alicui diversitati; in solo Deo est *imitatio* et similitudo pura non permixta alicui dissimilitudini; et in solo Deo est *expressio luminis* non permixta obscuritati.[7] In creatura autem est indivisio cum actus et potentiae diversitate et imitatio cum dissimilitudine; est ulterius in ea expressio cum obscuritate. Et ideo hoc modo veritas est divini esse proprietas; et sic accipit Magister et Augustinus et Hieronymus. Vocant enim verum esse, quod nihil habet de possibilitate, nihil habet de vanitate, nihil de non entitate. Et ideo in Deo non cadit *praeteritio* et *futuritio*, quae aliquo modo non entia sunt.

In *another manner*, insofar as truth is divided against confusion [permixtionem] or impurity, thus it is in God alone. For in God alone there is pure *indivision*, not confused [non permixta] with any diversity; in God alone there is pure *imitation* and similitude, not confused with any dissimilitude; and in God alone there is the *expression of a light* [luminis], not confused with obscurity.[7] In the creature, on the other hand, there is indivision with diversity of act and power and imitation with dissimilitude; there is furthermore in it an expression with obscurity. And for that reason in this manner truth is a property of the Divine "to be"; and thus do Master (Peter) and (St.) Augustine and (St.) Jerome accept it. For they call a true "to be", that which has nothing concerning possibility, has nothing concerning vanity, nothing concerning non-entity. And for that reason in God there does not fall a *passing-away* [praeteritio] and a *comming-to-be* [futuritio], which in some manner are not beings.

1, 2, 5, 6. Et sic procedunt duae primae auctorites et rationes.

1, 2, 5, 6. And thus proceed the first two authorities and reasons.

3. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur, quod non sit alia veritas quam aeterna, quia ipsa sola facit intelligere; dicendum, quod sicut color est obiectum visus et motivum visus --

3. However to that which is objected, that there is not an other truth than the eternal one, because It Itself alone causes understanding; it must be said, that just as

tamen non sine actu lucis -- et differt ab[8] ipsa luce; sic dicendum, quod veritas creata, quamvis non possit movere sine veritate increata, nihilominus est motiva suo modo et alia veritas ab illa.

color is the object of seeing and the motive for seeing -- however not without the act of light -- and differs from[8] the light itself; so it must be said, that created truth, although it cannot move without uncreated Truth, nevertheless it is motive in its own manner and a truth other than that One.

4. et 7. Ad illud quod obiicitur de Anselmo, quod omnia sunt vera veritate prima; dicendum, quod verum de sui impositione dicit comparationem ad causam exemplarem, sicut bonum ad causam finalem. Sicut enim dicitur bonum ratione *ordinis*, sic verum ratione *expressionis*; et ratio exprimendi est ipsius exemplaris. Sicut igitur, cum dicitur de bonis creatis, quod sunt bona bonitate increata, bonitas praedicat *finem* in ablativo, *non formam*, quia Dei bonitas[9] nullius creati est forma; similiter, cum dicitur, quod omnia sunt vera veritate increata, ablativus dicit causam formalem *exemplarem*.[10] Omnia enim vera sunt et nata sunt se exprimere per expressionem illius summi luminis; quod si cessaret influere, cetera desinerent esse vera. Ideo nulla veritas creata est vera per essentiam, sed per participationem; et per hoc patet ultimum.

4. and 7. To that which is objected concerning (St.) Anselm, that all (things) are true by the prime Truth; it must be said, that the true from its own imposition means a comparison to an exemplar cause, just as the good (does) to a final cause. For just as the good is meant by a reckoning of *order*, so the true by a reckoning of *expression*; and reckoning of expressing belongs to the exemplar itself. Therefore just as, when there is said of created goods, that they are good by the uncreated Goodness, "goodness" is said before the *end* (of the phrase) in the ablative, *not* (before the) *form*, because the goodness[9] of God is the form of no created (thing); similarly, when there is said, that all (things) are true by the uncreated Truth, the ablative means the formal, *exemplary* cause.[10] For all (things) are true and are bound to express themselves through the expression of that most high Light; which if It would cease to inflow, all other (things) would stop being true. For that reason no created truth is true through (its) essence, but (rather) through participation; and by this (reckoning) the last (affirmative proposition) is clear.

Ad illud vero quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod non est proprietas; patet responsio: quoniam / obiicit de vertate, . . .

To that, however, which is objected in the contrary, that it is not a property; the response is clear: since / it objects concerning the truth, . . .

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[1] Ratio communiter allegata est, quia *verum* est enti propinquius et *in se* abstactius.
[2] August., de Vera Religione, c. 7. n. 13: Omnis enim res vel essentia . . . simul haec tria habet, ut et unum aliquid sit, et specie propria discernatur a ceteris, et rerum ordinem non excedat.
[3] Libr. II. c. 5. n. 8: Verum mihi videtur esse id quod *est*.
[4] Multi codd. ut B D F I P Q T X Y Z cum ed. 1 omittunt *est*.
[5] Ex fere omnibus antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 hic pro *veritatis* substituimus *unitatis*, et paulo infra pro *distinguendi* posuimus *discernendi*, quae lectio etiam comprobatur argumento secundo pro affirmativa

[1] The reason commonly alleged is, that *the true* is nearer to being and *in se* more abstract.
[2] (St.) Augustine, On the True Religion, ch. 7, n. 13: For every thing and/or essence . . . at once has these three (characteristics), that it is both one something, and by its proper species is discerned from all the others, and it does not exceed the order of things.
[3] Book II, ch. 5, n. 8: The true seems to me to be that which *is*.
[4] Many codices as B D F I P Q T X Y Z together with edition 1 omit *is* [est].
[5] From nearly all the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have here substituted *unity* [unitatis] for *truth* [veritatis], and a little below this we have put

parte et argumento tertio pro negativa parte supra allato.
[6] Ex plurimus mss. et ed. 1 supplevimus bis particulam *et*.
[7] Vat. cum cod. cc *permixti obscuritate*, sed contra antiquiores codd., quorum tamen nonnulli etiam habet *obscuritate*, sed minus bene et contra immediate praecedentia.
[8] Vat. praeter fidem mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 *ipsa a luce*, sed incongrue, et in fine argumenti contra antiquiores mss. post *veritas* addit *est*.
[9] Vat. contra antiquiores codd. *bonitas increata* pro *Dei bonitas*.
[10] Codd. D T expressius *ablativus non dicit causam formalem esse rerum complectivam, sed exemplarem*. Paulo infra Vat. cum cod. cc, sed contra alios et ed. 1, *expressione* loco *per expressionem*, et in fine Vat. sola *patent ultima* pro *patet ultimum*, sed falso.

for discerning [discernendi] in place of *for distinguishing* [distinguendi], which reading is also corroborated by the second argument in the affirmative and the third argument in the negative, quoted above.
[6] From very many manuscripts and edition 1 we have supplied twice the particle *ant* [et].
[7] The Vatican text together with codex cc has the masculine *not confused* [non permixti] referring to *a light* rather than the feminine *not thoroughly mixed* [non permixta] refering to *expression*, but contrary to the more ancient codices, not a few of which, however, have only *in obscurity* [obscuritate], but less well and contrary to what immediately precedes this.
[8] The Vatican text not trusting in the manuscripts and editions 1, 2 and 3, has *itself from the light* [ipsa a luce], but incongruously, and at the end of the argument contrary to the more ancient manuscripts it reads *is another truth from that One* [alia veritas est ab illa].
[9] The Vatican text contrary to the more ancient codices reads *uncreated goodness* [bonitas increata] for *goodness of God* [Dei bonitas].
[10] Codices D and T more expressly read *the ablative does not mean that there is a formal cause embracing things, but (rather) exemplary (of them)*. A little below this the Vatican edition together with codex cc, but contrary to the others and edition 1, reads *by an expression* [expressione] in place of *through an expression* [per expressionem], and at the end the Vatican text alone has *the last (propositions) are clear* [patet ultima] in place of *the last (affirmative proposition) is clear* [patet ultimum], but falsely.

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obiicit de veritate, secundum quod habet oppositionem ad defectum *falsitatis*, non ad permixtionem possibilitatis; praedicto enim modo convenit non tantum Creatori, sed etiam creaturae.

it objects concerning the truth, according to which it has an opposition to the defect of *falsity*, not to the confusion of possibility; for in the aforesaid manner it is not only agreeable [convenit] to the Creator, but also to the creature.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod veritas est idem quod divina essentia; dicendum, quod de ratione *proprietatis* in creatura sunt ista tria: primum est, quod convenit soli; secundum est, quod est ratio innotescendi; tertium est, quod differt ab eo cuius est proprietas.[1] Duo prima sunt perfectionis, ultimum vero imperfectionis, quia excludit simplicitatem. Et ideo veritas dicitur divinae essentiae proprietas, non quia differat vel sit inhaerens divinae essentiae, sicut

4. To that which is objected, that the truth is the same (thing) which the Divine Essence (is); it must be said, that of the reckoning of *property* in a creature there are these three (manners): the first is, that it convenes with the latter alone [soli]; the second is, that it is a reason for (it) becoming known [ratio innotescendi]; the third is, that it differs from that of which it is the property.[1] The first two belong to perfection, but the last to imperfection, because it excludes simplicity.

accidens[2] subiecto, sed quia soli convenit et est ratio cognoscendi eam. Et haec est causa, quare e converso essentia non est proprietas veritatis, quia non est ratio innotescendi eam, sicut e converso.

And for that reason the truth is said (to be) a property of the Divine Essence, not because it differs from and/or is inherent to the Divine Essence, as an accident[2] to a subject, but because it convenes with the latter alone and is a reason for cognizing it. And this is the cause, why conversely "essence" is not a property of truth, because it is not a reason for coming to know it [ratio innotescendi eam], as (it is) conversely.

Si autem *quaeras*, cum idem significent essentia et veritas, quare unum est ratio cognoscendi alterum, et non e converso; ad hoc dixerunt aliqui, quod quamvis idem significent essentia et veritas, tamen unum, scilicet veritas, est magis ratio cognoscendi ratione connotati. Sed hoc non potest stare, quia veritas nihil connotat. Dicendum ergo, quod hoc est ratione modi significandi et intelligendi.

Moreover if *you ask*, since essence and truth signify the same (thing), why one is the reason for cognizing the other, and not conversely; to this some have said, that although essence and truth signify the same (thing), one however, namely the truth, is a greater reason for cognizing by reason of the (thing) connoted. But this cannot stand, because the truth connotes nothing. Therefore it must be said, that this (lack of reciprocity) is by reason of the manner of signifying and understanding.

Et notandum, quod dupliciter est loqui de his nominibus; *uno* modo ratione eius quod nominant seu significant; *alio* modo ratione eius, in quo significatur poni quod nominant.[3] Unde differt dicere *sensum* et *sensum hominis*; quia primo dicitur commune ad sensum hominis et bruti, secundo proprium hominis. Si ergo accipimus huiusmodi nomina secundum *se*, alia est ratio essentiae, alia veritatis, quoniam essentia dicit *quid*, veritas *conditionem entis*. Cum vero essentiam et veritatem trahimus ad Deum, quamvis idem sint, tamen ratione generalium significatorum unum accipitur ut proprietas alterius; et non est ibi synonymia nec sunt nomina synonyma, sed manet ratio subiecti et proprietatis secundum modum significandi, et manet etiam secundum modum intelligendi; quia per essentiam in creatura intelligimus essentiam in Creatore, et per veritatem creaturae intelligimus veritatem increatam. Unde sicut veritas creata est proprietas et ratio cognoscendi essentiam creatam, sic veritas increata secundum rationem significandi et intelligendi est ratio cognoscendi et intelligendi essentiam increatam.

And it must be noted, that there is a twofold manner in which one speaks [dupliciter est loqui] of these nouns; in *one* manner by reason of that which they name or signify; in *another* manner by reason of that, in which what they name is meant to be posited [significatur poni].[3] Whence it is different to say the *sense* and the *sense of a man*; because in the first manner it is meant commonly according to the sense of man and brute, in the second (according to what is) proper to a man. Therefore if we accept nouns of this manner according to *themselves*, one is the reckoning of the essence, another of the truth, since the essence means the *what*, the truth the *condition of the being*. However when we treat of essence and truth as regards God, although they are the same (Thing), however by reason of the general signifieds one is accepted as the property of the other; and There there is not a synonym nor are nouns synonymous, but (rather) there remains a reckoning of subject and of property according to the manner of signifying, and it remains also according to the manner of understanding; because through the essence in a creature we understand the Essence in the Creator, and

through the truth of a creature we understand the uncreated Truth. Whence just as created truth is a property and a reason for cognizing a created essence, so the uncreated Truth, according to a reckoning of signifying and understanding, is a reason for cognizing and understanding the uncreated Essence.

SCHOLION.

I. Sensus quaestionis est, utrum *veritas* competat Deo tanquam proprium, sive utrum sit de essentia Dei et proprietas Dei solius. *Veritas* hic accipitur, non prout est formaliter in intellectu, nec etiam pro re, quatenus est obiectum intellectus, sed in ordine ad ipsam rem, cuius est actus, sive quatenus dicit indivisionem entis et esse. — Ad intelligentiam terminorum, qui in prima ratione pro parte negativa et alibi saepe occurrunt, notandum, quod *complexum* et *incomplexum* idem sunt ac compositum et incompositum. Veritas *complexa* est passio sive proprietas propositionis, quae dicit connexionem praedicati cum subiecto, et habetur in secunda mentis operatione, nempe in iudicio. Veritas autem *incomplexa* est passio simplex cuiuslibet entis et definitur per hoc, quod sit adaequatio rei ad intellectum, qui rem cognoscit sicuti est. Haec habetur in qualibet prima mentis operatione, quae est simplex apprehensio.

II. Alibi S. Bonav. cum sententia communi distinguit veritatem tripliciter, scil. sumtam vel *formaliter*, quae est veritas in intellectu, vel *radicaliter* sive causaliter, quae est in rebus, vel prout est in *oratione* tanquam *in signo*. Cfr. infra d. 31. p. II. a. 1. q. 1; supra d. 3. p. I. dub. 7; II. Sent. d. 30. a. 3. q. 2; Hexaëm. Serm. 5. De veritate *singi*, infra d. 46. a. 1. q. 4. — S. Thom., I. Sent. d. 19. q. 5; de Verit. q. 1. a. 1. et seqq.; S. I. q. 16. a. 1. 2. 3. 5. — Hoc loco et in Prolog. ad Comment. in Ecclesiast. circa finem agit solummodo de veritate in *rebus*, sive prout veritas est proprietas entis. Haec veritas in

SCHOLIUM

I. The sense of the question is, whether pertains [competat] to God as (something) proper, or whether it concerns the essence of God and (is) a property of God alone. *Truth* is here accepted, not insofar as it is formally in the intellect, nor even on behalf of a thing, to the extent that it is an object of the intellect, but in order to the thing itself, of which it is the act, or to the extent that it means an indivision of a being and "to be". — For an understanding of the terms, which in the first reason occur on behalf of the negative side and often elsewhere, it must be noted, that the *complex* and the *uncomplex* are the same as the "composite" and the "not composite". *Complex* truth is a passion or property of a proposition, which means a connection of the predicate with the subject, and (this) is had in the second operation of the mind, namely in judgment. But *uncomplex* truth is a simple passion of any being and is defined through this, that it is an adequation of a thing to the intellect, which cognizes the thing just as it is. This is had in any first operation of the mind, which is simple apprehension.

II. Elsewhere St. Bonaventure, together with the common opinion, distinguishes "truth" in a threefold manner, that is, taken *formally*, which is truth in the intellect, and/or *radically* or causally, which is the one in things, and/or insofar as it is in *conversation* [oratione] as *in a sign*. Cf. below d. 31, p. II, a. 1. q. 1; above d. 3, p. I, dub. 7; Sent., Bk. II, d. 30, a. 3, q. 2; Hexaëmeron, Sermon 5 "On the truth of a *sign*", below in d. 46, a. 1, q. 4. — St. Thomas, Sent., Bk. I, d. 19, q. 5; On the Truth, q. 1, a. 1, and ff.; Summa., I, q. 16, aa. 1-3, 5. — In this passage and in the

rebus iterum triplici modo considerari potest: primo quidem respectu *subiecti*; et sic veritas est indivisio actus et potentiae, vel cum Avicenna in VIII. Metaph. c. 6: Veritas cuiuslibet rei est proprietas sui esse, quod stabilitum est rei; sive veritas est illa res, quae est in actu; et sub hoc respectu definitur: indivisio *esse* et *quod est*. — Secundo consideratur respectu sui *principii*, quod est exemplar divinum, cui res assimilantur; et sub hoc respectu definitur secundum Augustinum in libr. de Vera Religione c. 36. n. 66: Veritas est summa similitudo principii, quae sine ulla dissimilitudine est, unde falsitas oritur. — Tertio modo consideratur respectu ad *effectum consequentem*, quatenus obiectum intellectu causat veritatem; et sic est ratio cognoscendi rem eamque distinguendi, et sub hoc respectu definitur ab Augustino (loc. cit.): Veritas est quae ostendit id quod est; et ab Hilario: Veritas est declaritivum esse. Cfr. supra d. 3. p. I. dub. 7; Alex. Hal., p. I. q. 15. m. 3; S. Thom., de Veritate q. 1. a. 1. — Alia distinctio veritatis contra falsitatem et contra permixtionem patet ex textu.

Prologue to the Commentary on Ecclesiastes near the end he only deals with truth in *things*, or insofar as truth is a property of a being. This truth in things can again be considered in a threefold manner: first of all in respect to *a subject*; and thus truth is the indivision of act and potency, and or with Avicenna in Metaphysics, Bk. VIII, ch. 6: The truth of any thing is a property of its "to be", which established belongs to the thing; or the truth is that thing, which is in act; and under this respect there is defined: the indivision of *to be* and *that which is*. — Second it is considered in respect to its *principle*, which is the Divine Exemplar, to which the thing is assimilated; and under this respect it is defined according to (St.) Augustine in (his) book On the True Religion, ch. 36, n. 66: Truth is the most high similitude of the principle, which without any dissimilitude is, whence falsity arises. — In the third manner it is considered in respect to the *consequent effect*, to the extent that the object in the intellect causes truth; and thus it is a reason for cognizing a thing and for distinguishing it, and under this respect it is defined by (St.) Augustine (loc. cit.): Truth is that which shows what is; and by (St.) Hilary (of Poitiers): Truth is a declaritive "to be". Cf. above d. 3, p. I, dub. 7; Alexander of Hales, p. I., q. 15, m. 3; St. Thomas, On the Truth, q. 1, a. 1. — The other distinction of truth against falsity and against confusion is clear from the text.

III. Quoad ordinem argumentorum *pro* et *contra* notandum, quod prima propositio, quae agit de veritate, quatenus distinguitur contra falsitatem, probatur tribus prioribus argumentis pro parte *negativa*. Secunda vero, quae est de veritate, quatenus distinguitur contra permixtionem, probatur 5. et 6. argumento pro parte affirmativa. Cetera argumenta per distinctionem in recto sensu explicantur. — Attentione digna sunt, quae hic in corp. et in solut. ad 1. 2. et ad ult. de veritate creata dicuntur, scil. quod nulla veritas creata sit veritas per essentiam, . . .

III. In regard to the order of the arguments *pro* and *contra* it must be noted, that the first proposition, which deals with truth, to the extent that it is distinguished against falsity, is proven by the three prior arguments on the *negative* side. But the second, which concerns truth, to the extent that it is distinguished against confusion [permixtionem], is proven in the 5th and 6th argument on the affirmative side. All the other arguments are explained through a distinction in the right sense. — With due attention these are, those which are here said in the body (of the response) and in the solution to n. 1 and 2 and to the last concerning created truth, namely that no created truth is truth through (its) essence, .

[1] Cfr. Aristot., V. Topic. c. 1. et 2. ac Porphyr., de Praedicabili. c. de Proprio.
[2] Mendum Vat. *antecedens* loco *accidens* correximus fide mss. et trium primarum edd. Paulo infra post *veritatis* non nulli codd. cum ed. 1 non apte addunt particulam *et*.
[3] Plerique codd. ut A R S T Y etc. *denominat. Unde differret*, et paulo *deinde* pro *secundo* et *accipiamus* loco *accipimus*.

. .

[1] Cf. Aristotle, Topics, Bk. V, chs. 1 and 2, and Porphyry, On Predicables, ch. "On the Proper".
[2] The error of the Vatican text of putting *antecedent* [antecedens] in place of *accident* [accidens], we have corrected on the testimony of the manuscripts and the first three editions. A little below this after *of truth* [veritatis] not a few codices together with edition 1 add not aptly the particle *and* [et].
[3] Very many codices as A R S T Y etc. read *they name . . . Whence it would be different* [demoninant. Unde differret], and a little below this they have *then* [deinde] in place of *second* [secondo] and the subjunctive *we accept* [accipiamus] in place of the indicative.

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sed per participationem, et quod nihilominus suo modo est ratio cognoscendi distincta a veritate increata. Quod dictum est contra rigidos Ontologistas.

but (rather) through participation, and that nevertheless in its own manner it is a reason for cognizing distinct from uncreated Truth. What has been said is contrary to the rigid Ontologists.

IV. Quoad 1. et 2. concl. cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 15. m. 5; et q. 17. m. 4. — Pro explicatione loci sumti ex Anselmo (4. fundam.) cfr. S. Thom. (S. I. q. 16. a. 6.) et praecipue Richard. (hic q. 2. a. 4.), qui in extenso et bene rem tractat, licet alia via incedat ac S. Bonav. — De differentia inter *esse divinum* et *esse creatum* cfr. hic dub. 8.

IV. In regard to the first and second conclusion, cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 15, m. 5; and q. 17, m . 4. — For an explication of the text taken from (St.) Anselm (4th fundament) cf. St. Thomas (Summa., I, q. 16, a. 6) and especially Richard of Middletown (here in q. 2, a. 4), who treats of the matter extensively and well, though he proceeds in the other way as St. Bonaventure does. — On the difference among *the Divine "to be"* and *the created "to be"* cf. here in dub. 8.

De tota quaestione: S. Thom., S. c. Gent. I. c. 60; S. I. q. 16. a. 5. — B. Albert., hic a. 1, et d. 46, a. 11. seqq., ubi diffuse multas de hac re quaestiones solvit; S. p. I. tr. 4. q. 19. m. 1. 3. — Petr. a. Tar., hic q. 2. a. 1. et 2. — Richard. a Med., hic. q. 1. et 2. — Aegid. R., hic. 1. princ. q. 1. et d. 19. 2. princ. q. 2. et 3. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 34. per tot. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 1.

On the whole question: St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles., I, ch. 60; Summa., I, q. 16, a. 5. — Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), here in a. 1, and d. 46, a. 11 ff., where he solves many questions concerning this matter at length; Summa., p. I, tr. 4, q. 19, m. 1 and 3. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 2, a. 1 and 2. — Richard of Middletown, here in q. 1 and 2. — Giles the Roman, here in 1st princ. q. 1, and d. 19, 2nd princ. q. 2 and 3. — Henry of Ghent, Summa., a. 34. throughout. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 1.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VIII.

PARS I.
ARTICULUS I.

Quaestio II.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 153-156.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VIII

PART I
ARTICLE I

Question 2

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 153-156.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Quaestio II.

Utrum divinum esse sit adeo verum, quod non possit cogitari non esse.

SECUNDO quaeritur, utrum haec proprietas conveniat Deo in summo, id est, utrum divinum *esse* sit adeo verum, quod non possit cogitari non esse.

1. Et quod sic, videtur per Anselmnum,[1] qui dicit, quod Deus secundum communem

Question 2

Whether the Divine "to be" is true to such an extent, that it cannot be thought not to be.

SECOND there is asked, whether this property convenes with God in the highest (manner), that is, whether the Divine *to be* is true to such an extent, that it cannot be thought [cogitari] not to be.

1. And that (it is) so, seems through (St.) Anselm (of Canterbury)[1] who says, that God

animi conceptionem est quo nihil maius cogitari potest; sed maius est quod non potest cogitari non esse, quam quod potest; ergo cum Deo nihil maius cogitari possit, divinum esse ita est, quod non potest[2] cogitari non esse.

according to the common conception of spirit is He whom nothing greater can be thought; but what cannot be thought not to be is greater, than that which can (be so thought); therefore since nothing can be thought greater than God, the Divine "to be" is such, that It cannot[2] be thought not to be.

2. Item, Damascenus[3] dicit, quod cognitio essendi Deum nobis naturaliter est impressa; sed naturales impressiones non relinquunt nec assuescunt in contrarium: ergo veritas Dei impressa menti humanae est inseparabilis ab ipsa: ergo non potest cogitari non esse.

2. Likewise, (St. John) Damascene[3] says, that the cognition of what it is to be [essendi] God is naturally impressed upon us; but natural impressions do not leave nor grow accustomed (to what is) to the contrary: therefore the truth of God impressed upon the human mind is inseparable from it: therefore He cannot be thought not to be.

3. Item, maior est veritas in esse divino quam in aliqua dignitate;[4] sed aliqua dignitas ita est vera, quod non est ei contradicere corde, ut, omne totum est maius sua parte, et similia; unde non potest cogitari non esse: ergo multo fortius hoc erit verum dicere de prima veritate.

3. Likewise, greater is the truth in the Divine "to be" than in any (other) dignity;[4] but any (other) dignity is so true, that there is no internal contradiction [non est ei contradicere corde], so that, every whole is greater than its part, and similar (things); whence it cannot be thought not to be: therefore much more strongly will this be true to say of the first Truth.

4. Item, intellectus noster nihil intelligit nisi per primam lucem et veritatem,[5] ergo omnis actio intellectus, quae est in cogitando aliquid non esse, est per primam lucem; sed per primam lucem non contingit cogitare, non esse primam lucem sive veritatem: ergo nullo modo contingit cogitare, primam veritatem non esse.

4. Likewise, our intellect understands nothing except through the first Light and Truth,[5] therefore every action of the intellect, which is in thinking something not to be, is through the first Light; but through the first Light one does not happen to think, that the first Light or Truth is not: therefore in no manner does one happen to think, that the first Truth is not.

5. Item, quod contingit cogitare contingit enuntiare;[6] sed non contingit enuntiare, primam veritatem non esse: ergo nec cogitare. *Probatio mediae*: omnis sermo enuntiativus asserit, se esse verum; unde sequitur: si homo est asinus, hominem esse asinum est verum; sed omne quod ponit veritatem, ponit primam veritatem, quia omnis veritas infert illam: ergo omnis sermo assert, primam veritatem esse: ergo etc.

5. Likewise, that which happens to think happens to ennunciate;[6] but one does not happen to think, that the first Truth is not: therefore neither to think (it). *Proof of the middle*: every enunciative discourse [sermo enuntiativus] asserts, that it is true; whence it follows: if a man is an ass, that a man is an ass is true; but everything which posits truth, posits the first Truth, because every truth infers It: therefore every discourse asserts, that the first Truth is: ergo etc..

6. Item, omnis sermo enuntiativus[7] aut affirmativus est, aut negativus; sed

6. Likewise, every ennunciative[7] discourse is either affirmative, or negative; but an

affirmativus affirmat *hoc de hoc*; sed sequitur: si est ens quod est hoc, est ens quod non est hoc, quia cum dico *ens hoc*, dico ens limitatum, finitum et arctatum; et tali posito, ponitur ens summum: ergo omnis sermo affirmativus circa creaturam infert Deum.

affirmative affirms *this of this*; but it follows: if there is a being which is this, it is a being which is not this, because when I say *this being*, I mean a limited, finite, constrained [arctatum] being; and with such posited, there is posited the most high Being: therefore every affirmative discourse about a creature infers God.

7. Item, negativus similiter, quia nullus sermo est magis negativus quam iste: nulla est veritas. Sed Augustinus in Soliloquiis[8] probat, quod sermo iste ponit, aliquam veritatem esse; quia si nulla veritas est, verum est, nullam veritatem esse; et si hoc est verum, aliquid est verum; et si aliquid est verum, aliqua veritas est: ergo etc.

7. Likewise, the negative similarly, because no discourse is more negative than this one: there is no truth. But (St.) Augustine in (his) Soliloquies[8] proves, that that discourse posits, that there is some truth; because if there is no truth, it is true, that there is no truth; and if this is true, something is true; and if something is true, there is some truth: ergo etc..

Sed contra: 1. Damascenus:[9] « In tantum praevaluit perniciosa hominum malitia, ut dicat, Deum non esse, secundum illud Psalmi: *Dixit insipiens* etc. »

But on the contrary: 1. (St. John) Damascene (says):[9] « The pernicious wickedness of men prevails to so great an extent [in tantum], that it says, that God is not, according to that (word) of the Psalm: *The fool said* etc.. »

2. Item, idolatra dicit, quod non est alius Deus nisi idolum, et hoc credit et cogitat; sed constat idolum non esse Deum: ergo etc.

2. Likewise, the idolater says, that there is no other God except an idol, and this he believes and thinks; but it is established that an idol is not God: ergo etc..

3. Item, omne illud, quo intellecto non esse, potest aliquid intelligi, potest cogitari non esse. Sed dicit Boethius in libro de Hebdomadibus,[10] quod in- / -ntellecto per impossibile, . . .

3. Likewise, every that, which when understood not to be, can be understood as something, can be thought not to be. But Boethius says in the book On Weeks,[10] that having un- / -derstood per impossibile, . . .

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[1] Proslog. c. 2. seqq.
[2] Aliqui codd. *possit*.
[3] Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 1. et 3: Nemo quippe mortalium est, cui non hoc ab eo naturaliter insitum sit, ut Deum esse cognoscat.
[4] *Dignitas*, graece □□□□□□, hic et passim significat propositionem immediate sive per se notam, quam definit Aristot., I. Poster. c. 2, quod sit propositio indemonstrabilis, quam necesse est quemlibet docendum habere; et Boeth. de Hebdomad., quod sit enuntiatio, quam quisque probat auditam.
[5] De hac propositione, quae fundatur in doctrina S. Augustini, vide supra q. 1 arg. 3. pro affirmativa parte, et d. 3. p. I. a. 1. q. 1. fundam. 2, ubi et in Scholio sensus ipsius explicatur. — Mox Vat. post *aliquid* omittit *non* et paulo infra post *cogitare* cum cod. cc omittit verba *non esse primam* usque *cogitare*, quae lectio mutila resarcitur ope aliorum codd. et ed. 1.

[1] Prosologion, ch. 2 ff.
[2] Some codices have the subjunctive *can* [possit].
[3] On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. I, ch. 1 and 3: Indeed, there is no one mortal [nemo . . . mortalium], in whom this has not been implanted by Him, to cognize that God is.
[4] *Dignity*, in Greek "axioma" □□□□□□, here and passim signifies a proposition known immediately or per se, which Aristotle defines in Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, ch. 2, which is an indemonstrable proposition, which anyone to be taught necessarily has; and which Boethius in On Weeks (says) is an enunciation, which is proven by anyone who has heard it.
[5] Concerning this proposition, which is founded upon the doctrine of St. Augustine, see above q. 1. arg. 3 of the affirmative part, and d. 3, p. I, a. 1, q. 1, fundament 2, where also in the Scholium the sense of this is explained. — Next the Vatican text after *something* [aliquid] omits *not* [non] and a little below

[6] Vat. contra codd. et edd. 1, 2, 3 verba transponit et modo negativo propositionem sic exhibet: *quod non convenit enuntiare, hoc non convenit cogitare*.
[7] De enuntiatione eiusque specibus vide Aristot., I. Periherm. c. de Enuntiatione. — Mox Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *quia sequitur* pro *sed sequitur*.
[8] Libr. II. c. 2. n. 2 et c. 16. n. 28. — Vat. cum cod. cc post *ponit* addit *primam*, sed contra ceteros codd. et ed. 1 nec non contra ed. operum Augustini.
[9] Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 3: Quoniam vero Satanae improbitas tantum adversus hominum naturam valuit, ut et quosdam in stolidissimam et quovis malo peiorem exitii voraginem detruserit, ita ut Deum esse negarent, quorum insipientiam divinorum verborum interpres David palam faciens ait: Dixit insipiens in corde suo (Psalm. 13, 1.) etc.
[10] Seu in libro: Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint, bonae sint, circa medium.

this after *to think* [cogitare] together with codex cc it omits the words *that there is not a prime* upto *to think* [non esse primam . . . cogitare], which mutilated reading is repaired with the help of the other codices and edition 1.
[6] The Vatican text contrary to the codices and editions 1, 2, and 3, transposes the words and exhibits the proposition in a negative manner, thus: *that which is not agreeable to enuntiate, this is not agreeable to think* [quod non convenit enuntiare, hoc non convenit cogitare].
[7] Concerning enunciation and its species see Aristotle, On Interpretation, Bk. I, ch. "On Enuntiation". — Then the Vatican text not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 has *because it follows* [quia sequitur] in place of *but it follows* [sed sequitur].
[8] Book II, ch. 2, n. 2 and ch. 15. n. 28. — The Vatican text together with codex cc after *posits* [ponit] reads *that there is some first Truth* [primam aliquam veritatem esse], but contrary to all the other codices and edition 1 and contrary to the edition of the works of (St.) Augustine.
[9] On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. I, ch. 3: Since, however, the improbity of Satan has prevailed so much against human nature, that it has pulled certain ones down into a most stupid and worse-than-any-evil chasm of departure, such that they deny that God is, whose foolishness the interpreter of the divine words, David, making clear, said: The fool said in his heart (Ps. 13:1) etc..
[10] Or in the book: In what manner the substances which are in it, are good, near the middle.

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in- / -tellecto per impossibile, summum bonum non esse, adhuc potest aliquid intelligi rotundum et album: ergo similiter in summo vero, et sic poterit cogitari non esse.

un- / -derstood per impossibile, that there is not a most high Good, something can still be understood (to be) round and white: therefore similarly in the most high True, and thus It can be thought not to be.

4. Item, illud quod maxime nos latet, de facili potest cogitari non esse; sed veritas divini esse est huiusmodi, quia *Deus habitat lucem inaccessibilem*:[1] ergo etc.

4. Likewise, that which lays most hidden from us [maxime nos latet], easily can be thought not to be; but the truth of the Divine "to be" is of this kind, because *God dwells (in) light inaccessible*:[1] ergo etc..

5. Item, quaero, quid est dicere, Deum non posse cogitari non esse? Si quia non potest aliquo modo cogitari[2] *nec vere nec false*, illud est manifeste falsum; si quia non potest *vere*, similiter nec anima nec caelum et huiusmodi.

5. Likewise, I ask, what is it to say, that God cannot be thought not to be? If because He cannot in any manner be thought[2] *neither truly nor falsely*, that is manifestly false; if because He cannot (be thought not to be) *truly*, similarly neither the soul nor Heaven and (things) of this kind.

6. Item, quod contingit exprimere contingit[3] et cogitare; sed contingit exprimere, divinum esse non esse: ergo et cogitare. Quod contingat, hoc patet, cum dicitur in speciali: Deus non est, et in generali: nihil est; et quod neutra istarum inferat, Deum esse, patet, quia oppositum non infert oppositum,[4] et quod nihil ponit nihil infert; quaelibet autem istarum nihil ponit.

6. Likewise, that which one happens to express one happens[3] also to think; but it happens that (someone) expresses, that the Divine "to be" is not: therefore also to think (this). That it may happen, this is clear, since there is said in particular cases [in speciali]: "God is not", and in general: "there is nothing"; and that neither of these infers, that God is, it is clear, because an opposite does not infer an opposite,[4] and what posits nothing infers nothing; moreover any of these posits nothing.

CONCLUSIO.

Tanta est veritas divini esse, ut non possit cum assensu cogitari non esse nisi propter defectum ex parte intelligentis, qui ignorat, quid sit Deus; ex parte vero intelligibilis non potest esse defectus nec praesentiae nec evidentiae, sive in se, sive in probando.

CONCLUSION

So great is the truth of the Divine "to be", that it cannot with an assent (of the mind) be thought not to be except on account of a defect on the part of the one understanding, who is ignorant of, what God is; on the part of the intelligible, however, there cannot be a defect neither of presence nor of evidence, either in itself, or in being proven.

R**ESPONDEO**: Dicendum, quod *aliquid cogitare*[5] *non esse* est dupliciter. *Aut* in ratione *falsi*, sicut cogito de hac: homo est asinus; et hoc *cogitare* nihil aliud est quam quid est, quod dicitur, intelligere. Hoc modo potest cogitari non esse veritas divini esse.

I **RESPOND**: It must be said, that *that something is thought*[5] *not to be* is (said) in a twofold manner. *Either* in a *false* reckoning, just as I think of this: man is an ass; and this *to think* is nothing other than what is, what is said, to understand. In this manner there can be thought not to be the truth of the Divine "to be".

Alio modo est cogitare *cum assensu*, sicut[6] cogito aliquid non esse, et credo non esse: et hoc modo *aliquid cogitare non esse*, quod est, potest venire aut ex defectu *intelligentis*, aut ex defectu *intelligibilis*.

In the other manner it is to think *with an assent* (of the mind), just as[6] I think something not to be, and I believe it not to be: and in this manner *that one thinks something not to be*, which is, can come either out of a defect of *the one understanding*, or out of a defect of *the intelligible*.

Defectus autem *intelligentis* est caecitas vel ignorantia, ob quam, quia ignorat rem, cogitat[7] ipsam non esse. Contingit autem dupliciter esse cogitationem de aliquo ente, videlicet *si est* et *quid est*.[8]

Moreover a defect of *the one understanding* is a blindness and/or ignorance, because of which, since [quia] one is ignorant of a thing, one thinks[7] that it is not. Moreover that there is a thinking of some being happens in a twofold manner, namely *if it is* and *what it is*.[8]

Intellectus autem noster deficit in cogitatione divinae veritatis quantum ad

Moreover our intellect is deficient in thought [cogitatione] of the Divine Truth as much as

cognitionem, *quid est*, tamen non deficit quantum ad cognitionem, *si est*. Unde Hugo:[9] « Deus sic ab initio cognitionem suam in homine temperavit, ut sicut nunquam, *quid esset*, poterat comprehendi, ita nunquam, *quia esset*, poterat ignorari ». Quia ergo intellectus noster nunquam deficit in cognitione Dei, *si est*, ideo nec potest ignorare, ipsum esse simpliciter,[10] nec cogitare non esse.

regards the cognition, *what It is*, however it is not deficient as much as regards the cognition, *if It is*. Whence Hugh (of St. Victor says):[9] « God has so tempered His own cognition in man from the start, that just as *what He is* could never be comprehended, so *that He is* could never be ignored » [ignorari]. Therefore because our intellect is never deficient in the cognition of God, *if He is*, for that reason neither can it be ignorant of, that He is simply,[10] nor think that He is not.

Quia vero deficit in cognitione, *quid est*, ideo frequenter cogitat, Deum esse quod non est, sicut idolum, vel non esse quod est, sicut Deum iustum.[11] Et quia qui cogitat, Deum non esse quod est, ut iustum, per consequens cogitat, ipsum non esse: ideo ratione defectus intellectus Deus potest cogitari non esse sive summa veritas; non tamen simpliciter sive generaliter, sed ex consequenti, sicut qui negat, beatitudinem esse in Deo, negat eum[12] esse.

However [vero] because it is deficient in the cognition, *what He is*, for that reason frequently it thinks, that God is what He is not, as an idol, and/or that He is not what He is, as the Just God.[11] And because he who thinks, that God is not what He is, such as the Just One, consequently think, that He is not: for that reason by reason of the defect of the intellect God or the most high Truth can be thought not to be; not however simply or generally, but from the consequence, just as he who does not know, that beatitude is in God, does not know that it is He.[12]

Hoc autem modo procedunt rationes probantes, quod aliquis intellectus cogitat vel cogitare[13] potest, divinum *esse* non esse.

Moreover in this manner proceed the reasons proving, that some intellect does think and/or can think[13], that the Divine *to be* is not.

Alio modo potest cogitari, aliquid non esse propter defectum *a parte intelligibilis*, et huiusmodi defectus potest esse dupliciter: aut defectus *praesentiae*, aut defectus *evidentiae*; defectus *praesentiae*, utpote quia non *semper*, non *ubique*,[14] non ubique totaliter. Quod non *semper* est, aliquando est, aliquando non: et ideo aliquando vere potest cogitari non esse. Similiter de eo quod non est *ubique*, quia eadem ratione, qua potest cogitari non esse hic, potest cogitari non esse alibi. Similiter de eo quod *secundum partem* adest, secundum partem abest.

In another manner it can be thought, that something is not on account of a defect *on the part of the intelligible*, and a defect of this kind can be in a twofold manner: either a defect of *presence*, or a defect of *evidence*; a defect of *presence*, to the extent [utpote] that (it is) not *always*, not *everywhere*,[14] and not everywhere totally. What is not *always*, sometimes is, sometimes is not: and for that reason sometimes it can be truly thought not to be. Similarly concerning that which is not *everywhere*, because by the same reckoning, by which it can be thought not to be here, it can be thought not to be elsewhere. Similarly concerning that which is present [adest] *according to a part*, (for it is therefore) absent according to a part.

Deus autem est semper et ubique et totus

Moreover God is always and everywhere

semper et ubique: ideo non potest cogitari non esse. Hanc rationem assignat Anselmus in libro contra insipientem.[15]

and (is) whole always and everywhere: for that reason He cannot be thought not to be. (St.) Anselm assigns this reason in the book Against the Fool.[15]

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[1] I. Tim. 6, 16; Vulgata: *lucem inhabitat inaccessibilem*.
[2] Cod. W *potest cogitari aliquo modo non esse nec*.
[3] Plerique codd. ut A C S T V W etc. omittunt *contingit*.
[4] Immo impsum destruit, includendo negationem sui oppositi.
[5] Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 *cogitari*, sed cum subnexis minus cohaerenter.
[6] Codd. aa bb satis bene addunt *cum*.
[7] Fide vetustiorum codd. et ed. 1 expunximus *ideo*, quod Vat. cum cod. cc praefigit verbo *cogitat*. Cod. V post *rem* addit *esse*.
[8] Aristot., II. Poster. c. 1.
[9] Libr. I. de Sacram. p. III. c. 1. in fine. Vat. sola in hoc textu post *poterat* addit *ab homine*.
[10] Auctoritate antiquiorum mss. et ed. 1 *simpliciter nec* (quod etiam paulo post occurit) substituimus pro *similiter non*, quod, mutata insuper interpunctione, habet Vat. cum cod. cc; sed non ita distincta est ista lectio.
[11] VAt. cum cod. cc, obnitentibus tamen aliis codd. et ed. 1, hic et paulo infra pro *iustum* minus bene substituit *non iustum*; lectionis utriusque unus sensus; in lection siquidem codd. *iustum* refertur ad praecedens *non esse*.
[12] Praeferimus lectionem plurimum mss. ut H P T Y ee etc. *eum* pro *eam*, utpote quae distinctior est.
[13] Ita codd. cum ed. 1, quorum lectio hic praeferenda est lectioni Vat. *cogitari*. Paulo post etiam unus alterve cod. pro *cogitari* ponit *cogitare*.
[14] Vat., post *semper* addito *quia*, hic adiungit *aut quia, quamvis semper et ubique*; sed obstat auctoritas mss., quorum plures ut A C F K L R S T U V propter repetitionem verborum *non ubique* semel haec verba omittunt, sed incongruenter, ut patet ex subnexis. Ed. 1 *non semper aut non ubique aut non ubique totaliter*. Immediate post Vat. cum cod. cc praeter fidem ceterorum mss. et ed. 1 minus bene *Quia* pro *Quod*, cui codd. aa, bb adiungunt *enim*.
[15] Cap. 1.

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[1] 1 Tm. 6:16; in the Vulgate: *dwells in light inaccessible* [lucem inhabitate inaccessibilem].
[2] Codex W reads *He can be thought in some manner not to be neither* [potest cogitari aliquod modo non esse nec].
[3] The greater part of the codices as A C S T V W etc. omit *happens*.
[4] Nay rather it destroys it, by including a negation of its opposite.
[5] Very many codices together with edition one have *be thought* [cogitari], but less coherently with what is subjoined.
[6] Codices aa and bb add *when* [cum] well enough.
[7] Trusting in the older codices and edition 1 we have expunged *for that reason* [ideo], which the Vatican text together with codex cc prefixed to the word *one thinks* [cogitat]. Codex V after *a thing* [rem] adds *to be* [esse].
[8] Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. II, ch. 1.
[9] On the Sacraments, Bk. I, p. III, ch. 1 at the end. The Vatican text alone in this passage adds *by a man* [ab homine] after *could* [poterat].
[10] On the authority of the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted in place of *similarly not* [similiter non], *simply, nor* [simpliciter nec], which also occurs a little after this, which reading, with changed punctuation, the Vatican text together with codex cc also has; but its reading is not so clear.
[11] The Vatican text together with codex cc, disagreeing however with the other codices and edition 1, here and a little below this substitutes for *the Just (One)* [iustum] the less well *the not Just (One)*; each reading has one sense; in the reading of the codices *the Just* is referred to the preceding *is not* [non esse].
[12] We prefer the reading of the very many manuscripts as H P T Y ee etc., *it is He* [eum esse] instead of *it is* [eam esse], as that which is more distinct.
[13] Thus the codices together with edition 1, the reading of which is here preferred to the reading of the Vatican text *be thought* [cogitari]. A little after this one or an other of the codices also puts *think* [cogitare] in place of *be thought* [cogitari].
[14] The Vatican text, after having adding *that* [quia] after *always* [semper], here adjoins *or that, although always and everywhere* [aut quia, quamvis semper et ubique]; but the authority of the manuscripts withstand this, very many of which as A C F K L R S T U V on account of the repetition of the words *not everywhere* [non ubique], omit these words the first time [semel], but incongruously, as is clear from what is subjoined. Edition 1 reads *not always or not everywhere or not everywhere totally* [non semper aut non ubique aut non ubique totaliter]. Immediately after this the Vatican text together with

codex cc, not trusting in all the other manuscripts and edition 1, has less well *Because* [Quia] in place of *What* [Quod], to which codices aa and bb adjoin *For* [enim].
[15] Chapter 1.

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Non solum propter defectum *praesentiae* potest cogitari aliquid non esse, sed etiam propter defectum *evidentiae*, quia non est evidens *in se*, nec est evidens *in probando*. Sed divini esse veritas est evidens et *in se* et *in probando*. *In se*, quia sicut principia cognoscimus in quantum terminos,[1] et quia causa praedicati clauditur in subiecto, ideo se ipsis sunt evidentia; sic et in proposito. Nam Deus sive summa veritas est ipsum esse, quo nihil melius cogitari potest: ergo non potest non esse nec cogitari non esse. Praedicatum enim clauditur in subiecto. Nec tantum habet evidentiam ex[2] se, sed etiam *ex probatione*, quoniam divinam veritatem esse probat et concludit omnis *veritas et natura* creata, quia se est ens per participationem et ab alio, est ens per essentiam et non ab alio. Probat etiam ipsam et conludit omnis intelligentia recta, quia omni animae eius cognitio est impressa, et omnis cognitio est per ipsam. Probat iterum impsam et concludit omnis *propositio affirmativa*; omnis enim talis aliquid ponit; et aliquo posito ponitur verum; et vero posito poniter veritas, quae est causa omnis veri.[3] Propositio autem *negativa* non infert ipsam nisi sophistice, ut dicunt. Unde ex hoc quod est *nihil esse*, vel *nullam veritatem esse*, non contingit concludere nec inferre, veritatem esse. Haec enim propositio: *nihil esse*,[4] destruit omnem veritatem. Et ideo ad ipsam non sequitur aliqua affirmatio, et haec est falsa: si nihil est, nihil esse est verum. Et si dicatur, quod omnis propositio infert dictum, verum est, sed si nihil est, null apropositio est nec aliquid. Augustinus autem tale argumentum non facit approbando, sed inquirendo.

Not only on account of a defect of *presence* can it be thought that something is not, but also on account of a defect of *evidence*, because it is not evident *in itself*, nor is it evident *in being proven*. But the truth of the Divine "to be" is evident *in itself* and *in being proven*. *In itself*, because just as we cognize principles inasmuch as (we cognize) terms,[1] and because a cause of a predicate is closed in a subject, for that reason these are by their very selves evident; so also in the proposed. For God or the most high Truth is Itself the "To Be", than whom nothing better can be thought: therefore He cannot not be nor be thought not to be. For the predicate is closed in the subject. Nor does it only have evidence out of[2] itself, but also *out of proof* [ex probatione], since every created *truth and nature* proves and concludes that there is a Divine Truth, because if there is a being through participation and from another, there is a being through essence and not from another. Every *right intelligence* also proves and concludes it, because upon every soul has its cognition been impressed, and every cognition is through it. Again, every *affirmative proposition* proves and concludes it; for every such posits something; and with something posited there is posited the true; and with the true posited there is posited the Truth, which is the cause of every true.[3] On the other hand [autem] a *negative* proposition does not infer it except in a sophistic manner, as they say. Whence from this that it is *that nothing is*, and/or *that there is no truth*, one does not happen to conclude nor infer, that there is truth. For this proposition: *that nothing is*,[4] destroys every truth. And for that reason after it there does not follow any affirmation, and this is false: if nothing is, "that nothing is" is true. And if it be said,

that every proposition infers what is said, it is true, and if nothing is, no proposition is nor (is) anything. (St.) Augustine, however [autem], does not make such an argument for approving it, but for inquiring (into it).

Concedendum est igitur, quod tanta est veritas divine esse, quod cum assensu non potest cogitari non esse nisi propter ignorantiam cogitantis, qui ignorat, *quid* est quod per nomen Dei[5] dicitur. Et concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc, licet aliquae sint sophisticae.

Therefore it must be conceded, that so great is the truth of the Divine "to be", that with an assent (of the mind) it cannot be thought not to be except on account of the ignorance of the one thinking, who is ignorant, *what* It is which is mean by the name of God.[5] And the reasons for this are to be conceded, though some are sophistic.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium: In tantum praevaluit etc.; dicendum, quod Damascenus loquitur de cogitatione, quae venit ab excaecatione; quod patet ex ipso verbo eius cum dicit *malitia*.

1. To that, therefore, which is objected in the contrary: To so great an extent does . . . prevail etc.; it must be said, that (St. John) Damascene speaks of the thinking, which comes from complete blindness [ab excaecatione]; which is clear from his very word when he says *wickedness*.

2. Similiter ad illud de idolo, dicendum, quod ideo errat,[6] quia ignorat, *quid* sit; unde non cogitat, Deum non esse in universali.

2. Likewise regarding that concerning an idol, it must be said, that for that reason (the idolater) errs,[6] because he is ignorant of, *what* He is; whence he does not think, that three is not a God in the universal (sense).

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod intellecto Deo non esse, possunt alia[7] intelligi; dicendum, quod Boethius loquitur de intellectu, quo per impossbile aliquid cogitamus, sed non assentimus.

3. To that which is objected, that with God understood not to be, other (things) can be understood;[7] it must be said, that Boethius speaks of an understanding, by which we think something per impossibile, but do not assent (to it).

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod maxime nos latet; patet responsio, quia[8] maxime nos latet, *quid est*, sed tamen maxime patet, *si est*.

4. To that which is objected, that It lies most hidden from us; the response is clear, because[8] *what He is* does lie most hidden from us, but nevertheless [tamen] *if He is* lies most openly [maxime patet].

5. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quid est dicere, divinam veritatem non posse cogitari non esse? dicendum, quod hoc est dicere, quod[9] aliquis non potest credere, quod Deus non sit, dummodo utatur ratione. Non sic de creaturis; quia etsi certum est, unam creaturam esse praesentem uni, non tamen omnibus, quia non est virtutis tantae, ut se omnibus offerat aequaliter, sicut prima veritas.

5. To that which is objected, "What it is to say, that the Divine Truth cannot be thought not to be?", it must be said, that this is to say, that[9] someone cannot believe, that God is not, so long as he uses reason. Not so concerning creatures; because even if it is certain, that one creature is present to one, (it is) not, however [tamen], to all (thus certain), because (a creature) is not of so great virtue, that it offers itself equally to

all, as the first Truth (does).

6. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod contingit exprimere contingit et cogitare; dicendum, quod potest accipi cogitare *generaliter* pro actu mentis sive errantis sive non, sive assentientis sive non; et tunc est illud verum; vel pro cogitatione *cum assensu*; et sic est falsum, quia dignitatibus contingit contradicere quantum ad exterius rationem, non tamen quantum ad interius, ut dicit Philosophus in libro Posteriorum.[10]

6. To that which is objected, (that) that which one happens to express one happens also to think; it must be said, that "to think" [cogitare] can be accepted *generally* for an act of the mind whether errant or not, whether assenting or not; and then that is true; and/or for thinking *with an assent*; and thus it is false, because it happens that one contradicts axioms [dignitatibus] as regards exterior reckoning, not however as much as regards interior, as the Philosopher says in the book Posterior Analytics.[10]

SCHOLION.

I. Quaestio haec fere coincidit cum illa, quae communiter sic exprimitur, utrum Deum esse sit per se notum. Nihilominus, ut bene intelligatur mens S. Doctoris, observare iuvat, quid status quaestionis, et consequenter etiam forma solutionis aliquatenus differunt a questione posita in forma supradicta et eius solutione. Sanctus enim loquitur hic directe de veritate divini esse et tantum indirecte de nostra cognitione huius divini esse; illa vero alia quaestio immeditate est de nostra co- / -gnitione.

SCHOLIUM

I. This question nearly coincides with that, which is commonly expressed thus, whether "that God is" is known through itself [per se notum]. Nevertheless, so that the mind of the Holy Doctor may be well understood, it helps to observe, that the status of the question, and consequently also the form of the solution differs to some extent from the question posited in the above said form and its solution. For the Saint speaks here directly of the truth of the Divine "to be" and only indirectly of our cognition of this Divine "to be"; however, that other question immediately concerns our co- / -gnition.

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[1] Supple: cognoscimus. Aristot., I. Poster. c. 3. (iuxta transl. Boethii): Principium scientiae esse quoddam dicimus, in quantum terminos cognoscimus.
[2] Ex antiquioribus mss. et ed. 1 substituimus *ex* pro *in*.
[3] Quomodo haec ratio sit intelligenda, vide supra fundam. 5. et 6.
[4] Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis codd. et ed. 1 refragantibus, *est*. Proxime sequentem propositionem, quae a Vat. corrupte et mutile exhibetur, restauramus ope mss. et ed. 1 ponendo *affirmatio* loco *affirmativa*, dein *falsa* pro *vera*, et addendo verba *nihil esse* usque *si nihil est*. Codd. in eo tantum dissident, quod alii habent *dicatur*, alii cum ed. 1 *dicat*, alii *dicas*.
[5] Plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt *Dei*.
[6] Supple: idolatra.
[7] Fide vetustiorum mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic non apte additum *esse*.
[8] Vat. contra mss. et ed. 1 *quod*.
[9] Supplevimus ex mss. D G H K T Y Z aa bb ee ff et ed. 1 verba *hoc est dicere quod*. Mox cod X *cogitare* loco *credere*. Paulo infra ex cod. T adiecimus *praesentem*; deinde ex eodem codice loco *veritatis* posuimus *virtutis*, quae lectio et in se distinctior est in corp. art. (de *defectu praesentiae*), insinuari videtur.

[1] Supply: *we cognize* [cognoscimus]. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, ch. 3 (according to Boethius' translation): We say that there is a certain principle of a science, inasmuch as we cognize (its) terms.
[2] From the more ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted *out of* [ex] for *in* [in].
[3] In what manner this reckoning is to be understood, see fundaments 5 and 6 above.
[4] The Vatican text together with codex cc, disagreeing with the other codices and edition 1, as *there is nothing* [nihil est]. The next following proposition, which is exhibited in a corrupt and mutilated form by the Vatican text, we have restored with the help of the manuscripts and edition 1 by putting *affirmation* [affirmatio] in place of *affirmative* [affirmativa], then *false* [falsa] in place of *true* [vera], and by adding the words *that nothing is* [nihil esse] upto *if nothing is* [si nihil est]. The codices disagree in this only, that some have *it be said* [dicatur], others together with edition 1 *one says* [dicat], others *you say* [dicas].
[5] Very many codices together with edition 1 omit *of God* [Dei].
[6] Supply: *the idolater* [idolatra].
[7] Trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1 we have

[10] Libr. I. c. 8. (c. 10) iuxta translat. Boethii: Semper enim est instare ad exterius orationem, sed ad interius orationem non semper (□□□). Cfr. S. Thomas in Comment. super hunc locum, lect. 19, ubi et in translatione antiqua et in Commentario ipso pro *orationem* semper habetur *rationem*. — Vat. transponit contra sensum verborum Aristotelis *rationem* ante *contradicere*, et paulo ante pro *et sic* habet *tunc*, ac post *dignitatibus* addit *id est propositionibus per se notis*, sed praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1.

expunged here the not aptly added *to be* [esse].

[8] The Vatican text contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 has *that* [quod].

[9] We have supplied from manuscripts D G H K T Y Z aa bb ee ff and edition 1 the words *this is to say that* [hoc est dicere quod]. Then codex X has *think* [cogitare] in place of *believe* [credere]. A little below this from codex T we have inserted *present* [praesentem]; then from the same codex in place of *of . . . a truth* [veritatis] we have put *of . . . virtue* [virtutis], which reading is both in itself more distinct and seems to be insinuated in the body of the article (from *defect of presence*.

[10] Book I, ch. 8 (ch. 10) according to the translation of Boethius: For there is always an insisting [instare] as regards exterior discourse, but as regards interior discourse not always (□□□). Cf. St. Thomas' Commentary on this passage, lect. 19, where both in the ancient translation and in his Commentary *reckoning* [rationem] is always had in place of *discourse* [orationem]. — The Vatican text transposes *reckoning* [rationem] before *to contradict* [contradicere] contrary to the sense of Aristotle's words, and a little before this it has *then* [tunc] in place of *and thus* [et sic], and after *axioms* [dignitatibus] it has *that is propositions known through themselves* [id est propositionibus per se notis], but contrary to the testimony of the manuscripts and edition 1.

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co- / -gnitione. Insuper bene attendendae sunt distinctiones in textu positae.

co- /-gnition. Moreover the distinctions posited in the text must be well attended to.

II. Circa quaestionem, utrum existentia Dei sit per se nota, antiqui Scholastici diverso modo loquuntur. Omnes tamen concedunt, existentiam esse de conceptu essentiali Dei. S. Anselmus docet, omni apprehendenti significationem vocabuli *Deus* per se notam esse eius existentiam; unde ex ipso conceptu Dei ut entis, quo melius cogitari non potest, format argumentum ad probandam existentiam Dei. De valore huius argumenti disputatur. In favorem ipsius citantur Aegid. R., d. 3. p. I. 1. princ. q. 2. et Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. Fortasse etiam hi duo vix discedunt a sententia communi Scholasticorum, qui efficaciam argumenti restringunt ad eos, qui iam *propriam* Dei rationem ut primi et necessarii entis habent et addmittunt. Porro Nominales asserunt, nec nobis nec Beatis illam propositionem, Deum esse, per se notam

II. About the question, whether the existence of God is known through itself [per se nota], the ancient Scholastics speak in a diverse manner. However all concede, that existence concerns the essential concept of God. St. Anselm teaches, that for everyone apprehending the significance of the word *God*, His existence is known through itself; whence from the very concept of God as of a being, a better than which cannot be thought, he forms the argument to prove the existence of God. Concerning the value of this argument there is a dispute. In its favor are cited Giles the Roman, d. 3, p. I, 1st princ., q. 2, and (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 2. Perhaps these two also slightly depart from the common sentence of the Scholastics, who restrict the efficacy of the argument to those, who already have and admit *their*

esse. Scotus facit quasdam difficultates circa distinctionem inter propositionem per se notam *in se* et per se notam *quoad nos*; attamen quoad rem principalem concedit, dictam propositionem esse notam per se Deo et Beatis, non tamen nobis. S. Thomas simpliciter docet, dictam propositionem esse notam per se secundum se, non tamen nobis (S. I. q. 2. a. 1; I. Sent. d. 3. q. 1. et quaestiunc. 2; de Verit. q. 10. a. 12; S. c. Gent. I. c. 10. 11.).

own reckoning of God as the first and necessary Being. Furthermore the Nominalists assert, that neither to us, nor to the Blessed is that proposition, that God is, known through itself. (Bl. John Duns) Scotus mentions certain difficulties about the distinction between a proposition known through itself *in itself* and one known through itself *in regard to us*; but he, however, does concede it in regard to the principle matter [rem], that the said proposition is known through itself to God and to the Blessed, not however to us. St. Thomas simply teaches, that the said proposition is known through itself according to itself, not however to us (Summa., I, q. 2, a. 1; Sent., Bk. I, d. 3, q. 1 and quaestiunc. 2; On the Truth, q. 10, a. 12; Summa against the Gentiles , I, chs. 10, 11).

Omnes tamen antiqui Scholastici concedunt, in aliquo sensu existentiam Dei esse etiam nobis notam per se, scilicet non sub ratione propria, sed sub rationibus communibus, nempe entis, veri, boni, beatitudinis; cfr. S. Thom., S. I. q. 2. a. 1. ad 1. et 3; S. c. Gent. I. c. 11. ad 4; I. Sent. d. 3. q. 2. — Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 3. m. 2. ad 3. rem sic explicat: « Cognitio alicuius potest esse duobus modis: in ratione communi et in ratione propria. Potest igitur aliquid cognosci in ratione communi, et tamen ignorari sub ratione propria, sicut cum aliquis cognoscit *mel* sub ratione communi, videlicet quod est corpus molle, rubeum, ignorat autem ipsum sub ratione propria; et ideo cum videt, *fel* esse corpus molle, rubeum, deceptus credit, ipsum esse *mel*. Similiter cognitio beatitudinis et appetitus ipsius nobis innatus est ratione communi, quod est status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus; tamen in ratione propria ab aliquibus ignoratur. Unde diversi in diversis ponunt et aetimant beatitudinem . . . Similiter dicendum, quod idolatrae Deum in ratione communi non ignorant, quod est ens, principium, omnipotens, Dominus; tamen sub ratione propria ignorant » etc. Idem in solut. ad 4. affirmat, Deum cognitione *quid* est posse ignorari, non cognitione *quia* est. Eandem distinctionem et idem exemplum fellis et mellis habet B.

However all the ancient Scholastics concede, that in some sense the existence of God is also known through itself to us, that is not under a proper reckoning, but under common reckonings, namely of being, the true, the good, beatitude; cf. St. Thomas, Summa., I, q. 2, a. 1, at nn. 1 and 3; Summa against the Gentiles, I. ch. 11, at n. 4; Sent., Bk. I, d. 3, q. 2. — Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 3, m. 2, at n. 3, explains the matter thus: « The cognition of anything can be in two manners: in a common reckoning and in a proper reckoning. Therefore something can be cognized in common reckoning, and however be ignored under a proper reckoning, just as when someone cognizes *honey* under a common reckoning, namely that it is a soft, ruby body [corpus molle, rubeum], but is ignorant of it under a proper reckoning; and therefore when he sees, that *gall* is a soft, ruby body, being deceived he believes, it to be *honey*. Similarly the cognition of beatitude and an appetite for it are innate to us in a common reckoning, that it is a state perfected by the aggregation of all goods; however in a proper reckoning some are ignorant of it. Whence diverse (things) in diverse manners are posited and estimated to be beatitude . . . Similarly it must be said, that because idolaters are not ignorant of God in

Albert., S. tr. 3. q. 19. m. 2. Cfr. etiam Richard., hic p. I. a. 1. q. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 1. a. 2. — Hoc posito, intelligitur doctrina illa communis, quod Deus implicite cognoscatur in omni actu intellectualis cognitionis. Ita S. Thom., de Verit. q. 22. a. 2. ad 1: « Dicendum, quod omnia cognoscentia cognoscunt implicite Deum in quodlibet cognitio. Sicut enim nihil hebet rationem appetibilis nisi per similitudinem primae bonitatis, ita nihil est cognoscibile nisi per similitudinem primae veritatis »; S. Bonaventura de Reductione artium ad Deum: « In omni re, quae sentitur sive quae cognoscitur, interius latet ipse Deus »; Scot. I. Sent. d. 3. q. 2: « Cognoscendo enim quodcumque ens, ut hoc ens est, *indistinctissime concipitur Deus* ».

the common reckoning, that He is the Being, the Principle, the Omnipotent, the Lord; however under a proper reckoning they are ignorant » etc.. He affirms the same in the solution to n. 4, that God according to the cognition of *what* He is can be ignored, not according to the cognition of *that* He is. The same distinction and the same example of gall and honey is had in Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), Summa., tr. 3, q. 19, m. 2. Cf. also Richard (of Middletown), here in p. I, a. 1, q. 2. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 1, a. 2. — With this posited, that doctrine is understood to be common, (which says) that God is implicitly cognized in every act of intellectual cognition. Thus St. Thomas, On the Truth, q. 22, a. 2, at n. 1: « It must be said, that all cognizing cognize implicitly God in everything cognized. For just as nothing has a reckoning of appetible except through a similitude of the first Goodness, so nothing is cognizable except through a similitude of the first Truth »; St. Bonaventure de Reductione artium ad Deum: « In every thing, which is sensed or which is cognized, God Himself interiorly lays hidden »; (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Sent., Bk. I, d. 3, q. 2: « For by cognizing whichever being, as this being is, *God is most indistinctly conceived* ».

Patet ergo, S. Bonaventuram non declinasse a via communi dicendo, intellectam nostrum non deficere quoad questionem, si Deus est (i. e. sub aliqua ratione communi), sed tantum quoad quaestionem, quid Deus est (i. e. sub ratione propria). Cfr. de hoc Trigosus, Summa theol. q. 2. a. 2. dub 1. (qui tamen istam distinctionem non satis considerat). Quodsi Seraphicus argumentum notum Anselmi approbare videtur, observandum est, eum loqui vel de divino esse in se, vel de eo intellectu, qui Deum sub ratione propria iam cognoscit. Huic enim evidens esse debet, existentiam Dei includi in eius essentia. Excaecato vero intellectui et ignoranti, quid Deus est, manet absconditum id quod in se est evidens, ita ut Deum verum et vivum in stultitia sua negare praesumat.

Therefore it is clear, that St. Bonaventure has not departed from the common way by saying, that our intellect does not fail in regard to the question, if God is (i. e. under some common reckoning), but only in regard to the question, what God is (i. e. under a proper reckoning). Cf. on this matter Trigosus, Summa theologica, q. 2, a. 2, dub. 1 (who however does not sufficiently consider this distinction). But if the Seraphic (Doctor) seems to approve the noted argument of (St.) Anselm, it must be observed, that he speaks of the Divine "to be" in itself, and/or of one understanding, who cognizes God already under a proper reckoning. For to this one it ought to be evident, that the existence of God is included in His essence. However having been blinded in understanding and ignorant of, what God is, there remains hidden that which is evident in itself, so that he

presumes to deny in his stupidity the true and living God.

III. Quoad ipsas conclusiones praeter iam citatos cfr. Bonav. Itinerar. c. 5; Hexaëm. Serm. 5. et 10. — Scot., I. Sent. d. 2. q. 2. — B. Albert., S. p. I. tr. 4. q. 19. m. 1. 4. — Henr. Gand., S. a. 22. per totum, et a. 30. q. 3. — Durand., hic p. I. q. 3. et 1. — Dionys. Carth., hic q. 2. — Biel, hic q. 4.

III. In regard to those conclusions, besides those things already cited, cf. St. Bonaventure, Itinerarium., ch. 5; Hexaëmeron, Serms. 5 and 10. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Sent., Bk. I, d. 2d q. 2. — Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), Summa., p. I, tr. 4, q. 19, m. 1 and 4. — Henry of Gent, Summa., a. 22 throughout, and a. 30, q. 3. — Durandus, here in p. I, qq. 3 and 1. — (Bl.) Dionysius the Carthusian, here in q. 2. — (Gabriel) Biel, here in q. 4.

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VIII.

PARS I.
ARTICULUS II.

Quaestio I.

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaries on the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VIII

PART I
ARTICLE II

Question 1

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 156-158.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 156-158.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

ARTICULUS II.

ARTICLE II

De immutabilitate Dei.

On the Immutability of God.

Consequenter secundo loco est quaestio de secunda proprietate divini esse, scilicet immutabilitate. De qua duo quaeruntur:

Consequently in the second place is the question concerning the second property of the Divine "Being" [esse], that is immutability. Of which two (questions) are asked:

Primo quaeritur, utrum immutabilitas sit in Deo.

Secundo, utrum sit Dei proprietas.

First there is asked, whether immutability is in God.

Second, whether it is a property of God.

Quaestio I.

Utrum Deus sit immutabilis.

Question 1

Whether God is immutable.

QUOD IMMUTABILITAS sit in Deo, ostenditur hoc modo.

THAT IMMUTABILITY is in God, is shown in this manner.

1. Omnis mutatio aut est secundum substantiam, aut secundum accidens;[1] sed Deus non mutatur secundum *substantiam*, quia omne tale est corruptibile, Deus autem sive divina substantia, cum non habeat principium, est incorruptibilis: ergo etc.

1. Every change [mutation] either is according to substance, or according to accident;[1] but God is not changed [mutatur] according to *substance*, because every such (thing) is corruptible, but God or the Divine Substance, since it does not have a principle, is incorruptible: ergo etc..

2. Item, nec secundum *accidens*, quia in Deo non est accidens: ergo nulla in eo est mutatio.

2. Likewise, neither according to *accident*, because in God there is not an accident: therefore there is no change in Him.

3. Item, omne quod mutatur, per prius est in potentia quam in actu,[2] et in tali differt actus a potentia; sed Deus est purus actus: ergo nullo modo mutatur.

3. Likewise, everything which is changed, is through (a consideration of what is) prior, in potency rather than in act,[2] and in such (its) act differs from (its) potency; but God is pure act: therefore in no manner is He changed.

4. Item, fiat deductio Richardi.[3] « Omnis mu- / -tatio

4. Likewise, let Richard (of St. Victor)'s deduction be made.[3] « Every change

[1] Vide Aristot., V. Phys. text. 1. seqq. ac XI. Metaph. c. 10. (X. c. 11.).
[2] Aristot., XII. Metaph. text. 8 (XI. c. 2.): Omne mutatur ex potentia ente in actu ens.
[3] Libr. II. de Trin. c. 3: Sciendum itaque, quia omnis mutatio est aut de statu in statum meliorem, aut de statu in statum deteriorem, aut de statu in statum priori aequalem; ubi autem nihil horum esse potest, vera incommutabilitas inest. — Mox ed. 1 *optima* pro

[1] See Aristotle, Physics, Bk. V, text 1 ff., and Metaphysics, Bk. XI, ch. 10 (Bk. X, ch. 11).
[2] Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. XII, text 8 (Bk. XI, ch. 2): Everything is changed from a being (in) potency to a being in act.
[3] On the Trinity, Bk. II, ch. 3: And so it must be known, that every change is either from a state into a better state, or from a state into a lower state [statum deteriorem], or from a state into a state

verissime, et cod. K in fine argumenti *divinae essentiae* pro *divino esse*.

equal to the prior one; but where there can be nothing of these, there is true incommutability. — Then edition 1 has *best* [optima] in place of *most truly* [verissime], and codex K at the end of the argument has *with the Divine Essence* [divinae essentiae] in place of *with the Divine "Being"*.

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« Omnis mu- / -tatio aut est in statum meliorem aut deteriorem aut parem »; sed nullo istorum modorum mutatur divina natura, quia non in meliorem, quia verissime est; non in deteriorem, quia a semetipsa est; non in aequalem, quia perfecta est: ergo nullo modo convenit divino esse mutabilitas.

change is either into a better or a lower [deteriorem] or a comparable [parem] state »; but in none of these manners is the Divine Nature changed, because not into a better, because It most truly is; not into a lower, because It is by Its very self; not into an equal, because It is perfect: therefore in no manner does mutability convene with the Divine "Being".

C**ONTRA**: 1. Sapientiae septimo:[1] *Omnibus mobilibus mobilior est sapientia*: ergo etc. *Si dicatur*, quod sapientia dicitur mobilis per causam, eo quod facit alia moveri; *contra*: nihil dat quod non habet; sed Deus dat omnibus motum:[2] ergo motus vel mutatio maxime est in Deo.

O**N THE CONTRARY**: 1. In the seventh (chapter) of Wisdom:[1] *More mobile than all movables is Wisdom*: ergo etc.. *If it be said*, that Wisdom is said to be mobile [mobilis] through (the manner of) a cause, for this that it causes others to be moved; *on the contrary*: nothing gives what it does not have; but God gives movement [motum][2] to all: therefore movement and/or change is most greatly in God.

2. Item, omne quod nunc est aliquid, quod non prius, est mutatum;[3] sed Filius Dei est homo, ab aeterno autem non fuit homo: ergo est mutatus. *Si dicas*, quod homo praedicatur de Filio Dei non per inhaerentiam, sed per unionem; et unio est relatio, et relatio advenit sine mutatione, ut de nummo fit pretium, ut dicit Augustinus in quinto de Trinitate:[4] *contra*: Ambrosius[5] ita arguit contra haereticum, qui posuit Filium ex tempore genitum a Patre, quia si hoc, tunc Pater factus est de *non Patre Pater*, ergo mutatur: ergo similiter in proposito.

2. Likewise, everything which is now something, because (it was) not before, has been changed;[3] but the Son of God is a man, moreover from eternity He was not a man: therefore He has changed. *If you say*, that man is predicated of the Son of God not through inherence, but through union; and union is a relation, and a relation comes without a change, as a price comes to be from a coin, as (St.) Augustine says in the fifth (book) <u>On the Trinity</u>:[4] *on the contrary*: (St.) Ambrose[5] thus argues against the heretic, who posited that the Son (was) begotten by the Father in time [ex tempore], because if (He would be) in this (manner), then the Father has become *the Father* from *a non-Father*, therefore He has changed: therefore similarly in the proposed.

3. Item, quicumque de non agente fit agens,

3. Likewise, whatsoever from not-acting

mutatur mutatione, quae est ab otio in actum;[6] sed Deus de non creante factus est creans: ergo est mutatus. *Si dicas*, quod Deus de non agente fit agens non propter mutationem sui, sed propter mutationem effectus producti, sicut sol de non illuminante fit illuminans; *contra*: non quia creatura est, ideo Deus creat, sed quia Deus creat, creatura fit sive producitur. Per prius est ergo Deum agere, quam creaturam fieri: ergo cum posterius non sit causa prioris, non quia creatura fit de non ente ens, Deus fit de non creante creans, sed e converso; et ita mutatio est ratione agentis,[7] non effectus.

becomes acting, is changed by a change, which is from leisure [ab otio] into act;[6] but God from not-creating has become creating: therefore He has been changed. *If you say*, that God from not-acting becomes acting, not on account of a change of Himself, but on account of the change of an produced effect, just as the sun from not-illuminating becomes illuminating (with the advent of dawn); *on the contrary*: not because there is a creature, does God for that reason create, but because God creates, a creature is made or is produced. Therefore, it is through (a consideration of what is) prior, that God acts, rather than that a creature is made: therefore since the posterior is not a cause of the prior, not because a creature is made a being from a non-being, does God become creating from not-creating, but conversely; and thus the change is according to the reckoning of the agent,[7] not of the effect.

4. Item, Deus aliquid vult, quod prius non voluit, quia ex tempore voluit creare, quod non voluit ab aeterno; sed quicumque vult aliquid, quod non prius, mutatus est:[8] ergo etc. *Si tu dicas*, quod ab aeterno voluit creare mundum in illo instanti,[9] sicut ego volo audire missam cras; *contra*: voluntas Dei est causa rerum proxima et immediata; sed posita causa proxima et immediata, ponitur effectus: ergo si ab aeterno voluit, ab aeterno mundus fuit.

4. Likewise, God wills something, which He does not will before, because He has willed to create in time [ex tempore], what He has not willed (to create) from eternity; but whosoever wills something, which (he did) not (will) before, has been changed:[8] ergo etc.. *If you say*, that from eternity He willed to create the world in that instant,[9] just as I will to hear Mass tomorrow; *on the contrary*: the Will of God is the cause of things proximate and immediate; but having posited a proximate and immediate cause, the effect is posited: therefore if from eternity He did will (it), from eternity the world came to be.

CONCLUSIO.

Deus est omnino immutabilis et secundum locum, quia immensus, et secundum tempus, quia aeternus, et secundum formam, quia simplex; et quia immutabilis, ideo omnia movet.

CONCLUSION

God is entirely immutable both according to place, because (He is) immense, and according to time, because (He is) eternal, and according to form, because (He is) simple; and because (He is) immutable, for that reason He moves all (things).

RESPONDEO: Dicendum quod, sicut dicit Boethius,[10] « Deus stabilis manens dat cuncta moveri ». Unde divina essentia est *immutabilis*. Non enim mutatur *loco*, quia ubique est; non *tempore*, quia aeternitas

I RESPOND: It must be said, that just as Boethius says,[10] « God, remaining stable, grants that all other (things) to be moved ». Whence the Divine Essence is *immutable*. For It is not changed *according to place*,

simul est; non *forma*, quia pure actus est. Unde mutationem secundum formam tollit simplicitas, secundum tempus tollit aeternitas, secundum locum tollit immensitas.

because It is everywhere; not *according to time*, because It is at once Eternity; not *according to form*, because It is purely act. Whence simplicity bears off mutation according to form, eternity bears its off according to time, immensity bears it off according to place.

Et ideo in Deo est summa stabilitas, et inde omnis *motus causalitas*; quia, sicut probat Augustinus[11] et vult Philosophus, omnis motus procedit ab immobili; ut cum movetur manus, stat cubitus, et movetur cubitus, stante humero. Quia ergo Dei sapientia est stabilis,[12] ideo omnia movet.

And for that reason in God there is a most high stability, and hence *the causality of* every *movement*; because, just as (St.) Augustine proves[11] and the Philosopher wants, every movement proceeds from the immoveable; as when the hand is moved, the elbow stands still, and the elbow is moved, with the shoulder standing still [stante humero]. Therefore because the Wisdom of God is stable,[12] for that reason it moves all (things).

1. Quod ergo obiicitur de sapientia, quod dicitur mobilis; dicendum, quod mobile dicitur *active* de ea, quia facit moveri,[13] non *passive*, sicut sensibile de animali.

1. What is therefore objected concerning Wisdom, that it is called mobile [mobilis]; it must be said, that "mobile" is said of it *actively*, because it causes (others) to be moved,[13] not *passively*, as just as "sensible" (is said) of an animal.

Et ad illud quod obiicitur, nihil dat alteri quod non habet; dicendum, quod tripliciter est aliquid habere, scilicet *formaliter*, *exemplariter*, *causaliter*;[14] et quodlibet istorum modorum quod habet dare potest. Primo autem modo non habet Deus motum, sed secundo et tertia sic.

And to that which is objected, (that) nothing gives to the other what it does not have; it must be said, that to have something is in a threefold manner, that is *formally*, *exemplarily*, *causally*;[14] and in any of those manners one can give what he has. In the first manner, moreover, God does not have movement, but in the second and third He does [sic].

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur de relatione, dicen- / -dum . . .

2. To that which is objected concerning relation, it must be / said . . .

[1] Vers. 24.
[2] Ed. 1. *moveri*, quo alluditur ad illud Boethii, III. de Consol. Metro 9: Stabilisque manes *das cuncta moveri*.
[3] Vide Aristot., V. Phys. text. 7. et VI. text. 32. et 73. (c. 3. et 8.).
[4] Cap. 16. n. 17: Nummus autem cum dicitur pretium, relative dicitur nec tamen mutatus est, cum esse coepit pretium. Nota tamen, quod relatio pretii in nummo est tantum accidentalis, relatio vero, quae est in unione hypostatica, est substantialis. Explicationem huius exempli vide infra d. 30. dub. 3.
[5] Libr. I. de Fide, c. 9: Nam si Pater esse coepit, Deus ergo primo erat, postea Pater factus est. — Vat. cum cod. cc post *tunc* contra lios codd. et ed. 1 omittit

[1] Verse 24.
[2] Ed. 1 has *to be moved* [moveri], by which there is an allusion to Boethius, Consolation on Philosophy, Bk. III, Metro 9: And remaining stable *Thou dost grant all (things) to be moved* [Stabilique manens *das cuncta moveri*].
[3] See Aristotle, Physics, Bk. V, text. 7, and Bk. VI, texts 32 and 73 (chs. 3 and 8).
[4] Chapter 16, n. 17: Moreover a coin [nummus] when it is said (to be) the price, is said relatively, nor, however, has it been changed, when it undertook to be the price. — Note however, that the relation of price unto a coin is only accidental, but the relation, which is in the Hypostatic Union, is substantial. For an explanation of this example see below d. 30,

Pater. Ed. 1 post *si hoc* addit *esset*.
[6] Simila habetur Aristot., VIII. Phys. text. 7, et II. de Anima, text. 45. (c. 4.), ubi sic: Faber autem mutatur solum in actum ex otio.
[7] Aliqui codd. ut K V *efficientis*.
[8] Averroes in libro Destructio Destructionum, disput. 1. dub. 1. et in Comment. super VIII. Physic. text. 15. ex hac propositione impossibilitatem creationis deducere conatur. — Paulo ante post *ex tempore voluit* codd. aa bb satis bene addunt *mundum*.
[9] Cod. W addit *in quo creatus est*.
[10] Libr. III. de Consol. Metro 9, post quem textum cod. Z addit *Psalmus* (101,28.): *mutabis res et mutabuntur* etc. Paulo infra cum plerisque codd. ut A S T V W etc. et ed. 1 legimus *pure* loco *purus*, quod habet Vat.
[11] Libr. VIII. de Genes. ad lit. c. 24. — Verba Aristotelis in libro de Motu animalium c. 1. haec sunt: Verumtamen principium, in quantum principium, quiescit, mota particula, quae subest: veluti brachio moto, cubitus, toto autem membro, humerus (ed. Ven. 1584).
[12] Cod. W addit *et immobilis*. Mox cod. F *Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur*.
[13] Vat. cum cod. cc *motum*, sed contra ceteros mss. et ed. 1.
[14] Cfr. Dionys., de Div. Nom. c. 5. — Mox codd. inter se dissentiunt; alii siquidem habent *quodlibet* pro *quolibet*, alii cum ed. 1 *dari* loco *dare*, alii ut A T bb cc ponunt *quodlibet* et *dari*; melius legeretur *et quod quolibet istorum modorum habet, dare potest*.

dubium 3.
[5] On the Faith, Bk. I, ch. 9: For if the Father undertook to be, therefore first there was God, the Father was made afterwards. — The Vatican text together with codex cc after *then* [tunc], contrary to the other codices and edition 1, omits *the Father* [Pater]. Edition 1 has *if He would be in this (manner)* [si hoc esset].
[6] A similar passage is had in Aristotle, Physics, Bk. VIII, text 7, and On the Soul, Bk. II, text 45 (ch. 4), where he (speaks) in this manner: But the worker is changed solely from idleness into act.
[7] Some codices as K and V have *of the one effecting* [efficientis].
[8] Averroes in the book The Destruction of Destructions, disputation 1, dubium 1, and in Commentary on the Physics, Bk. VIII, text 15, strives to deduce from this proposition the impossibility of creation. — A little before this at *He willed to create* codices aa and bb add sufficiently well *the world* [mundum].
[9] Codex W adds *in which it was created* [in quo creatus est].
[10] On the Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. III, Metro 9, after which text codex Z adds *Psalm (101,28): Thou shall change things and they shall be changed* etc. [Psalmus: mutabis res et mutabuntur etc.]. A little below this along with very many codices as A S T V W etc. and edition 1, we read *purely* [pure] in place of *pure* [purus], which the Vatican text has.
[11] A Litteral Exposition of Genesis, Bk. VIII, ch. 24. — The words of Aristotle in the book On the Movement of Animals, ch. 1, are these: Nevertheless, a principle, in as much as (it is) a principle, rests, in respect to a moved particle, which is beneath it: just as if with an arm moved, the elbow (rests), but in respect to the whole member, the shoulder does (Venetian edition of 1584).
[12] Codex W adds *and immoveable* [et immobilis]. Next codex F has *To that, therefore, which is objected* [Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur].
[13] The Vatican text together with codex cc has *movement* [motum], but contrary to all the other manuscripts and edition 1.
[14] Cfr. Dionysius (the Areopagite),On the Divine Names, ch. 5. — Next the codices disagree among themselves; some indeed have *any* [quodlibet] in place of *in any* [quolibet], others together with edition 1 have *be given* [dari] in place of *give* [dare], others as A T bb and cc have both *any* and *be given*; though *and what one has in any of those manners, one can give* [et quod quolibet istorum modorum habet, dare potest.] would read better.

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dicen- / -dum, quod relatio, cum dicitur de novo,[1] de necessitate ponit mutationem in altero extremorum, nec oportet quod in

it must be / said, that "relation", when it is said of (something) new,[1] of necessity posits a mutation in one of the two extremes, and

utroque. Ideo ista relatio, quae est personae ad personam, ponit mutationem in altera personarum; et una mutata, mutatur et reliqua, quia eadem sunt essentia: ideo de necessitate, si[2] de non-Patre fieret Pater, mutaretur. Relatio autem essentiae ad essentiam non de necessitate ponit mutationem, nisi in altero extremorum, quia cum diversae sint essentiae, potest unum mutari, altero non permutato:[3] et ideo in relatione ad creaturam semper intelligitur in creatura facta mutatio, non in Deo. Tamen proprie loquendo, sicut alibi patebit,[4] Deus non refertur ad creaturam, nisi secundum dici et modum loquendi.

it is not proper that (it be) in both. For that reason that relation, which is of a person to a person, posits a mutation in one of the two persons; and with one changed, the rest is also changed, because they are the same essence: for that reason of necessity, if[2] the Father came to be from a non-Father, He would be changed. Moreover a relation of an essence to an essence does not of necessity posit a mutation, except in one of the two extremes, because when the essences are diverse, one can be changed, with the other of the two thoroughly unchanged [non permutato]:[3] and for that reason in a relation to a creature a mutation is always understood to have been caused in the creature, not in God. Nevertheless [tamen] properly speaking, just as will be shown elsewhere,[4] God is not referred to a creature, except according to a meaning [dici] and a manner of speaking.

Posset tamen aliter dici, sicut supra tactum est,[5] quod non est simile: quia relatio personalis dat personae existere, non sic autem relatio ad creaturam; et ideo sequitur: si incipit *esse Pater*, incipit *esse*; non autem sequitur: si[6] Deus incipit *esse homo*, incipit *esse*. Et ideo bene valet argumentum Ambrosii, quodsi Pater incepisset gignere, quod esset mutatus, quia incepisset esse, non quia ab uno statu in alterum mutatus esset.

However, it could be otherwise said, just as has been touched upon above,[5] that it is not similar: because a personal relation grants a person to exist, not so, however, a relation to a creature; and for that reason it follows: if He began *to be the Father*, He began *to be*; moreover it does not follow: if[6] God began *to be a man*, He began *to be*. And for that reason the argument of (St.) Ambrose is very valid [bene valet], that if the Father would have begun to beget, because He had been changed, that He would have begun to be, not that He would have been changed from one state into the other.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quando de non agente etc.; dicendum, quod est agens, quod est sua actio, et est agens, quod non est sua actio, sed actio est ab ipso.[7] Agens, quod non est sua actio, sic agit, quod inter ipsum et effectum cadit medium, quod disponit ipsum; et tale agens nunquam fit agens de non agente, quin mutetur, quia novum[8] sibi advenit. Sed agens, quod est sua actio, agit se ipso; et ideo inter ipsum et effectum non cadit aliquod medium ipsum disponens; et ideo cum de non agente fit agens, quia nihil novum sibi accidit, ideo non mutatur. Tale agens Deus est.

3. To that which is objected, when from a non-acting etc.; it must be said, that there is an agent, which is its own action, and there is an agent, which is not its own action, but is an action by itself.[7] The agent, which is not its own action, so acts, that between itself and (its) effect there falls a medium, which disposes it; and such an agent never becomes acting from a non-acting, unless it be changed, because there becomes present (something) new[8] to itself [novum sibi advenit]. But an agent, which is its own action, acts by its very self; and for that reason between itself and (its) effect there does not fall any disposing medium; and for that reason since the agent comes to be

from a non-agent, because nothing new accedes to itself, therefore it is not changed. Such an agent is God.

4. Ad illud quod obiicitur de voluntate, dicendum, quod causa proxima et immediata dicitur tripliciter: aut respectu *substantiae*, aut *dispositionis*, aut *actus*; respectu *substantiae*, inter quam[9] et effectum non cadit alia substantia media causans; respectu *dispositionis*, cui non additur nova dispositio ad effectum producendum; respectu *actus*, quando actui coniungitur. Dico ergo, quod Dei voluntas fuit causa proxima et immediata ab aeterno respectu substantiae et dispositionis, sed[10] non respectu *actus*; quia actui non coniungitur voluntas nisi pro tempore, in quo vult agere, ut patet, cum dicitur: volo cras legere, voluntas non copulatur actui nisi pro tempore crastino.

4. To that which is objected concerning the will, it must be said, that a proximate and immediate cause is said in a threefold manner: either in respect of *substance*, or of *disposition*, or of *act*; in respect of the *substance*, between which[9] and (its) effect there does not fall another, middle causing substance; in respect of the *disposition*, to which there is not added a new disposition to produce the effect; in respect of the *act*, when it is conjoined to an act. Therefore I say, that the Will of God was the proximate and immediate cause from eternity in respect of the substance and disposition (of the world), but[10] not in respect of the *act* (of creating); because to the act the Will was not conjoined except for the time, in which He willed to act, as is clear, when there is said: "I will to read tomorrow", the will is not conjoined to the act except for the time of tomorrow [pro tempore crastino].

SCHOLION.

I. Quoad diversas species *mutationis* et immutabilitatis cfr. q. seq., et quoad solut. ad 1. S. Thom., S. I. q. 9. a. 1. ad 2.

II. Immutabilitas Dei iam in Nicaeno Concilio definita est. Cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 4. m. 1. a. 2. — Scot., hic. 5; Report., hic q. 2. de rerum principio q. 3. — S. Thom., hic q. 3. a. 1; S. loc. cit. — B. Albert., hic q. 16. seqq.; S. p. I. tr. 4. q. 21. m. 1. 2. — Petr. a Tar., hic q. 4. a. 1. — Aegid. R., hic 3. princ. q. 1. — Henr. Gand., de hac et seq. q.; S. a. 30. — Durand., de hac et seq. q.; hic q. 3. — Dionys. Carth., de hac et seq. q.; hic q. 4. — Biel, de hac et seq. q.; hic q. 7.

SCHOLIUM

I. In regard to the diverse species of *mutation* [mutationis] and immutability, cf. the following question, and in regard to the solution to n. 1, St. Thomas, Summa., I, q. 9, a. 1 to n. 2.

II. The immutability of God has already been defined in the Council of Nicea. Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 4, m. 1, a. 2. — (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 5; Reportatio., here in q. 2 on the principle of things (and) q. 3. — St. Thomas, here in q. 3, a. 1; Summa., loc. cit.. — Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), here in a. 16 ff.; Summa., p. I, tr. 4, q. 21, m. 1 and 2. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 4, a. 1. — Giles the Roman, here in 3rd princ. q. 1. — Henry of Ghent, on this and the following question; Summa., a. 30. — Durandus, on this and the following question; here in q. 4. — (Gabriel) Biel, of this and the following question; here in q. 7.

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[1] Plures codd. ut A C L R U V X omittunt *de novo*, sed male. Cod. W. *de duobus* et ed. 1 *de persona divina* loco *de novo*, sed inepte. Cod G *cum de novo*

[1] Very many codices as A C L R U V X omit *of (something) new* [de novo], but badly. Codex W has *of two (things)* [de duobus] and edition 1 has *of a*

advenit.
[2] Codd. aa bb addunt *Deus*.
[3] Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *una mutari, altera non permutata*, ac immediate post omittit *et*; aliqui codd. ut A aa bb cum ed. 1 *mutato* pro *permutato*.
[4] Infra d. 30. q. 3. — Mox post *dici* ed. 1 *vel secundum modum loquendi*.
[5] Dist. 7. dub. 4. Vide etiam infra d. 26. q. 3. — Immediate post Vat. omittit *quod non est*, quae lectio corrupta resarcitur ope mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3.
[6] Vat. cum cod. cc *hic* loco *si*, et post *homo* addit *igitur*, sed obstat auctoritas aliorum mss. et ed. 1.
[7] Vat. contra fere omnes codd. et ed. 1 omittit non bene *sed actio est ab ipso*, pro quio cod. Q *sed actio est aliquid ab ipso*. Paulo ante post *obiicitur* in cod. V et ed. 1 deest *quando*.
[8] Auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 expunximus hic additum *quid*.
[9] Ex mss. et ed. 1 hic substituimus *inter quam* loco *cum inter eam* et paulo infra *cui* pro *cum*.
[10] Vat. cum cod. cc contra alios codd. et ed. 1 minus clare *et* pro *sed*.

Divine Person [de persona divina] in place of *of (something) new* [de novo], but ineptly. Codex G reads *when it arrives from (something) new* [cum de novo advenit].
[2] Codices aa and bb add *God*.
[3] The Vatican text, not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, has the feminine form [una mutari, altera non permutata], and immediately after this it omits *and* [et]; the other codices as A aa and bb together with edition 1 have *unchanged* [non mutato] in place of *thoroughly unchanged* [non permutato].
[4] Below in d. 30, q. 3. — Then after *a meaning* [dici] edition 1 reads *and/or according to a manner of speaking* [vel secundum modum loquendi].
[5] Distinction 7, dubium 4. See also below d. 26, q. 3. — Immediately after this the Vatican text omits *that it is not* [quod non est], which corrupt reading is repaired with the help of the manuscripts and editions 1, 2 and 3.
[6] The Vatican text together with codex cc has *this does not follow: God* [non sequitur hic: Deus], and after *man* it adds *therefore* [igitur], but the authority of the other manuscripts withstand this.
[7] The Vatican text contrary to nearly all the codices and edition 1 omits, not well, *but is an action by itself* [sed actio est ab ipso], in place of which codex Q has *but an action is a something by itself* [sed actio est aliquid ab ipso]. A little before this after *is objected* [obiicitur], *when* [quando] is lacking in codex V and edition 1.
[8] On the authority of the manuscripts and edition 1 we have expunged the here added *something* [quid: which is however necessary to be infer in English context].
[9] From the manuscripts and edition 1 we have here substituted *between which* [inter quam] in place of *when between it* [cum inter eam] and a little below this *to which* [cui] in place of *when* [cum].
[10] The Vatican text together with codex cc, contrary to the other codices and edition 1, has less clearly *and* [et] in place of *but* [sed].

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in Quatuor Libros

Commentaries on the Four Books of

Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VIII.

PARS I.

ARTICULUS II.

Quaestio II.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 158-162.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

Quaestio II.

Utrum solus Deus immutabilis sit.

S**ECUNDO QUAERITUR**, utrum immutabilitas sit divinae essentiae proprietas, ita quod nulli creaturae conveniat. Et quod sic, videtur.

1. Primae ad Timotheum ultimo[11] dicitur de Deo, quod *solus habet immortalitatem*. Et Augustinus dicit contra Maximinum:[12] « In omni natura mutabili nonnulla mors est ipsa mutatio »: ergo si solus Deus habet immortalitatem, solus habet immutabilitatem.

2. Item, omne vertibile est mutabile; sed omnis creatura est vertibilis; unde Damascenus:[13] « Omne quod a versione incipit, in versionem tendit »: ergo etc.

[11] Vers. 16.
[12] Lib. II. c. 12. 2.
[13] Libr. I. de Fide orthod. c. 3: Quorum enim esse a mutatione incepit, ea mutationi quoque subsint necesse est.

Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VIII

PART I

ARTICLE II

Question 2

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 158-162.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

Question 2

Whether God alone is immutable.

S**ECONDLY THERE IS ASKED**, whether immutability is a property of the Divine Essence, so that it convenes with no creature. And that (it is) so, it seems:

1. In the last (chapter) of the First (Letter) to Timothy there is said of God, that *He alone has immortality*. And (St.) Augustine says Against Maximinus:[12] « In every mutable nature not every mutation is itself a death »: therefore if God alone has immortality, He alone has immutability.

2. Likewise, every vertible is mutable; but every creature is vertible; whence (St. John) Damascene (says):[13] « Everything which starts from being turned [a versione], tends towards being turned [in versionem] »: therefore etc..

[11] Verse 16.
[12] Book II, ch. 12, n. 2.
[13] On the Orthodox Faith, Book I, ch. 3: For of those which start to be by mutation, it is necessary also that they be subject [subsint] to that mutation [trans. note: here *versio* is used as a technical term

meaning "a change in the order of being": it is derived from that metaphor for creating, which has creatures "turned away from nothingness"; whence in English we say, "turned into", for "became": hence what is "able to be turned" is "vertible".].

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3. Item, omne quod sibi relictum in nihilum cedit,[1] quantum est de se, est mutabile; sed omnis creatura est huiusmodi; unde Gregorius:[2] « Cuncta in nihilum tenderent, nisi manus Conditoris ea retineret »: ergo etc.

3. Likewise, everything which left to itself passes [cedit] into nothing,[1] as much as concerns itself, is mutable; but every creature is of this kind; whence (St.) Gregory (the Great says):[2] « All (things) would tend unto nothing, unless the Hand of the Founder retained them (in being) »: ergo etc..

4. Item, nullum accidens de se habet stabilitatem; sed esse omni creaturae accidit, sicut dicit Hilarius et habetur in littera,[3] quia ab alio venit: ergo omnis creatura quantum ad esse est instabilis.

4. Likewise, no accident from itself has stability; but "to be" [esse] accedes to every creature, just as (St.) Hilary (of Poitiers) says and (as) it is had in the text,[3] that it comes from another: therefore every creature as much as regards (its) "to be" is instable.

5. Item, omne vanum est subiectum variabilitati; sed omnis creatura vana, cum sit ex nihilo; unde ad Romanos octavo:[4] *Vanitati subiecta est creatura* etc.: ergo si omnis creatura vana, nulla immutabilis.

5. Likewise, everything vain is subject to variability; but every creature (is) vain, since it is out of nothing; whence in the eighth (chapter) of (the Letter) to the Romans (there is written):[4] *Unto vanity is the creature subjected* etc.; therefore if every creature (is) vain, none (is) immutable.

6. Item, omne mutatum habet in se mutabilitatem; sed omnis creatura facta est: ergo omnis creatura mutata, ergo nulla immutabilis.

6. Likewise, every changed thing [omne mutatum] has mutability in itself; but every creature has been made: therefore every creature (has) changed, therefore none (is) immutable.

CONTRA: Immutabilitas non dicitur nisi tripliciter. Dicitur enim immutabilitas aut *invariabilitas*, aut *incorruptibilitas*, aut *invertibilitas*.

ON THE CONTRARY: Immutability is not said except in a threefold manner. For immutability means either *invariability*, or *incorruptibility*, or *invertibility*.

1. Ostenditur autem, quod *invariabilitas* conveniat creaturis, utpote *principiis*. Nam Augustinus ostendit in duodecimo Confessionum,[5] quod *materia* informis est invariabilis; quia quod caret forma, caret ordine, et quod caret ordine, caret

1. Moreover it is shown, that *invariability* convenes with creatures, as *principles*. For (St.) Augustine shows in the twelfth (book of his) Confessions,[5] that formless *matter* [materia informis] is invariable; because what is without [caret] form, is without

vicissitudine, ergo variatione. Auctor autem sex Principiorum[6] dicit hoc de *forma*, « quod est in simplici et invariabili essentia consistens ».

order, and what is without order, is without vicissitude, therefore without variation. Moreover the author of The Six Principles[6] says this of *form*, « that it is consistent in a simple and invariable essence ».

2. Item videtur, quod invariabilitas conveniat *Beatis*, quia ubi perfecta beatitudo, ibi nulla deperditio, et ubi hoc,[7] nulla variatio.

2. Likewise it seems, that invariability convenes with the *Blessed*, because where (there is) perfect beatitude, there is no loss [deperditio], and where (there is) this,[7] (there is) no variation.

3. Item, variatio attenditur, sicut dicit Augustinus super Genesim ad litteram,[8] aut secundum locum, aut secundum tempus; sed aliqua creatura caret determinato loco et tempore, ut universale, quod est semper et ubique,[9] et caelum empyreum, quod est extra tempus et locum: ergo etc.

3. Likewise, variation is tended towards, just as (St.) Augustine says in On a Litteral Exposition of Genesis,[8] either according to place, or according to time; but some creature is without a determinate place and time, (such) as a universal, which is always and everywhere,[9] and the empyrean Heaven, which is outside of time and place: therefore etc.

4. Item, si immutabilitas dicatur *incorruptibilitas*, idem ostenditur. « Nam omnis corruptio naturalis venit ex contrarietate », sicut dicit Philosophus in libro de Morte et vita;[10] sed multae creaturae carent contrarietate: ergo et corruptibilitate.

4. Likewise, if immutability means *incorruptibility*, the same is shown. « For every natural corruption comes out of a contrariety », just as the Philosopher says in his book On Death and Life;[10] but many creatures are without contrariety: therefore also without corruptibility.

5. Item, omnis corruptio est in aliquid prius se, quia corruptio naturalis in aliquid est;[11] sed principia non habent aliquid prius, utpote materia: ergo sunt incorruptibilia.

5. Likewise, every corruption is in something prior to itself, because natural corruption is in a something;[11] but principles, as matter, do not have something prior: therefore they are incorruptible.

6. Item, omne perpetuum incorruptibile;[12] sed aliqua creatura naturaliter est perpetua: ergo etc. *Minor* probari potest sic: perpetuitas est de ratione imaginis; unde Augustinus:[13] « Non esset anima imago, si mortis termino clauderetur »; cum ergo anima naturaliter sit imago, ergo naturaliter est immortalis sive perpetua.

6. Likewise, every perpetual (is) incorruptible;[12] but some creature is naturally perpetual: ergo etc.. The *minor* can be proved in this manner: perpetuity concerns the reckoning of an image; whence (St.) Augustine (says):[13] « The soul would not be an image, if it were enclosed [clauderetur] by death's terminus »; therefore since the soul is naturally an image, therefore it is naturally immortal or perpetual.

7. Item, ostenditur, quod creatura sit *invertibilis*, sic: vertibilitas est in non esse; sed nihil est, quod possit creaturam aliquam vertere in non esse, quia *a se* non vertitur, cum nihil se corrumpat;[14] *ab alio* non, quia

7. Likewise, it is shown, that a creature is *invertible*, in this manner: there is vertibility in ‘non being’ [in non esse]; but there is nothing, which can turn any creature into ‘non being’, because (the creature) is not

actio creaturae in id terminatur, ex quo incipit; sed nullius creaturae actio incipit a *non esse*: ergo etc. *Praeterea*, distantia infinita est inter esse creaturae et nihil; sed inter extrema in infinitum distantia non potest fieri mutatio per virtutem finitam: ergo nihil potest cedere in nihil, nisi Deo faciente.

turned *by itself* [a se], when nothing corrupts it;[14] not *by another*, because the action of a creature is terminated upon that, out of which it starts; but the action of no creature starts from *non being*: ergo etc.. *Besides*, there is an infinite distance between the "to be" of a creature and nothing; but between extremes infinite in distance [in infinitum distantia] there cannot come to be a mutation through a finite virtue: therefore nothing can pass into nothing, except by God causing it.

8. Item, vertibilitas dicitur per corruptionem in *non esse* omnino; sed nihil, quod corrumpitur, secedit omnino in non ens:[15] ergo nullum corruptiblile vertibile. *Si tu dicas*, quod invertibilitatem non habet creatura per *naturam*, sed solum per *gratiam*;[16] *contra*: quod omnibus inest, est naturale,

8. Likewise, vertibility is said through a corruption entirely into *non being*; but nothing, which is corrupted, secedes entirely into a non-being [non ens]:[15] therefore no corruptible (is) vertible. *If you say*, that a creature does not have invertibility through (its) *nature*, but only through *grace*;[16] *on the contrary*: what is in all (things), is natural,

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[1] Nonnulli codd. ut D F K X ee cum ed. 1 *tendit*.
[2] Libr. XVI. Moral. c. 37: Cuncta quippe ex nihilo facta sunt, eorumque essentia rursum ad nihilum tenderet, nisi eam auctor omnium regiminis manu retineret.
[3] Cap. 1 in fine.
[4] Vers. 10. — Mox in fine argumenti codd. cum edd. 1, 2, 3, 6 omittunt *est* additum a Vat.
[5] Cap. 9. n. 9.
[6] Gilbert. Poreetan., c. 1: Forma est compositioni contingens, simplici et invariabili essentia consistens. — Post quem textum cod. O addit *et ita nec forma nec materia variatur*.
[7] Ex antiquis mss. et ed. 1 pro *haec* substituimus *hoc*, quod sensus expostulat. Paulo ante plurimi codd. cum ed. 1 omittunt *ibi*, qui et in fine argumenti ponunt *mutatio* loco *variatio*.
[8] Libr. VIII. c. 20.
[9] Aristot., I. Poster. c. 24. (c. 31.). — Mox nomine *caeli empyrei* intellige ultimam sphaeram, quae iuxta opinionem tunc communiter receptam est immodbilis et uniformis, quia eius intrinseca principia, scil. materia et forma, sunt « ita bona coniunctione coniuncta, quod nulla cadit in illud contrarietas », ut ait S. Doctor infra ad 4. obiectionem. Cfr. supra d. 1. a. 3. q. 2. opp. 1., et Aristot., I. de Caelo text. 100 (c. 9.).
[10] Melius poneretur: in libro de Longitudine et brevitate vitae. Aristoteles siquidem duo scripsit opuscula, quorum uni titulus: de Iuventute et senectute, de vita et morte; alteri autem: de Logitudine et brevitate vitae. In priore opusculo perpauca occurunt de re, quam S. Doctor hic proponit; in posteriore tamen, c. 2 et seq., fusius de hac re tractatur, et inter cetera inveniuntur hoc: Quare, cui non est contrarium et ubi non est, impossibile utique erit corrumpi.

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[1] Not a few codices as D F K X and ee together with edition 1 have *tends* [tendit].
[2] Morals, Book XVI, ch. 37: All things [cuncta] indeed have been made out of nothing, and their essence would again tend toward nothing, unless the Author of all things [omnium] retained it (in being) with the Hand of (His) governance [regiminis manu].
[3] Chapter 1, at the end.
[4] Verse 10. — Then at the end of the argument the codices together with editions 1, 2, 3 and 6 omit the *is* [est] added by the Vatican text.
[5] Chapter 9, n. 9. [Tr. note: here *invertibility* is inability to be turned, rather than ability to be turned upside down.]
[6] Gibert of Porretain, ch. 1: Form is contingent to composition, consistent with a simple and invariable essence. — After which text codex O adds *and thus it is varied neither in form nor in matter*.
[7] From the ancient manuscripts and edition 1 we have substituted the neuter *this* [hoc] for the feminine *this* [haec], which is demanded by the sense. A little before this very many codices together with edition 1 omit *there* [ibi], and also at the end of the argument put *mutation* [mutatio] in place of *variation* [variatio].
[8] Book VIII, ch. 20.
[9] Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, ch. 24 (ch. 31). — Then by the noun *empyrean Heaven* [caelum empyreum] understand the last sphere, which according to the opinion then commonly received is immobile and uniform, because its intrinsic principle, namely matter and form, are « goods so conjoined by conjunction, that there falls no contrariety in it », as the Seraphic Doctor says below at objection n. 4. Cr. above d. 1, a, 3, q. 2, op. 1, and Aristotle, On Heaven, Bk. I, text 100 (ch. 9).

[11] Cfr. Aristot., I. Phys. text. 42. et 82. (c. 6. et 9. in fine), et I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 14. seqq. (c. 3.), ubi et propos. minor huius argum. insinuatur.
[12] Vide Aristot., I. de Caelo, text. 110. seqq. (c. 11. et 12.).
[13] Libr. XIV. de Trin. d. 2-4. n. 4-6., ex quo loco propositio ista colligi potest, sed quoad litteram habetur in libro de Spiritu et anima c. 18, et in M. Aurelii Cassiodori libro de Anima, c. 2: Nam quemadmodum poterat esse imago aut similitudo Dei, si animae hominum mortis termino clauderentur? — Paulo infra post *ergo anima* Vat. cum cod. cc, aliis tamen codd. et ed. 1 obnitentibus, *naturalis* pro *naturaliter*.
[14] Cfr. Aristot., I. Phys. text. 81. (c. 9.). et Boeth., III. de Consol. Prosa 11. — Mox ope plurimum mss. ut H I L O S U etc. substituimus *a non esse* (i. e. a nihilo) pro *ante esse*, quod Vat. habet quodque non ita correspondet modo loquendi Scholasticorum; multi codd. propter compendiosam scripturam sunt dubiae lectionis.
[15] Hinc Aristot., I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 17. (c. 3.): Huius corruptio alterius est generatio.
[16] Vat. cum multis codd. hic omittit *solum* et transponit, / paulo supra legendo *ergo nullum corruptibile vertibile solum*; quae lectio falsa est, nisi fiat transpositio terminorum v. g. ergo nullum solum corruptibile, vertibile; vel ergo nullum vertibile corruptibile solum. Codd. E H Z ii omittunt *solum* utrobique; codd. P Q ee vero ponunt eo loco, quo nos posuimus. *Gratiam* accipias hic sensu largo, quo Ioan. Damas., II. de Fide orthod. c. 3. de Angelo ait: Immortalis est non quidem natura, sed Dei munere et gratia.

[10] It would be better to put: in the book On the Length and Brevity of Life. Aristotle did indeed write two small works, of which one title is: On Youth and Old Age, On Life and Death; the other: On the Length and Brevity of Life. In the former work very few things occur on the matter, which the Seraphic Doctor here proposes; in the latter, however, in ch. 2 ff., this matter is more broadly treated, and among all the others there is found these words: Wherefore, to that to which there is not a contrary and where it is not, it will be indeed impossible for it to be corrupted.
[11] Cf. Aristotle, Physics, Bk. I, texts 42 and 82 (chs. 6 and 9 at the end), and On Generation, Bk. I, text 11 ff. (ch. 3), where the minor of this proposition is also hinted at.
[12] See Aristotle, On Heaven, Bk. I, text 110 ff. (chs. 11 and 12).
[13] On the Trinity, Bk. XIV, chs. 2-4, nn. 4-6, from which text that proposition of his can be gathered, but it is literally found in the book On Spirit and Soul, ch. 18, and in M. Aurelius Cassiodorus' book On the Soul, ch. 2: For in accord with what manner could it have been an image or similitude of God, if the souls of men were enclosed by death's terminus? — A little below this after *therefore when* [cum ergo], the Vatican text together with codex cc, withstanding however the other codices and edition 1, has *the natural soul is* [anima naturalis est] in place of *soul is naturally* [anima est naturaliter].
[14] Cf. Aristotle, Physics, Bk. I, text 81 (ch. 9) and Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy, Bk. III, prose 11. — Then with the help of very many manuscripts as H I L O S U etc. we have substituted *from 'non being'* [a non esse], i. e. from nothing, in place of *before (its) "to be"* [ante esse], which the Vatican text has and which does not correspond with the manner of speaking of the Scholastics; many codices on account of their abbreviated writing are of a doubtful reading.
[15] Hence Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, Bk. I, text 17 (ch. 3): The corruption of this is the generation of the other.
[16] The Vatican text together with many codices here omits *only* [solum] and transposes, a little above this by reading *therefore no corruptible (is) only vertible* [ergo nullum corruptibile vertibile solum]; which reading is false, unless one makes a transposition of terms, v. g. *therefore no solely corruptible (is) vertible* [ergo nullum solum corruptible vertibile]; and/or *therefore no vertible is only corruptible* [ergo nullum vertibile corruptible solum]. Codices E H Z and ii omit *only* [solum] in both places; codices P Q and ee however put it where we have put it. — *Grace* is here accepted in the broad sense, which (St.) John Damascene uses, On the Orthdox Faith, Bk. II, ch. 3, "On the Angel", where he says: Indeed a nature is not immortal, but by the gift and grace of God.

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quoniam gratia speciale est; sed naturale est quod est idem apud omnes;[1] sed fere omnis creatura est invertibilis, quia nulla redigitur in nihilum: ergo hoc est *naturale*.

since it is by a special grace; but the natural is what is the same among all;[1] but nearly every creature is invertible, because none is driven back into nothing: therefore this is (something) *natural*.

9. Item, ostenditur, quod nec *per gratiam*; quia gratia est perfectio naturae: ergo quod repugnat naturae, non datur per gratiam: ergo si invertibilitas est contra naturam creaturae, ergo non datur per gratiam.

9. Likewise, it is shown, that neither (does a creature have invertiblility) *through grace*; because grace is the perfection of nature: therefore what is repugnant to nature, is not given through grace: therefore if invertibility is contrary to the nature of a creature, therefore it is not given through grace.

10. Item, obiicitur de *illa gratia*, quia si est creatura, est[2] vertibilis; si ergo conveniat ei invertibilitas, oportet quod per aliam gratiam; et sic erit abire in infinitum. Si ergo oportet stare, patet quod non per gratiam. *Si dicas*, quod gratia illa non dicitur habitus, sed Deus gratis conservens; hoc nihil est, quia sine Deo operante[3] nulla creatura operatur: ergo sicut nulla creatura operatur nisi per gratiam: ergo nulla operatio est naturalis, quod stultum est dicere.

10. Likewise, it is objected concerning *that grace*, because if a creature is, it is[2] vertible; and therefore if invertibility convenes with it, it is proper that (it be) through an other grace; and thus there will be an infinite regress [abire in infinitum]. Therefore if it is proper that it stand, it is clear that (it cannot be) through grace. *If you say*, that that grace is not meant as a habit, but as God conserving by graces; this is nothing, because without God operating[3] no creature operates: therefore just as no creature operates except by grace: therefore no operation is natural, which is a foolish (thing) to say.

CONCLUSIO.

Immutabilitas, accepta ut invariabilitas, est propria solis Dei, accepta ut incorruptibilitas aut invertibilitas, a Deo communicatur aliquibus creaturis vel per naturam vel per gratiam.

CONCLUSION

Immutability, accepted as invariability, is proper to God alone, accepted as incorruptibility or invertibility, it is communicated by God to some creatures by nature and/or by grace.

R**ESPONDEO**: Dicendum, quod immutabilitas dicitur per privationem mutabilitatis. *Mutatio* autem dicitur tripliciter: uno modo ab ente in ens; et haec est mutatio secundum accidens[4] et dicitur *variatio*; alio modo ab ente simpliciter in ens potentia sive secundum *quid*; et haec est mutatio secundum formam et dicitur *corruptio*; alio modo est mutatio ab ente simpliciter non ens; et haec est secundum totam rei substantiam et dicitur *versio*. Secundum hoc intelligendum, quod *immutabilitatis* dicitur tripliciter: uno modo *invariabilitas*, alio modo *incorruptibilitas*, et tertio modo *invertibilitas*.

I **RESPOND**: It must be said, that immutability is said through a privation of mutability. Moreover *mutation* is said in a threefold manner: in one manner from a being into a being; and this is mutation according to accident[4] and is called *variation*; in another manner from a being simply into a being by potency or according to something [secundum quid]; and this is mutation according to form and is called *corruption*; in another manner there is mutation from a being into simply a non-being; and this is according to the whole substance of a thing and is called *version* [versio]. According to this it must be

understood, that *immutability* is said in a threefold manner: in one manner as *invariability*, in another manner as *incorruptibility*, and in a third manner as *invertibility*.

Si ergo immutabilitas dicatur *invariabilitas*, sic dico, quod in nulla omnino est creatura neque per naturam neque per gratiam; nam omne creatum aut est accidens, aut habet accidens, et ita variabile; et haec[5] est proprie proprium ipsius Dei.

Therefore if immutability be called *invariability*, thus I say, that it is entirely in no creature neither through nature nor through grace; for every created (thing) is either an accident, or has an accident, and is thus variable; and this (invariability)[5] is properly proper to God Himself.

Si autem dicatur immutabilitas *incorruptibilitas*, sic dico, quod in aliquibus est creaturis: in quibusdam per naturam, ut puta in simplicibus, in quibusdam per gratiam, ut puta in glorificatis corporibus. Nec sic est proprie proprium divinae essentiae.

Moreover if immutability be called *incorruptibility*, thus I say, that it is in some creatures: in certain ones through nature, as for example [ut puta] in simple (things), in certain ones through grace, as for example in glorified bodies. Nor it is in this manner properly proper to the Divine Essence.

Si vero tertio modo dicatur immutabilitas,[6] sic omnibus creaturis inest per *gratiam*, nulli autem per *naturam* nisi soli Deo. Invertibile enim per *naturam* est, quod ex se ipso habet, ut possit stare; hoc autem est, in quo nulla est vanitas[7] et in quo omnino nulla essentiae mutatio nec ad esse, nec ad non esse; et hoc est solum aeternum. Ideo haec invertibilitas est in solo Deo et est proprie proprium eius. Invertibilitas autem per *gratiam* inest omnibus vel pluribus creaturis, quia Deus sua gratuita bonitate cetera continet, ne in nihil cedant; et loquor de creaturis, quae dicunt quid completum et per se existens.

However if immutability be said in the third manner,[6] it is thus in all creatures through *grace*, but in none through *nature* except God alone. For the invertible through *nature* is, that which out of its very self it has, so that it can stand; but it is this, in which there is no vanity[7] and in which (there is) no mutation of essence as regards (its) ‘being’ [esse], nor as regards (its) ‘*being not’* [non esse]; and this is the Eternal One alone. For that reason this invertibility is in God alone and is properly proper to Him. But invertibility through *grace* is in all and/or very many creatures, because God by His gratuitous goodness contains all other (things), lest they pass into nothing; and I am speaking of creatures, which they call "something completed and <u>per se</u> existing" [quid completum et per se existens].

Concedendum igitur, quod immutabilitas, prout privat variationem secundum accidens quantum ad actum[8] et potentiam, solius Dei est. *Similiter* prout privat mutationem in non esse secundum actum et potentiam, quantum est de *natura*, solius Dei est, licet per *gratiam* conveniat multis creaturis; et sic procedunt rationes ad primam partem, unde concedendae sunt.

Therefore it must be conceded, that immutability, insofar as it frees from [privat] a variation according to accident, as much as regards act[8] and potency, belongs to God alone. *Similarly* insofar as it frees from a mutation in ‘non being’ according to act and potency, as much as it is from *nature*, belongs to God alone, though through *grace* it does convene with many creatures; and thus do the reasons for the first part

proceed, whence they are to be conceded.

1. Ad illud ergo quod obiicitur in contrarium, quod *principia* rerum sunt *invariabilia*; dicendum, quod verum est, si considerentur secundum essentiam abstractam; sed si considerentur secundum esse naturae, sic de necessitate habent accidentia coniuncta et possunt variari; variatio autem[9] accidentalis respicit esse.

1. To that which, therefore, is objected in the contrary, that the *principles* of things are *invariable*; it must be said, that it is true, if they are considered according to abstract essence; but if they are considered according the ‘being of their nature’ [esse naturae], they thus from necessity have accidents conjoined and can be varied; moreover[9] accidental variation respects the ‘being’ (of a creature).

2. Ad illud quod obiicitur, quod in *Beatis* non potest esse variatio; dicendum, quod verum est quantum ad substantiam praemii sive quantum ad praemium substantiale; cadit tamen quantum ad conversionem ad inferius, tum quantum ad affectiones, sicut patet in Angelis, tum quantum ad actiones. Unde Beati erunt agiles et poterunt moveri.

2. To that which is objected, that in *the Blessed* there cannot be variation; it must be said, that it is true as much as regards the substance of the reward or as much as regards the substantial reward; however (the argument) fails [cadit] as much as regards conversion toward the inferior, both as much as regards affections, just as is clear among the Angels, and as much as regards actions. Whence the Blessed shall be agile and able to be moved.

3. Ad illud quod obiicitur de *universali* et de *empyreo*, dicendum, quod utrumque recipit variationem; sed universale ratione eius *in quo* est; quia, « motis[10] nobis, moventgur ea quae in nobis / sunt » . . .

3. To that which is objected concerning *the universal* and concerning the *empyrean (Heaven)*, it must be said, that each receives variation; but the universal by the reckoning of that *in which* it is; because, « with us moved,[10] there are moved those (things) which are in us » . . .

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[1] Vide Aristot., I. Periherm. c. 1. — In fine argumenti post *hoc* supplevimus ex vetustioribus mss. et ed. 1 *est*.
[2] Cod. T cum ed. 1 *ergo* pro *est*.
[3] Cod. A *cooperante*.
[4] Multi codd. ut A B C D E F G L R S T U etc. *actus* loco *accidens*, minus bene, ut patet ex paulo infra positis de invariabilitate. — De primis duabus mutationis speciebus vide Aristot., V. Phys. text. 7. seqq. (c. 1.) ac I. de Generat. et corrupt. text. 23. et 24. (c. 4.).
[5] Supple: invariabilitas. Vat. *Sic accepta immutabilitas* loco *et haec*, sed contra plurimos codd., quorum tamen aliqui ut A F T etc. cum ed. 1 pro *haec* ponunt minus bene *hoc*.
[6] In cod. T ab altera manu hic additur *invertibilitas*.
[7] Vat. contra plurimos codd. ut A F G H I S T Z etc. cum ed. 1 addit hic *vel varietas*, et mox post *nulla* verbum *est*.
[8] Vat. *naturam* loco *actum*, sed falso et contra mss. et ed. 1.
[9] Ed. 1 *enim*.
[10] Substituimus *motis* pro *moventibus*, rationem vide supra d. 5. a. 2. q. 1. argum. 3. ad opp.

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[1] See Aristotle, On Interpretation, Bk. I, ch. 1. — At the end of the argument after *this* [hoc] we have supplied from the older manuscripts and edition 1 *is* [est].
[2] Codex T together with edition 1 has *therefore (it is)* [ergo] in place of *it is* [est].
[3] Codex A has *cooperating* [cooperante].
[4] Many codices as A B C D E F G L R S T U etc. have *act* [actus] in place of *accident* [accidens], less well, as is clear from what is put a little below this concerning invariability. — Concerning the first two species of mutation see Aristotle, Physics, Bk. V, text 7 ff. (ch. 1), and On Generation and Corruption, Bk. I, text 23 and 24 (ch. 4).
[5] Supply: invariability. The Vatican text reads *Accepted in this manner immutability* in place of *and this (invariability)*, but contrary to very many codices, some of which, however, as A F T etc. together with edition 1 put *in this manner (invariability)* [hoc] in place of *this (invariability)* [haec], less well.
[6] In codex T there is here added by another hand *invertability* [invertabilitas].
[7] The Vatican text contrary to very many codices as

A F G H I S T Z etc. together with edition 1 adds here *and/or variety* [vel varietas], and then at *no* [nulla] the word *there is* [est].
[8] The Vatican text has *nature* [naturam] in place of *act* [actum], but falsely and contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1.
[9] Edition 1 reads *for* [enim].
[10] We have substituted *moved* [motis] in place of *moving* [moventibus], for the reason above in d. 5, a. 2, q. 1, argum. 3 ad opp.

sunt »; empyreum vero ratione *contenti*. Post enim aliquid continere, quod non continet, et aliquid non continere, quod continet.

but the empyrean by a reckoning of the *contained*. For after containing something, which it does not contain, and (after) not containing something, which it does contain (it receives variation).

4. 5. 6. Ad illud quod obiicitur de *incorruptibilitate*, dicendum, sicut praetactum est, quod convenit creaturis; aliquae enim creaturae sunt ita simplices et ita bona coniunctione coniunctae, quod nulla cadit in eis contrarietas, nec est in eis maior ratio corruptionis quam in principiis. Unde sicut principia non sunt resolubilia in aliquid, tamen cederent in nihil, si sibi relignquerentur; sic intelligendum in aliquibus substantiis. Unde non est dicendum, quod sit verum, quod omne compositum sit resolubile secundum *rem*; sed sicut dicit Anselmus,[1] « est resolubile *re*, vel *intellectu* ». Unde concedendae sunt rationes ad hoc inductae.

4. 5. 6. To that which is objected concerning *incorruptibility*, it must be said, just as it has been touched upon before, that it does convene with creatures; for there are some creatures so simple and so conjoined by a good conjunction, that there falls in them no contrariety, nor is there in them a reckoning of corruption greater than in (their) principles. Whence just as principles are not resolvable into something, they would, nevertheless [tamen], pass into nothing, if they were left to themselves; thus it must be understood in some substances. Whence it must not be said, that it is true, that every composite is resolvable according to *thing*; but just as (St.) Anselm says,[1] « it is resolvable according to *thing*, and/or according to *understanding* ». Whence the reasons induced for this are to be conceded.

7. 8. Ad illud vero quod obiicitur *de vertibilitate*, dicendum, quod quaelibet creatura vertibilis est per naturam, si sibi relinquatur.

7. 8. To that, however, which is objected *concerning vertibility*, it must be said, that any creature is vertible through nature, if it is left to itself.

Si quaeritur causa huius, dicendum, quod huius versionis, cum sit defectus purus, non est reddenda causa *efficiens* vel reducens in non esse, sed solum *deficiens*. Propter quod notandum, quod natura dicitur naturalis origo. Origo autem creaturae et est ex nihilo et est ex suis principiis: secundum hoc dupliciter aliquid ipsi creaturae naturale, vel

If one asks for [quaeritur] the cause of this, it must be said, that of this version, since it is a pure defect, (its) cause is not to be reckoned as an *efficient* one and/or as one reducing into ‘non being’, but only as *deficient* one. On account of which it must be noted, that nature is called a natural origin. Moreover the origin of a creature is

quia inest ei ex eo, quod est *ex nihilo*, vel quia inest ei ex eo, quod est ex *suis principiis*. Et quia *nihil* nullius est causa efficiens, sed deficiens, ideo proprietates, quae insunt creaturae ratione eius, quod est ex nihilo, non sunt positiones, sed defectus, nec sunt a virtue, sed a defectu virtutis, nec habet causam efficientem, sed deficientem: et tales sunt *vanitas*, *instabilitas*, *vertibilitas*. Si igitur quaeratur, a quo est vertibilis creatura,[2] dico, quod non ab aliquo efficiente, sed per defectum in se ipsa. Secundum autem quod *naturale* dicitur quod inest[3] rei per propria et intrinseca principia, sic non dicuntur naturaliter inesse privationes vel defectus, sed habilitates: et ideo hoc modo accipiendo *naturale*, nulla creatura est *vertibilis* in non esse; nec tamen dicitur *vertibilis naturaliter*, quia *naturale* est in quod potest natura; sed principia rei non possunt in rei conservationem nec conservationem sui; et ideo invertibilitas non est huiusmodi naturalis. Nec tamen est *contra* naturam, immo est ei consona; quia omnis natura[4] appeit salvari, quamvis ex se non possit, et maxime illa creatura, quae appetit beatificare, et haec est illa quae ad Dei imaginem facta est. Et quia desiderium naturae non est frustra,[5] ubi deficit natura, supplet Dei gratuita influentia. Et sic patet, quod vertibilitas inest per naturam, sed invertibilitas per gratiam.

both from nothing and is from its principles: according to this something is said in a twofold manner to be natural to a creature itself, because it is in it out of that, which is *out of nothing*, and/or because it is in it out of that which is out of *its own principles*. And because *nothing* is the efficient cause of no thing [nullius], but (rather) the deficient (cause of it), for that reason the properties, which are in a creature by the reckoning of that, which is out of nothing, are not positions, but (rather) defects, nor are they by virtue, but by a defect of virtue, nor have they an efficient cause, but (rather) a deficient one: and such are *vanity*, *instability*, *vertibility*. If therefore it be asked, from what is the creature vertible,[2] I say, that (it is) not by something effecting, but through a defect in its very self. Moreover according to which the *natural* is said (to be) what is in[3] a thing through (its) proper and intrinsic principles, thus not privations and/or defects, but abilities [habilitates], are said to be naturally in (a thing): and for this reason when accepting in this manner the *natural*, no creature is *vertible* into ‘non being’; nor, however, is it said (to be) *naturally invertible*, because the *natural* is in what nature can (do); but the principles of a thing cannot (be) the conservation in a thing nor the conservation of itself; and for that reason invertibility does not belong to this kind of natural. Nor however is it *contrary* to nature, nay rather it is consonant with it; because every nature[4] seeks to be saved [appetit salvari], although it cannot out of itself (do this), and most of all [maxime] that creature, which seeks to be beatified, and this is that which has been made to the image of God. And because the desire of nature is not by a trick [frustra],[5] where nature is deficient, the gratuitous influence of God supplies. And thus it is clear, that vertibility is in (a creature) through nature, but invertibility through grace.

9. Ad illud quod obiicitur de comparatione gratiae ad naturam, intelligendum est, quod gratia dicitur adiutorium, veniens a superiori, respectu eius quod est supra posse naturae. Hoc autem adiutorium est duplex: aut respectu *esse simpliciter*, aut

9. To that which is objected concerning the comparison of grace to nature, it must be understood, that grace is said to be a help [adiutorium], coming from the Superior, in respect of that which is above the ability of nature [posse naturae]. Moreover this help

respectu *esse perfecti*.

is twofold: either in respect of ‘*being’ simply*, or in respect of the ‘*being’ of the perfect*.

Si respectu *esse simpliciter*, ut puta conservationis esse, quia nulla principia, cum sint vana,[6] de se possunt se ipsa conservare, sic non est mediante aliquo habitu infuso vel dato. Quia respicit esse, et quia[7] esse est commune omnibus, ideo haec gratia est omnibus communis. Unde haec est gratia habens modum naturae, et haec est gratia, qua dicuntur cetera invertibilia.[8]

If in respect of ‘*being’ simply*, as one supposes belongs to conservation, because no principles, since they are vain,[6] from themselves can conserve their very selves, thus it is not by means of any infused and/or given habit. Because it respects the "to be", and because[7] "to be" is common to all (things), for that reason this grace is common to all (things). Whence this is a grace having the manner of nature, and this is the grace, by which all the others are called invertibles.[8]

Alio modo dicitur gratia adiutorium respectu *perfecti esse*, et quia *perfectio esse* est in his quae ad beatitudinem ordinantur, respicit *bene esse* et[9] quod non est omnium. Ideo haec est habitus speicialis aliquorum, non omnium, et haec est gratia per modum gratiae. Ex his patet quod obiicit[10] de gratia: obiicit enim secundum quod gratia est specialis habitus divisus contra naturam, quia sic dicit aliquid de novo creatum; sed gratia praedicto modo non.

In another manner grace is said to be a help in respect of the ‘*being’ of the perfect*, and because *the perfection of ‘being’* [perfectio esse] is in those which are ordered toward beatitude, it respects ‘*well being’* [bene esse] and[9] what does not belong to all. For that reason this is a special habit of some, not all, and this is a grace through a manner of grace. From these it is clear that it objects[10] of grace: for it objects according to which grace is a special habit divided against nature, because in this manner it means something created from (something) new; but grace in the aforesaid manner (does) not.

10. Et ex hoc patet ultimo obiectum: quia gratia dicitur adiutorium respectu eius quod est supra posse naturae; et quia conservatio principiorum est supra possse naturae, non autem egressus actionum, immo infra, ideo patet etc.

10. And from this is clear the last objection: because grace is called a help in respect of that which is above the ability of nature; and because the conservation of principles is above the ability of nature, but the egress of actions (is) not, nay rather (it is) below (it), for that reason it is clear etc..

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[1] Libr. de Fide Trin. c. 3: Quoniam omne compositum necesse est aut actu aut intellectu posse disiungi. — Mox plerique codd. ut A G H S T X cum ed. 1 *adductae* loco *inductae*.
[2] Codd. P Q bene *vertibilitas creaturae*.
[3] Vat. minus distincte ac contra mss. et ed. 1 *inesse* loco *quod inest*.
[4] Cod. Z cum ed. 1 *creatura*. — Vide Boeth., III. de Consol. Prosa 11, ubi haec propositio probatur.
[5] Vide Aristot., I. de Caelo. text. 32. (c. 4. in fine) et III. de Anima, text. 45. (c. 9.). — Codd. V X *in vanum* loco *frustra*.
[6] Plerique codd. ut F G H I K P Q S T etc. minus bene *varia*; cod. X *variabilia*. — Paulo infra post *sic non est*

[1] On the Faith of the Trinity, ch. 3: Since it is necessary that every composite be able either in act or in understanding to be disjoined. — Then the greater part of the codices as A G H S T X together with edition 1 have *adduced* [adductae] in place of *induced* [inductae].
[2] Codices P and Q do well to have *the vertibility of a creature*.
[3] The Vatican text less distinctly and contrary to the manuscripts and edition 1 has *to be in* [inesse] in place of *(to be) what is in* [quod inest].
[4] Codex Z together with edition 1 reads *creature* [creatura].
[5] See Aristotle, On Heaven, Bk. I, text 32 (ch. 4 at the

subaudi: adiutorium vel gratia.

[7] Vat. prater fidem mss. et ed. 1. in principio huius propositionis ponit *Et*, deinde hic pro *et qua* habet *quod*, quo vis rationis debilitatur.

[8] Vat. incongrue *dantur cetera vertibilia*; omnes codd. cum ed. 1 *invertibilia*; cod. cc *dantur*, antiquiores autem codd. *dicuntur*, licit aliqui propter abbreviationem dubiae sint lectionis.

[9] Vat. *vel esse* loco *et*, quod maior pars codd. habet; aliqui codd. ut O T cum ed. 1 omittunt insuper particulam *et*, pro qua cod. cc habet *vel*. Paulo post aliqui codd. ut A M T aa cum ed. 1 bis *hic* loco *haec*.

[10] Vat. contra antiquiores codd. et ed. 1 *obiicitur*, sed propter subnexa minus bene. Mox Vat. cum cod. cc *et* loco *quia*, at minus distincte et praeter fidem ceterorum mss. et ed. 1.

end), and On the Soul, Bk. III, text 45 (ch. 9). — Codices V and X have *in vain* [in vanum] in place of *by a trick* [frustra].

[6] A greater part of the codices as F G H I K P Q S T etc. have less well *various* [varia]; codex X has *variables* [variabilia]. — A little below this at *thus it is not*, understand *help and/or grace*.

[7] The Vatican text not trusting in the manuscript and edition 1 puts at the beginning of this proposition *And* [Et], then here in place of *and because* [et quia] it has *which* [quod], which reading weakens the force of the reasoning.

[8] The Vatican text incongruously has *there are given all other vertibles* [dantur cetera vertibilia]; all the codices together with edition 1 have *invertibles* [invertibilia]; codex cc has *there are given* [dantur], but the more ancient codices have *are called* [dicuntur], though some on account of abbreviation are of a doubtful reading.

[9] The Vatican text has *and/or the being* [vel esse] in place of *and* [et], which a greater part of the codices have; other codices as O and T together with edition 1 omit moreover the particle *and* [et], in place of which codex cc has *and/or* [vel]. A little after this some codices as A M T and aa together with edition 1 twice has *here* [hic] in place of *this* [haec].

[10] The Vatican text contrary to the more ancient codices and edition 1 has *it is objected* [obiicitur], but less well on account of what is subjoined. Then the Vatican text together with codex cc has *and* [et] in place of *because* [quia], but less distinctly and contrary to the testimony of all the other manuscripts and edition 1.

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SCHOLION.

I. *Triplex illa distinctio mutationis*, cui correspondet triplex immutabilitas, sumta est ex Damasceno (de Fide orthod. I. c. 3.). Prima mutatio, quae a S. Doctor vocatur *variatio*, tunc fit, quando subiectum de aliquo accidente mutatur in aliud accidens; haec nunc communiter vocatur motus sive mutatio *accidentalis*. Secunda est *corruptio* sive mutatio ab esse substantiali formae in materia ad non esse eiusdem, manet tamen materia in potentia ad actum. Tertia est *annihilatio*, a S. Bonav. vocato *versio*, qua fit de ente simpliciter non ens; cfr. II. Sent. d. 1. p. I. a. 3. q. 2. in corp. Aristoteles (V. Phys. c. 1.), omittendo hoc ultimum membrum, mutationes sic distinguit: ex subiecto in subiectum (alteratio, augmentatio), ex subiecto in non-subiectum (corruptio), ex non-subiecto in subiectum

SCHOLIUM

I. *That threefold distinction of mutation*, to which corresponds a threefold immutability, has been taken from (St. John) Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. I, ch. 3. The first mutation, which is called *variation* by the Seraphic Doctor, comes to be, when a subject is changed [mutatur] from some accident into another accident; this now is commonly called a movement or *accidental mutation*. The second is a *corruption* or a mutation from the substantial 'being' of a form in matter towards the 'non being' of the same, the matter, however, remains in potency to act. The third is *annihilation*, called *version* by the Seraphic Doctor, by which there simply comes to be from a being a non-being; cf. Sent., Bk. II, d. 1, p. I, a. 3, q. 2, in the body. Aristotle, Physics, Bk. V., ch. 1, by omitting this last member,

(generatio).

distinguishes the mutations in this manner: out of a subject into a subject {alteration, augmentation}, out of a subject into a non-subject {corruption}, out of a non-subject into a subject {generation}.

II. S. Doctor non sibi contradicit hic asserendo, quibusdam creaturis, ut Angelis, inesse incorruptibilitatem per naturam, et alibi dicendo, solius Dei esse incorruptibilitatem. Nam in primo loco sermo est de incorruptione respectu suae particularis naturae, non respectu dependentiae a causa prima; in secundo loco loquitur de illa proprietate, quae soli primae causae competit, quae potest creare et annihilare. Cfr. St. Thom., S. I. q. 9. a. 2. in corp. — Notanda est egregria doctrina in solut. ad 6. 7. 8. exposita. Circa causam effecientem et deficientem, cfr. II. Sent. d. 34. a. 1. q. 2.

II. The Seraphic Doctor does not contradict himself by asserting here, that in certain creatures, as Angels, incorruptibility is through their nature, and elsewhere by saying, that incorruptibility belongs to God alone. For in the first place the discourse concerns incorruption in respect of their own particular nature, not in respect of dependence from a first cause; in the second place he speaks of that property, which befits [competit] the First Cause alone, which can create and annihilate. Cf. St. Thomas, Summa., I, q. 9, a. 2 in the body. — To be noted is the egregious doctrine (of the Seraphic Doctor) expounded in the solution to n. 6, 7, and 8. About the efficient and deficient cause, cf. Sent., Bk. II, d. 34, a. 1, q. 2.

III. Quoad conclusionem: Alex. Hal., S. p. I. a. 4. m. 3. et p. II. q. 13. m. 2. 3. 4. — Scot., hic q. 5; et Report. hic q. 3. — S. Thom., q. 3. a. 1. et 2; S. loc. cit. — B. Albert., hic a. 16 et seqq.; S. p. I. tr. 4. q. 21. m. 3. — Petr. a. Tar., hic q. 4. a. 2. — Richard. a Med., hic a. 2. q. 2. — Aegid. R., hic 3. princ. q. 2.

III. In regard to the conclusion: Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, a. 4, m. 3, and p. II, q. 13, m. 2, 3, 4. —(Bl. John Duns) Scotus, here in q. 5; and Reportatio., here in q. 3. — St. Thomas, q. 3, aa. 1 and 2; Summa., loc. cit.. Bl. (now St.) Albert (the Great), here in a. 16 ff.; Summa., p. I, tr. 4, q. 21, m. 3. — (Bl.) Peter of Tarentaise, here in q. 4, a. 2. — Richard of Middletown, here in a. 2, q. 2. — Giles the Roman, here in 3. princ., q. 2.

S. Bonaventurae Bagnoregis
S. R. E. Episc. Card. Albae
atque Doctor Ecclesiae Universalis

St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio
Cardinal Bishop of Alba
& Doctor of the Church

Commentaria in

Commentaries on

Quatuor Libros Sententiarum

Magistri Petri Lombardi, Episc. Parisiensis

PRIMI LIBRI

COMMENTARIUS IN DISTINCTIONEM VIII.

PARS I.
DUBIA CIRCA LITTERAM MAGISTRI.

Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol 1, pp. 162-164.
Cum Notitiis Originalibus

the Four Books of Sentences

of Master Peter Lombard, Archbishop of Paris

BOOK ONE

COMMENTARY ON DISTINCTION VIII

PART I
DOUBTS ON THE TEXT OF MASTER PETER

Latin text taken from **Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae**,
Ad Claras Aquas, 1882, Vol. 1, pp. 162-164.
Notes by the Quaracchi Editors.

DUB. I.

In parte ista sunt dubitationes circa litteram, et primo contingit dubitari de hoc quod dicit Magister: *Nunc de veritate sive proprietate divinae essentiae* etc. Videtur enim male dicere, quia omne, quod habet proprium, distinguitur: sed divina essentia non est distinguibilis: ergo non habet proprium.

DOUBT I

In the first part of his (text) there are doubts concerning the text, and first there happens to be a doubt concerning this which Master (Peter) says: *Now one must deal with the truth or property of the Divine Essence* etc.. For it seems that he speaks badly, because, everything, which has (what is) proper, is distinguished: but the Divine Essence is not distinguishable: therefore it does not have (what is) proper.

RRESPONDEO:[1] Dicendum, quod divina essentia eo modo est distinguibilis, quo modo habet proprietates, et e converso; quia quamvis in se non sit distinguibilis per plurificationem sui nec a persona per diversitatem, est tamen distinguibilis respectu essentiae creatae, respectu cuius habet has proprietates.

I RESPOND:[1] It must be said, that the Divine Essence is distinguishable in that manner, in which it has properties, and conversely; because although in itself it be not distinguishable through plurification of itself nor from [a] a Person through diversity, it is however distinguishable in respect of a created essence, in respect of which it has properties.

DUB. II.

Item quaeritur de illis tribus proprietatibus, quas ponit, scilicet de *veritate*, *immutabilitate*, *simplicitate*, cum multae aliae conditiones sint divinae essentiae,

DOUBT II

Likewise is asked concerning those three properties, which he posits, that is concerning *truth*, *immutability*, *simplicity*, since there are many other conditions of the

quare solum de his tribus agit?

Divine Essence, why does he deal solely with these three?

R**ESPONDEO**: Dicendum, quod per has tres proprietates sufficienter distinguitur *esse increatum* a *creato*. Nam *creatum*,[2] eo ipso quod creatum, habet esse post non esse, et ita esse vanum et possibile: ideo habet esse permixtum cum possibilitate, et propter hoc deficit a veritate, a stabilitate et simplicitate. *Increatum* vero *esse* habet contrarias proprietates, et in his sufficienter distinguitur. Nam veritas respicit *quod est*, immutabilitas *quo est*,[3] simplicitas *utrumque*. Ideo patet sufficientia et ordo.

I **RESPOND**: It must be said, that through these three properties there is sufficiently distinguished *uncreated "being"* from *created* ("being"). For the *created*,[2] for the reason that it (is) created, has "being" after being not, and thus (its) "being" (is) vain and possible: for that reason it has a "being" thoroughly mixed [permixtum] with possibility, and on this account it is lacking [deficit] in truth, stability and simplicity. The *uncreated "being"*, however, has contrary properties, and in these it is sufficiently distinguished. For truth respects *what is*, immutability *how it is*,[3] simplicity *both* (of these). For that reason the sufficiency and order (of the argument) is clear.

DUB. III.

DOUBT III

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *a sapere dicitur sapientia*, quia non videtur dicere verum. Sicut enim albedo se habet ad album, ita sapientia ad sapere; sed albedo non dicitur ab albo, immo magis e contra:[4] ergo etc.

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says, that *wisdom* [sapientia] *is said from "knowing"* [sapere], because it does not seem that he speaks truth [verum]. For just as "brightness" regards the "bright" while [albedo se habet ad album], so wisdom regards "knowing"; but brightness is not said from bright white, nay rather on the contrary:[4] ergo etc..

R**ESPONDEO**: Dicendum, quod secundum intellectum *componentem* sapere dicitur a sapientia, quia intellectus componens procedit ab abstracto ad concretum; secundum vero intellectum *resolventem* est e converso; et quantum ad hunc loquitur Augustinus. — Vel posset dici, quod loquitur secundum considerationem grammatici, non logici.[5]

I **RESPOND**: It must be said, that according to a *composing* intellect "knowing" is said from wisdom, because a composing intellect proceeds from the abstract to the concrete; however according to a *resolving* intellect it is conversely; and as much as regards this (understanding St.) Augustine speaks. — And/or it could be said, that he speaks according to the consideration of a grammarian, not of a logician.[5]

DUB. IV.

DOUBT IV

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Quis magis est quam ille, qui dixit famulo*. Videtur enim male dicere, quia *esse* non recipit magis et minus, et maxime in Deo.

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says: *And who is more than that One, who . . . said to his household-servant*. For he seems to speak badly, because "being" does not receive more and less, most of all even in God.

RESPONDEO: Dicendum, quod magis et minus dupliciter possunt considerari, scilicet in comparatione *ad idem*; et sic[6] dicunt intensionem et remissionem;

I RESPOND: It must be said, that more and less can be considered in a twofold manner, that is in comparison *to the same* (thing); and thus they[6] mean intension and remission;

[1] Vat. cum cod. cc, ceteris tamen codd. cum ed. 1 refragantibus, addit *Ad quod*. Mox plerique codd. ut A F G K S V W X non bene *uno* pro *eo*, alii vero ut H T aa bb *illo*.
[2] Aliqui codd. ut F T dd repetunt hic *esse*. Mox ed. 1 post *creatum* addit *est*.
[3] Plurimi codd. omittunt *est*.
[4] Plures mss. cum ed. 1 *e converso*.
[5] De intellectu resolvente sive analytico, et componente sive synthetico vide infra d. 28. dub. 1, et IV. Sent. d. 50. p. II. a. 1. q. 1 ad 4. — Secunda solutio inde sumitur, quod grammatici formam verborum abstractam derivant a forma concreta, logici autem sive philosophi (Aristot., de Praedicam. c. 1.) e contrario. Cfr. infra d. 33. q. 3.
[6] Vat. praeter fidem omnium mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 addit *non*, sed falso, quia iuxta omnes Scholasticos intensio et remissio est motus *eiusdem* v. g. caloris a statu imperfectiore ad perfectiorem et vicevera. Vide St. Thomam, qui hic circa litteram idem dubium solvit consimili distinctione, scilicet: Magis et minus potest dici aliquid vel quantum ad ipsam naturam participatam, quae secundum se intenditur et remittitur secundum accessum ad terminum vel recessum; et hoc non est nisi in accidentibus; vel quantum ad modum participandi; et sic etiam in essentialibus dicitur magis et minus secundum diversum modum participandi, sicut Angelus dicutr magis intellectualis quam homo.

[1] The Vatican text together with codex cc, disagreeing however with all the other codices together with edition 1, adds *To which* [Ad quod]. Next more of the codices as A F G K S V W X have not well *one* in place of *that* [eo], but others as H T aa and bb have *that* [illo].
[2] Some codices as F T and dd here repeat *"being"* [esse].
[3] Very many codices omit *it is* [est].
[4] Very many manuscripts together with edition 1 have *conversely* [e converso].
[5] Concerning a resolving or analytic intellect, and a composing or synthetic one see below in d. 28, dub. 1, and Sent., Bk. IV, d. 50, p. II, a. 1, q. 1 at n. 4. — Thence the second solution is taken, because the grammarians deriver the abstract form of words from the concrete one, but the logicians or philosophers (Aristotle, On the Predicaments, ch. 1) in a contrary manner. Cf. below d. 33, q. 3.
[6] The Vatican text, not trusting in nearly all the manuscripts and editions 1, 2 and 3, adds *do not* [non], but falsely, because according to all the Scholastics, intension and remission are movements *of the same thing*, v. g. of heat from an more imperfect state toward a more perfect one and vice versa. See St. Thomas, who on the same text solves a doubt with the exactly same distinction, that is: Something can be said (to be) more or less as much as regards the participated nature itself, which is intended according to itself and is remitted according to access to and/or recess from a terminus; and this is not but in accidents; and/or as much as regards a manner of participating; and thus there is also said in essentials a more or less according to a diverse manner of participating, just as an Angel is said (to be) more intellectual than a man.

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vel in comparatione ad *diversas substantias* et naturas; et sic dicunt gradum et excessum, et sic est bene[1] ponere magis et minus in ente respectu Creatoris et creaturae, et respectu creaturarum ad invicem. Sed in comparatione Creatoris ad creaturam est excessus improportionabilis et infinitus; respectu creaturarum ad invicem est proportionalibilis.

and/or in comparison to *diverse substances* and natures; and thus they mean a step and excess, and thus it is well[1] to posit a more and a less in a being in respect of the Creator and of the creature, and in respect of creatures in regard to one another. But in a comparison of Creator to creature there is an improportionable and infinite excess; in respect of creatures in regard to one another it is proportionable.

Dub. V.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Cuius essentia non novit praeteritum vel futurum*. Videtur enim esse ista proprietas et Angelorum, quia Augustinus de Civitate Dei[2] dicit, quod « immortalitas Angelorum non est praeterita, quasi non sit, nec futura, quasi nondum sit », sed semper est praesens: ergo non est proprium solius Dei.

Respondeo: *Quidam* dicunt, quod duratio aevi est simplex et tota simul, non habens praeteritum et futurum; nihilominus ipsum aeviturnum[3] habet praeteritum et futurum quantum ad affectiones; et ita[4] proprium est solius Dei.

Alii dicunt, quod in omni duratione creata, quoniam differt a durante et[5] habet esse possibile, est prius et posterius; sed distinguunt in priori et posterior. Quoddam enim est quod dicit *durationis successionem*, quoddam *successionis durationem* cum variatione et innovatione. Primum est in aevo, secundum in tempore; et hoc vult Anselmus[6] expresse, et hoc credo probabilius. Et patet responsio ad verbum Augustini; ipse enim loquitur de priori et posteriori, quod quidem dicit innovationem et variationem et corruptionem.[7]

Doubt V

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says: *Whose essence knows not past nor future*. For that property of His seems also to belong to the Angels, because (St.) Augustine in On the City of God[2] says, that « the immortality of the Angels is not past, as if it is not, nor future, as if it is not yet », but is always present: therefore it is not proper to God alone.

I respond: *Certain ones* say, that the duration of the aevum is simple and wholly simultaneous [tota simul], not having past and future; nevertheless an aeviturnal (being)[3] does itself have a past and future as much as regards (its) affections; and thus (the lack of these)[4] is proper to God alone.

Others say, that in every created duration, since it differs from (the thing) enduring and[5] has a possible "being", there is a prior and a posterior; but they distinguish among the prior and the posterior. For one of which is what one calls the *succession of duration*, one of which the *duration of the succession* with variation and innovation. The first is in the aevum, the second in time; and this (St.) Anselm[6] wants to express, and this I believe (is) more probable. And the response to the word of (St.) Augustine is clear; for he himself speaks of the prior and the posterior, which he does indeed call innovation and variation and corruption.[7]

Dub. VI.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit, quod *divinae essentiae comparatum nostrum esse non est*. Videtur enim falsum, quia quod inest alicui substantialiter non adimitur comparatione aliqua; sed esse est substantiale rei cuilibet: ergo etc. *Item* ex comparatione ad Deum creatura melioratur, ut dicit Augustinus,[8] ergo magis est, quam si non comparetur: ergo etc.

Respondeo: Dupliciter est accipere talem comparationem. *Uno* modo secundum rationem influentiae et receptionis; et sic creatura ad Deum comparata est magis,

Doubt VI

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says, that *to the Divine Essence our "being" is not compared*. For it seems false, because what is in anything substantially is not taken away by any comparison; but "being" is substantial to any thing: ergo etc.. *Likewise* from a comparison to God the creature is made better [melioratur], as (St.) Augustine says,[8] therefore it is more, than if it were not compared: ergo etc..

I respond: To accept such a comparison is in a twofold manner. In *one* manner according to the reckoning of influence and reception; and thus a creature compared to

quam si non comparetur. *Alio* modo comparatur secundum habitudinem aequiparantiae et proprortionis; et hoc modo verum est, quod nulla[9] est proportionabilis secundum conditionem veritatis nobilitatis esse divini; et ideo quasi nihil est, non omnino in se, sed nihil ad proportionem, quia non potest inveniri aliqua proportio quantitativa.

God is more, than if it were not compared. In *another* manner it is compared according to a habitude of equivalence [aequiparantiae] and proportion; and in this manner it is true, because no (creature)[9] is proportionable according to the condition of truth and nobility of Divine "Being" [esse divini]; and for that reason it is as if nothing, not entirely in itself, but nothing as regards proportion, because there cannot be found any quantitative proportion (between them).

Dub. VII.

Doubt VII

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit: *Dicatur ergo quod semper fuit, est et erit*. Videntur enim haec verba non dici[10] de Deo, quia dicunt diversa tempora; sed in Deo non cadit diversitas temporum.

Likewise is asked concerning this which he says: *Therefore let it be said, that He always was, is and shall be*. For these words seem not to be spoken[10] of God, because they mean diverse times; but in God there does not fall a diversity of times.

Respondeo: *Quidam* voluerunt dicere, quod actus isti non praedicant de Deo diversa tempora secundum essentiam, sed secundum concomitantiam; quia divinum esse omnino invariatum omne tempus concomitatur. Sed haec positio non solvit plene. Dicitur enim vere, quod Deus fuit ante omne tempus; tunc[11] ergo concomitantiam non potest dicere. Ideo dicunt *alii*, quod tempus consignificatum non est dispositio rei acceptae sive intellectae, quando dicitur de Deo, sed solum modi intelligendi; quando vero de re mobili, utroque modo. Exemplum patet de masculinitate[12] in lapide et in viro: quoniam in viro est ut dispositio rei acceptae, in lapide ut modus intelligendi solum. Sed haec positio non videtur sufficiens, quia intellectus non ponit praeteritum circa suum intelligere, quando intelligit Deum fuisse: ergo oportet, quod ponat circa rem.

I respond: *Certain ones* wanted to say, that those acts (of God) do not predicate of God diverse times according to essence, but according to concomitance; because the Divine "To Be" [divinum esse], entirely invaried, is concomitant to every time. But this position does not solve it fully. For it is truly said, that God was before every time; therefore then[11] it cannot said (to be) concomitance. For that reason *others* say, that the time consignified is not a disposition of a thing accepted or understood, when it is said of God, but only a manner of understanding; but when (it is said) of a mobile thing, (it is said) in each manner. An example is clear from the masculinity[12] in (the word) "stone" [lapide] and in "man" [viro]: since in "man" it is as a disposition of the thing accepted (under the figure of the word), in "stone" only as a manner of understanding. But this position does not seem sufficient, because the intellect does not posit a past about its own understanding, when it understands that God was: therefore it is proper, that it posit (such) about the thing (understood).

Propter hoc notandum, quod verba diversorum temporum aliter dicuntur de aeterno, aliter de aeviturno, aliter de

On account of this it must be noted, that words of diverse times are said in one manner of the eternal, in another manner of

temporali. Nam respectu temporalis important mutabilitatem et succesionem et durationem. Secundum vero quod de aeviternis dicuntur, duo tantum important, successionem et durationem, sicut vult Hieronymus,[13] Augustinus et Anselmus. Secundum vero quod dicuntur de Deo, important solum durationem. Unde dicitur: *Deus fuit*, quia eius dur- / -ratio non coepit;

the aeviturnal, in another manner of the temporal. For in respect of the temporal they convey [important] mutability and succession and duration. But according to which they are said of aeviternals, they only convey two, succession and duration, just as (Sts.) Jerome,[13] Augustine and Anselm want. But according to which they are said of God they convey only duration. Whence there is said: *God was*, because His du- / -ration did not begin.

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[1] Cod. T *verum*, cod. W *ibi* pro *bene*.
[2] Libr. XII. c. 15. n. 2.
[3] Hoc est res aeviterna sive subiectum aevi v. g. Angelus. — Vat. absque auctoritate mss. et ed. 1 non bene addit *seu aeternum*, quia non est idem cum aeviterno.
[4] Supple: non noscere sive non habere praeteritum vel futurum.
[5] Vat. praeter fidem mss. et ed. 1 *etiam*, et paulo post *cum priori et posteriori* (nonnulli codd. habent quidem *cum* loco *est*, sed solus cod. cc *cum priori et posteriori*). Pro nostra lectione militant etiam ea quae S. Doctor II. Sent. d. 2. p. I. a. 1. q. 3. in corp. habet, ubi fusius hanc questionem pertractans, ex creaturae possibilitate sive ex eo, quod *nulla creatura omnino est actus*, deducit durationem successionis sive prius et posterius in aevo. — Mox Vat., omnibus mss. et sex primis edd. obnitentibus, *de* loco *in*. Paulo infra post *successionem* cod. I satis bene addit *sine variatione et innovatione*.
[6] Vide Monolog. c. 28. et Prosolog. c. 20. et 22.
[7] De hoc dubio cfr. Alex. Hal., S. p. I. q. 12. m. 9. a. 3. — S. Thom., S. I. q. 10. a. 5.
[8] Libr. I. de Genes. ad lit. c. 4. 5. n. 9. 10. et libr. contra Epist. Manichaei, c. 40. n. 46.
[9] Subaudi: creatura. — Vat. autem cum cod. cc, aliis tamen codd. cum ed. 1 refragantibus, addit *ratio* et paulo infra loco *ad proportionem* habet *a proportione*.
[10] Plurimis codd. obnitentibus, Vat. praemittit *debere*.
[11] Ex mss. et edd. 1, 2, 3 supplevimus *tunc*.
[12] Substituimus fide antiquorum mss. et ed. 1 *masculinitate* pro *masculino genere*.
[13] De Hieronymo vide notam hic in lit. Magistri c. 1. — Augustini et Anselmi textus accipe ex dub. 5. — Cfr. Scot., I. Sent. d. 9. q. unica in fine. — Paulo ante post *important* aliqui codd. ut F aa bb cum ed. 1 addunt *scilicet*, aliqui ut G I ff *et*.

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[1] Codex T reads *true* [verum], codex W reads *there* [ibi] in place of *well* [bene].
[2] Book XII, ch. 15, n. 2.
[3] This is an aeviturnal thing or a subject of the aevum, e.g. an Angel. — The Vatican text without the authority of any manuscript and edition 1 does not well add *or eternal*, because it is not the same as aeviturnal.
[4] Supply: not knowing or not having a past and/or future.
[5] The Vatican, not trusting in the manuscripts and edition 1, reads *also* [etiam], and a little after this *with the prior and the posterior* {not a few codices have indeed *with* [sum] in place of *is* [est], but only codex cc reads *with the prior and the posterior*). On behalf of our reading there also militates those things which the Seraphic Doctor says in Sent., Bk. II, d. 2, p. I, a. 1, q. 3 in the body, where thoroughly treating this question more fully, deduces from the possibility of a creature or from this, that *no creature is entirely an act*, that the duration of succession or a prior and a posterior is in the aevum. — Next the Vatican text, disagreeing with all the manuscripts and the six first editions, has *concerning* [de] in place of *among* [in]. A little below this after *the succession of duration* codex I adds sufficiently well *without variation and innovation* [sine variatione et innovatione].
[6] See The Monologium, ch. 28, and The Prosologium, chs. 20 and 22.
[7] Concerning this doubt, cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa., p. I, q. 12, m. 9, a. 3. — St. Thomas, Summa., I. q. 10, a. 5.
[8] On a Litteral Exposition of Genesis, Book I, chs. 4-5, nn. 9-10 and his book Against the Letter of Manichaeus, ch. 40, n. 46.
[9] Understand: creature. — The Vatican text, moreover, together with codex cc, disagreeing with the other codices, however, and with edition 1, adds *reckoning* [ratio] and a little below this in place of *as regards proportion* [ad proportionem] it has *from proportion* [a proportione].
[10] Disagreeing with very many codices, the Vatican text prefaces this with *to ought* [debere].
[11] From the manuscripts and editions 1, 2 and 3, we have supplied *then* [tunc].
[12] We have substituted on the testimony of the ancient manuscripts and edition 1 *masculinity* [masculinitate] in place of *the masculine genus*

[masculino genere].
[13] Concerning (St.) Jerome see the note here in the text of Master (Peter), ch. 1. — The text of (Sts.) Augustine and Anselm is taken from dubium 5. — Cf. (Bl. John Duns) Scotus, Sent., Bk. I, d. 9, q. sole at the end. — A little before this after *they convey* [important] some codices as F aa and bb together with edition 1 add *that is* [scilicet], others as G I and ff *also* [et].

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du- / -ratio non coepit; *est*, quia duratio eius non interrumpitur; *erit*, quia non desinit nec corrumpitur. Proprie ergo loquendo, non dicuntur de Deo, ut dicit Hieronymus; large autem loquendo, dicuntur, ut dicit Magister et Augustinus; et ad hoc vadit opinio Magistri.[1]

du- / -ration did not begin; *is*, because His duration is not interrupted; *shall be*, because He does not stop nor is He corrupted. Therefore properly speaking, they are not said of God, as (St.) Jerome says; however broadly speaking, they are said, as Master (Peter) and (St.) Augustine say; and toward this does the opinion of Master (Peter) go.[1]

Dub. VIII.

Item quaeritur de verbo Hilarii: *Esse non est Deo accidens* etc., quia nec creaturae est accidens — nulli enim omnino rei accidit esse — quomodo ergo per hoc notatur Deus differre a creatura?

Doubt VIII

Likewise is asked concerning the word of (St.) Hilary: *"To be"* [esse] *is not an accident for God* etc., because neither is it an accident for a creature — for to entirely no thing does a "to be" accede — therefore in what manner through this (argument) is God noted to differ from a creature?

Respondeo: Dicendum, quod accidens dicit quid natum in alio *esse*, ab alio *exire*, et ab illo[2] *recedere*. Accidens enim dicitur quod *inest* subiecto et ab illo *trahit ortum*, et propterea potest *adesse* et *abesse*. In his tribus proprietatibus communicat esse creatum, licet non eodem modo omnino. Nam *esse* nostrum pendet ab alio sustinente, oritur ab alio efficiente, creatura etiam nata est suum esse perdere: ideo esse eius est quasi accidens, non tamen vere accidens, quia cum pendeat a Deo, non pendet sicut a subiecto. E contrario est in Deo; et ideo dicit Hilarius, quod esse non est accidens Deo; et hoc propter contrarias proprietates: quia accidens natum est alii *inesse*, propter hoc dicit: *subsistens veritas*; quia natum est ab alio *exire*, contra hoc dicit: *manens causa*; quia natum est etiam ab alio *recedere*, contra hoc dicit: *naturalis*

I respond: It must be said, that an accident means what is bound *to be* in another, *to go forth* form another, and *to recede* from that.[2] For an accident is said (to be) what *is in* a subject and *draws its rise* from it, and on this account it can *be present* and *not be present* [adesse et abesse]. In these three properties the created "to be" communicates, though not in entirely the same manner. For our "to be" is dependent on [pendet ab] one sustaining, rises from another effecting, the creature too is born to loose its own "to be": for that reason its "to be" is a quasi-accident, not however truly an accident, because since it is dependent on God, it is not dependent just as (one is) on a subject. On the contrary it is in God; and for that reason (St.) Hilary says, that "to be" is not an accident for God; and this on account of the contrary properties:

generis proprietas, quae non dimittit esse.[3]

because an accident is bound *to be in* another's [alii inesse], on this account he says: *a subsisting truth*; because it is bound to *go forth* from another, he says against this: *a remaining cause*; because it is bound *to recede* from another, he says against this: *the property of (His) natural genus, which does not dismiss its "to be"*.[3]

Dub. IX.

Item quaeritur, quomodo intelligitur *immortalitas*, cum dicitur: *Solus habet immortalitatem*, et dicit Augustinus,[4] quod accipitur pro incommutabilitate; sed hoc non videtur conveniens. Mors enim non dicit omnem mutabilitatem, sed solum corruptibilitatem[5] viventium: ergo non idem est dicere.

Doubt IX

Likewise is asked, how is *immortality* to be understood, when there is said: *He alone has immortality*, and (St.) Augustine says,[4] that it is accepted on behalf of incommutability; but this does not seem convenient. For death does not mean every mutability, but solely the corruptibility[5] of the living: therefore to say (this) is not the same thing.

R**espondeo**: Sicut vita accipitur *communiter* et *proprie*, ita et mors, ita et immortalitas. *Uno* enim modo dicitur vita actus continuus et internus,[6] qui est a forma spirituali; et sic dicitur proprie, et sic immortalitas dicit vitam talem cum immpossibilitate ad eius privationem. *Alio* modo dicitur vita actus completus potentiae, quae est secundum rei naturam, sicut dicitur aqua viva, quae habet operationem aquae convenientem; et hoc modo importat repugnantium ad corruptionem. Et ideo[7] debet dici secundum hanc vitam *immortale* quod est ita in actu completo, quod nullo modo potest aliquam peiorationem recipere; et sic accipit Apostolus et exponit Augustinus.

I **respond**: Just as life is accepted *commonly* and *properly*, thus also death, thus also immortality. For in *one* manner life is said (to be) a continuous and internal act,[6] which is from [a] the spiritual form; and thus it is said properly, and thus immortality means such a life with an impossibility for its privation. In *another* manner life is said (to be) a complete act of potency, which is according to the nature of a thing, just as water is said (to be) living, which has an operation convenient to water; and in this manner it conveys repugnance to corruption. And for that reason[7] it ought to be said according to this *immortal* life which is such in complete act, that in no manner can it receive any worsening [peiorationem]; and thus does the Apostle accept and (St.) Augustine expound it.

Dub. X.

Item quaeritur de hoc quod dicit beatus Iacobus et est in littera:[8] *Nec vicissitudinis obumbratio*; quae differentia est inter *vicissitudinem* et *obumbrationem*, et quae convenientiae, ratione cuius dicatur *vicissitudo obumbrare*?

Doubt X

Likewise is asked concerning this which blessed Jacob says and is in the text:[8] *nor the overshadowing of vicissitude*; what is the difference between *vicissitude* and *overshadowing*, and what is the convenience, by the reckoning of which there is said that *a vicissitude overshadows*?

Et dicendum, quod *vicissitudo* importat numerum *vicis*, et iste est numerus cum interruptione; sed *obumbratio* dicitur per privationem actus lucis. Quoniam igitur actus formae lux est, privatio eius recte dicitur *obumbratio*; et quia *vicissitudo* ratione numeri dicit interruptionem, et ratione interruptionis dicit privationem, et ratione privationis *obumbrationem*, hinc est, quod recte dicitur *vicissitudinis obumbratio*.

And it must be said, that *vicissitude* conveys the number of a *turn* [vicis], and that is a number with interruption; but *overshadowing* is said through a privation of the act of light. Therefore since light is an act of a form, its privation is rightly said (to be) an *overshadowing*; and because *vicissitude* by the reckoning of a number means an interruption, and by the reckoning of an interruption means privation, and by reckoning of privation (means) *overshadowing*, hence it is, that there is rightly said *overshadowing of vicissitude*.

[1] Vide supra in lit. c. 1, ubi et verba Augustini afferuntur.
[2] Vat. cum cod. cc contra ceteros codd. cum ed. 1 *alio* pro *illo*. — De *accidente* vide Porphyr., de Praedicab.; Aristot., I. Topic. c. 4. et V. Metaph. text. 13. et 35. (IV. d. 7. et 30.).
[3] Plura de hac re vide hic p. II. q. 2. et II. Sent. d. 37. a. 1. q. 2.
[4] Verba Augustini vide supra in lit. Magistri c. 2.
[5] Ed. 1 *corruptionem*.
[6] Bernard., de Gratia et libr. arb. c. 2. ait: Est enim in quolibet corpore vita, internus ac naturalis motus, vigens tantum intrinsecus.
[7] Aliqui codd. ut I Z cc *illud* pro *ideo*; ed. 1 cum uno alterove cod. ut W *illud ideo*.
[8] Cap. 2.

[1] See above in the text, ch. 1, where the words of (St.) Augustine are also brought forward.
[2] The Vatican text together with codex cc, contrary to all the other codices together with edition 1, reads *another* [alio] in place of *that* [illo]. — Concerning *accident* see Porphyry, On Predicables; Aristotle, Topics, Bk. I, ch. 4, and Metaphysics, Bk. V, texts 13 and 45 (Bk. IV, chs. 7 and 30).
[3] For more on this matter see part II, q. 2, and Sent., Bk. II, d. 37, a. 1, q. 2.
[4] See the words of (St.) Augustine above in the text of Master (Peter), ch. 2.
[5] Edition 1 reads *the corruption* [corruptionem].
[6] (St.) Bernard (of Clairvaux), On Grace and Free Will, ch. 2, says: For there is in any body a life, an internal and natural movement, vigorous as much as intrinsic.
[7] Some codices as I Z and cc have *that* [illud] in place of *for that reason* [ideo]; edition 1 together with one or the other codex as W reads *for that reason that* [illud ideo].
[8] Chapter 2.

 The / symbol is used to indicate that the text which follows appears on the subsequent page of the Quaracchi Edition. The translation of the notes in English corresponds to the context of the English text, not that of the Latin text; likewise they are a freer translation than that which is necessitated by the body of the text. Items in square [ ] brackets contain Latin terms corresponding to the previous English word(s), or notes added by the English translator. Items in round ( ) brackets are terms implicit in the Latin syntax or which are required for clarity in English.